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PREFACE 
This case study was performed in the context of a larger research 
project at  IIASA: the Study on Liquefied Energy Gas Terminal Siting ( ~ u n -  
reuther, Linnerooth, e t  al, 1982). A comparison of four concrete decision 
processes in four countries (namely the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), is an intrinsic 
part of this project. All the studies are concerned with siting decisions on 
major energy gas import or export facilities that were made in the last 
decade. The comparative evaluation of these case studies seeks, in par- 
ticular, a greater insight into the way technical studies succeed or fail to 
influence political decisions. 
In the FRG the selected decision concerns the siting of an import ter- 
minal to unload, store, and regasify liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipped in 
special tankers from distant producing countries. This project was con- 
ceived around 1970 by German energy companies. Approximately ten 
years later, in July 1979, the plans for an LNG terminal at  Wilhelmshaven 
had received all the necessary approvals, licenses, and permits for con- 
struction to be started. The description and analysis of the public 
decision-making process leading to this approval is the topic of the study 
presented here. Since the main goal of this research is a deeper under- 
standing of the events leading up to such a decision, it does not matter 
that the project has yet to be realized. 

I t  would have been impossible to carry out this study without the 
obliging support of representatives from most of the institutions involved 
in the decision process under consideration. I wish to express my thanks 
to all these individuals for giving us their time and providing us with 
important material and information on the siting process. 
Furthermore, I am indebted to my colleagues from the Risk Task 
Group a t  IIASA, in particular to Joanne Linnerooth and Howard Kun- 
reuther, who, through numerous discussions, suggestions, and comments 
contributed substantially to this case study. Among the various persons 
reviewing the first draft of this report, Volker Ronge played an outstand- 
ing role by the depth of his theoretical remarks and his familiarity with 
political decision making in the FRG. Moreover, he participated in a cou- 
ple of key meetings with representatives from industry. 
Special thanks also go to Eryl Ley and Derek Delves for smoothing 
my English, and to Noel Blackwell and Rhonda Starnes who patiently 
endured numerous revisions in producing this final manuscript. 
Finally, I wish to  acknowledge the continuous active interest in this 
case study of Werner Salz, of the Bundesministerium fiir Forschung und 
Technologie (Federal Ministry for Research and Technology), who was 
responsible for the entire Liquefied Energy Gas study. It is not necessary 
to mention that this project was made possible only through the 
Ministry's financial support. 
Hermann Atz 
June 1982 
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AT WILHEL?dSHAVEN: A CASE STUDY ON DECISION MAKING 
CONCERNING RISK-PRONE FACILITIES IN THE 
FEDERAL REX'UBLIC OF GERMANY 
Hermann Atz 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Siting decisions on large-scale technical installations have been a source 
of societal conflict for a number of years now. The sensitivity of health 
and safety issues, the possibility of catastrophic accidents, and uncer- 
tainty about the long-term consequences of certain industrial activities 
have resulted in technological risks frequently being at  the center of pub- 
lic debate. 
As a consequence, the development of methods to assess the effects 
of technical installations, in particular those relating to health and safety, 
has become a focus of scientific interest. For more than a decade risk 
assessment and, more generally, risk research has developed as an 
independent field of scientific activity (Conrad 1980, Kunreuther 1982). 
Yet most of this research has been normative in nature. Further 
research has been devoted to psychological aspects of risk perception, 
but the reality of societal decision making with regard to risk-prone 
activities is as yet only poorly understood (Kunreuther and Ley 1982). 
Clearly, this lack of knowledge limits the effectiveness of prescriptive risk 
research. The case study presented here attempts to reduce precisely 
that gap by accounting rather extensively for a concrete decision making 
process in the FRG. 
Having stated the descriptive emphasis of this study, we can explain 
its goals by contrasting the idealized model of decision making that 
underlies prescriptive analysis with societal reality. Normative decision 
theory usually assumes a situation where a single decision maker has to 
make one particular decision on the basis of clear objectives, preferences 
and framing conditions. Actual public decision making involves a variety 
of actors with different interests. It is a sequence of partial decisions in a 
complex institutional setting whose final outcome may be influenced in an 
unpredictable way by external information, unexpected events, or 
changes in the societal environment. The decision problem itself is not 
even well defined but may be changed during the process according to 
particular parties' interests. These and similar factors are likely to influ- 
ence the actual use and impact of technical analysis in ways not con- 
sidered in the idealized normative model of rational decision making. For 
our purposes it is very important to obtain a better understanding of pre- 
cisely those relations in order to contribute to an explanation of why cer- 
tain kinds of technical analysis are preferred to others, or why they do 
not have the effects promised by their promoters. In addition, the study 
should shed some light on the question of what functions technical studies 
and expert opinion really have in the societal process of risk manage- 
ment. 
This case study does not start  from an elaborate theoretical model 
or from fixed hypotheses on public decision making concerning risk to 
the population. Instead it draws a comprehensive and lively picture of 
the decision process under consideration. Such an approach seems to be 
appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, not much research has been done in 
the field, so it is reasonable to collect some empirical evidence before 
formulating theoretical models. Secondly, this case study is supposed to 
serve as a basis for international comparisons. Using a strict framework 
for the description would mean suppressing information that a t  the com- 
parative stage of the project could possibly turn out to be of interest. 
Our description starts with an overview of the main features and ele- 
ments of the LNG terminal siting decision (Chapter 2). After a brief look 
at  some relevant characteristics of the political and administrative sys- 
tem in the Federal Republic of Germany, the most important technical 
details of the project and the site at  Wilhelmshaven are mentioned. A 
description of the nature of the major parties and the roles they played in 
the LNG decision follows. The summary of the main events in the siting 
process that concludes this chapter is supposed to serve as a guide to the 
more detailed discussions in the rest of the report. 
While questions relating to health and safety risks are frequently 
considered in an isolated manner by analysts as well as by actors in the 
political process, we try to put risk into perspective with other important 
aspects of the siting decision. Therefore, Chapter 3 is devoted to  a 
description of the policy context of the LNG terminal decision and the 
type of arguments related to it. For each of the main aspects identified, 
namely energy supply, regional development, health and safety, and 
environmental impact, the regulatory framework is also briefly referred 
to in order to give some background information on the politics of the 
respective field. 
Chapter 4 attempts to  account for the views the main actors in the 
decision held with respect to the LNG project and its different impacts. 
A t  the same time some consideration is also given to the interests each of 
the parties might have had in taking a certain attitude towards the pro- 
ject. This effort seems to be justified by the fact that risk studies are 
usually commissioned by and addressed to only one or a few parties in 
the decision. Against the background of these party interests and per- 
spectives it is much easier to judge the impact technical expertise had on 
the parties' positions. conversely, the commissioning parties views might 
also explain some features of the expert studies used in the decision pro- 
cess. Finally, it seems to be worth investigating the relationship between 
risk concerns and other relevant aspects of the decision on the level of 
the individual parties also. 
The dynamics of the decision process are dealt with in Chapter 5. In 
chronological order we will describe how the decision problem was viewed 
and who participated at  subsequent stages of this process, and which fac- 
tors seemingly determined its outcome. Apart from the concrete policy 
context and the distinct party interests, these events are determined by 
the different framing conditions, such as regulations and legally required 
procedures, and also by unwritten rules of the political culture. 
Illuminating the relationship between the proper decision problem and 
the structural factors will later be of importance for assessing the roles 
played by technical studies and expert views in the decision. On the one 
hand these roles may be regarded as a function of the framing conditions; 
on the other hand some of the actors might have used expertbstudies to 
influence the political and institutional framework. 
Chapter 6 is a reflection on the decision making process as perceived 
by the different interested parties and legal actors. It points out some 
special aspects that would have confused the previous description of the 
decision process. Moreover, the parties' views on the final outcome 
should shed some light on the winners and losers in the siting decision for 
the LNG terminal a t  Wilhelmshaven. 
Chapter 7 summarizes features and events considered by the author 
to be outstanding or noteworthy for various reasons. The interest in a 
particular aspect may be due to its central role in the dynamics of the 
process. It may also result from the observation that this aspect distin- 
guishes the LNG terminal decision from comparable siting processes. By 
no means is i t  suggested that such deviations are related to any legal 
irregularities in the procedures. It seems to be important, though, to 
recognize that each political decision represents a new interpretation of 
established procedures and rules, and thus more or less influences later 
decisions as a precedent. The chapter ends with an independent evalua- 
tion of the decision process with regard to distribution of responsibilities. 
timing, participation, flow of information, and related aspects. 
The last chapter (Chapter 8) exclusively focuses on the risk issue. A 
general review of the importance of risk questions in the LNG terminal 
decision is followed by a fairly extensive description of all expert studies 
dealing with population risk related to the project at Wilhelmshaven and 
their use in the siting process. In addition to stating when and by whom 
the studies were commissioned and introduced in the decision process 
and what explicit purposes they pursued, we also try to point out how the 
contents of these studies were interrelated. Particular attention is paid 
to the final risk assessment procedure which we consider as both crucial 
for the concrete decision and remarkable from a general perspective. 
Further interesting features of the risk evaluation process and a tentative 
analysis of the impact the different expert studies had on the decision 
conclude the report. 
At the end of this introductory chapter I would like to make a few 
comments on sources of information and methods. The information 
underlying this case study stems from several sources, the most impor- 
tant being interviews with representatives of the main actors in the deci- 
sion.* These essentially open interviews were made by several members 
of the IIASA research team, but mainly by the author of this report, 
between May 1980 and April 1981. Original documents, such as official 
reports or approval announcements, minutes of council meetings, public 
relations material, and expert studies were used wherever possible. 
Unfortunately, not many such documents exist, and moreover, not all of 
them were made available to us. In addition some information was drawn 
from articles in the local press, but we did not pursue a systematic media 
analysis. 
Owing to the incompleteness of this information and to the unreliabil- 
ity of ex post fac to  interviews a second step of verification seemed to be 
important. Thus, a first draft of the case study report was sent for com- 
mefits to all parties contacted in the f i s t  round. Although not all parties 
replied, we now feel that the important facts can be considered as reli- 
able. Of course one cannot presume precision in every detail, but we 
have confirmed those aspects that are relevant in the context of this 
study. Because of this intricate data base, we decided not to support all 
factual statements with references, and we have cited the  sources only in 
cases where this helps to clarify the text. 
Obviously the picture of the actual events emerging from this pro- 
cedure cannot be "objective." Instead it is an attempt to  aggregate the 
distinct pieces of information in a logically consistent manner that is as 
unbiased as possible. The result, of course, still reflects the author's per- 
sonal views in more subtle ways. - 
A final remark concerns the notions of public decision making and of 
parties or actors in the decision. The terms decision process, public deci- 
sion making, and political process are used almost synonymously 
throughout this report. This contradicts the common use of the 
corresponding German terms, in which the predicate political is applied 
to legislative bodies, governments, political parties, and interest groups, 
but not the public administration. In the terms we use here we do not 
make this distinction, following a basic assumption of modern political 
science namely that the differences between these two types of public 
institutions are only gradual. 
Parties and actors in the decision are not only considered to have 
interests but also to depend in their positions and actions very much on 
the type of resources available to them: financial resources, information, 
access to decision makers, public influence, etc. Of course their actions 
are also determined by the laws and regulations in force, in particular if 
they have a legal mandate. In general the decision making process is not 
viewed as a single and relatively independent phenomenon but rather as 
the expression of underlying political and socioeconomic structures. 
Nevertheless, each political process conversely shapes this structure. 
The special features and events of such a process, therefore, not only are 
indicators of the status quo, but also contribute to originate societal real- 
ities. 
*See the Appendix for a ljst of orgarlizatiorls interviewed. 
CHAPTER 2 
OVETNIEXi OF THE IJLkIN ELEIJENTS OF THE DECISION 
2.1. NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949 established the FRG as a 
federation of what are currently ten autonomous sta tes ,  called Lander 
(not including Berlin which has a special status). As a rule, the Federal 
Government establishes laws and regulations tha t  are implemented by 
the Lander.* There are a few cases of direct Federal administration, 
including the regulation of the inland waterways, which according to  Ger- 
man public law include coastal waterways. In these cases specific Federal 
authorities operate at  the local and regional (intermediate) level. 
For the major part of the legislation there are five administrative lev- 
els: Federal, s tate (Land), government district, county (Kreis) and muni- 
cipality. At the two lowest levels an elected council appoints the head of 
administration. The latter acts in some matters as an  agent of the Land 
but a t  the same time is also responsible for executing the autonomous 
legislation (Selbstverwaltung) of the local authorities. At the intermedi- 
ate level of the government district no elected body exists. The district 
government (Bezirksregierung), which is responsible for a variety of dif- 
ferent administrative duties, is the principle executive institution within 
the Land, and may act as an  agency of the Land government in rn.atters 
delegated to  it. Some policy areas are not wholly assigned to either the 
Federal or Land governments but are defined as so-called concurrent 
matters. Thls means that,  in principle, the  Lander are responsible for 
legislation; however, the Federal government is able to override their laws 
in all matters that  affect more than a particular region. Energy policies 
*For a more detailed description see Southern (1978). 
are a typical example of this category. Formally most environment legis- 
lation belongs to this category, though, in practice, Federal legislation 
dominates (Steiger and Kimminich 1976). In other areas, such as town 
and country planning a t  various levels or water management, the Federal 
government has only the power to issue framework laws which have to  be 
regarded by the Land or local governments in their appropriate legisla- 
tion. 
Political decision making in the FRG cannot be understood ade- 
quately unless one takes into account the separation of powers between 
the legislature and the executive, as laid down in the constitution. Public 
administration is regarded as  a branch of law rather than a part of what 
in the German tradition is considered to be the proper political system. 
Because administrative bodies are not directly controlled by the elected 
bodies, the administrative law and administrative law courts have a par- 
ticularly important role. Every private individual or institution affected 
by an administrative act  (Verwaltungsakt) may appeal to the courts 
against the  decision. There is a n  intricate system of administrative law 
courts to deal with litigation of this kind. 
Owing to  these characteristics, namely the complicated di-stribution 
of responsibilities, the strict separation of powers, the important role of 
civil servants in policy making together with the relatively weak position 
of political parties, a tendency toward consensus prevails in German poli- 
tics (see Scharpf, e t  al. 1976). I t  includes established interest groups 
which are either integrated through the political parties or co-opted in 
advisory bodies to ministries, parliament, etc. This cooperative climate 
against the background of a complicated but formally well defined and 
separate institutional structure determines also to a large extent the 
relations between public administration and private industry. In spite of 
the usually close contacts between public authorities and companies, a - 
certain profection against corruption is secured by the different adminis- 
trative levels involved in every decision and by judicial control. Direct 
public participation in decision making is severely hampered by this 
structure, however (see Hin.z 1974; KitscheIt 1980). 
Yet over the last years citizen action groups of all kinds have 
changed considerably the political. landscape of the FRG. With regard to 
environmental issues, nuclear power being the outstanding example, a 
growi.ng number of these groups has entered the political arena (Murphy, 
e t  al. 1979, Guggenberger 1980). In many cases siting decisions regarding 
large-scale technical installations were the focus of the protest. However, 
the climate of consensus between political parties and the main interest 
groups has hardly changed, a t  least in those policy areas which have 
attracted a lot of extraparliamentary opposition. 
Therefore, despite the increased formal possibilities of public partici- 
pation, the chances for nonestablished interest groups to influence par- 
ticular decisions through political demands has remained rather small. 
Since litigation has proved to be more effective for stopping, or a t  least 
for delaying, technical projects or even whole technological policies, judi- 
cial expertise has become a major resource in political conflicts of this 
sort.  
2.2. DESCRIPTIOlJ OF  PROJECT AND POLICY CONTEXT 
In September 1977, two German gas companies filed (through a joint 
subsidiary company) applications with the responsible regulatory author- 
ities to construct an  LNG importing terminal a t  Wilhelmshaven. The 
natural gas was to be shipped to Wilhelmshaven from a li uefaction facil- 3 ity in Algeria in special tankers each carrying 125,000m of LNG. Each 
tanker would have five tanks to carry the liquid gas a t  a temperature of 
-160°C and normal pressure. From Wilhelmshaven the gas would be distri- 
buted either by pipeline (after regasification) or by smaller LNG tankers. 
The planned terminal consists of a berth to unload or load two large and 
one smaller LNG tanker a t  the  same time, a closed transfer system to the 
land facilities, storage tanks for (originally four, later six) approximately 
500,000 m3 of LNG, and a system for regasification (see Figure 2.1). 
Depending on the season, seawater or fossil fuels could be used t o  provide 
the necessary heating in this system. The facilities are designed to 
transfer 12 x l0'mS of natural gas (equivalent a t  normal temperature and 
pressure) a year; in a first stage approximately half of this capacity would 
be used (DGWE 1979; WSB 1979).* As this amount of gas corresponds to 
one fifth of the current level of natural gas use in the FRG, two thirds of 
which has to be imported, the project is not negligible with respect to 
national energy supply. 
For several reasons that  will be explained in the following chapters, 
the originally independent LNG terminal project became closely con- 
nected with another large-scale project, namely that  of a petrochemical 
plant planned by Imperical Chemical Industries Ltd. of the UK (ICI). This 
facility, designed to produce chemical half-way products such a s  vinyl- 
chloride and polyvinlychloride, was going to be sited on a plot adjacent to 
the terminal site (see Figure 2.1). The real physical connection was 
effected through the harbor facilities which in their central part ,  the so- 
called transport bridge, should be used jointly by DFTG and ICI. The 
actual jetties for each of the plants branched off separately a t  the end of 
this common transfer system. A t  the ICI jetty various chemical liquids 
used as raw materials were to be handled, the most important among 
them being ethylene, vinylchloride and soda lye. To illustrate an  order of 
magnitude, the  ICI project is roughly twice as large as the planned LNG 
terminal by its scope, investment sum, and the number of jobs created. 
Wilhelmshaven, founded as a Prussian naval harbor in the last cen- 
tury, is a city of about 100,000 inhabitants located on the German North 
Sea coast to the west of Bremen. In spite of its location on Jade Bay, with 
naturally good shipping conditions, Wilhelmshaven's industry has 
remained relatively weak and unimportant. The coastal zone near  the 
city, which is still highly dependent on agriculture and which has a con- 
siderable rate of unemployment, is one of the least developed parts  of 
Lower Saxony. To at tract  industry, the water chan.ne1 was deepened and 
a large area appropriate for industrial installations was reclaimed from 
the sea. Now vessels with up to 250,000 tonn.es of cargo, more than twice 
as much as  in any other German harbor, can enter  the  Jade 
*For the  risks related to  this technology, in particular distant vapor cloud ignition IoUowing a 
major LNG spill, see Mandl and Lathrop (1881). 
Figure 2 . 1 .  The LNG Terminal S i t e .  
(Wilhelmshaven undated). This put Wilhelmshaven in a unique position 
with regard to the siting of the LNG terminal. 
The site eventually selected is situated in the very north of this 
recently created industrial area at  Wilhelmshaven, on the border of the 
adjacent municipality of Wangerland (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2), a land 
community of approximately 10,000 inhabitants. The village Hooksiel 
which belongs to this municipality is 2.6 km away from the nearest point 
of the terminal plot, its recreation area only several hundred meters 
away. This recreation zone, which is also situated on the land that  has 
been reclaimed from the sea for industrial development purposes, was 
intended to be a compensation for Hooksiel's loss of its old harbor and 
the  inconveniences resulting from the vicinity of industry. Nonetheless, 
the location of the LNG terminal became a source of conflict during the 
town and country planning procedures. 
Because of sand banks on the Jade, the planned jetty would have to 
be built a t  a distance of more than 1.5 km from land and connected by a 
transport bridge with the facilities there. The shipping channel passes 
this jetty a t  a distance of about 500 meters. Thus the safety risk debated 
most in the decision process was the possibility of a ship deviating from 
its channeled course and colliding with an LNG tanker. 
The technical features of the LNG project determined which approval 
procedures would be necessary. The most important are the following: 
(1) The land-based facilities would be licensed, as  for other major 
industrial projects, by an agency of the Land administration. 
(2) Since the Jade is a part of the German coast within the  three 
mile zone, it belongs to the inland waterways, which are  under 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Waterways and Shipping Adminis- 
tration. A special licensing proced-ure is necessary for any con- 
struction in a Federal waterway. 
(3) The plans for the land-based facilities can only be licensed if 
they are consistent with town and country planning. The adjust- 
ment of the relevant zoning plans, a responsibility of the auto- 
nomous administration of the municipalities, was therefore a 
precondition for the proposed terminal to be approved. 
2.3. THE MAIN PARTIES TO THE DECISION 
2.3.1. Definition 
The distinction between main interested parties and others is more 
difficult to draw because there is no criterion to make the choice unique. 
However, the following three criteria define the selected set  of actors rea- 
sonably precisely: 
legislative responsibilities 
assessment by participants in the decision process of who the 
main actors were 

author's assessment of who influenced the decision in a sensitive 
way. 
A couple of interested parties could perhaps have been added or omitted, 
but for the rest there is no arbitrariness according to these criteria. 
2.3.2. Gas Companies and DFTG 
The company assigned to plan, construct, and operate the LNG ter- 
minal in Wilhelmshaven, the DFTG (Deutsche Fliissigerdgas Terminal 
Ges.m.b.H/German LNG Terminal Inc. Ltd.) was founded as a subsidiary of 
Gelsenberg AG and Ruhrgas AG. To date it has only a few employees and a 
very small capital stock (0.25 million Deutschmarks/DM) (Brecht, e t  al 
1980). Thus many of the planning and preparation activities remained 
with the management and the technical staff of Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg. 
Until 1978 DFTG was a fifty-fifty subsidiary company of these two com- 
panies. Since January 1, 1979, following an agreement between the share- 
holders of DFTG and Lower Saxony, the company tree of DFTG has been as 
shown in Figure 2.3: 
Ruhrgas, a privately owned joint stock company with a complicated 
shareholding structure,, provides two thirds of all natural gas in the FRG 
(three-quarters of imported gas) and calls itself the biggest gas purchas- 
ing company in Europe (Ruhrgas 1980). With the vastly expanded gas 
market in the FRG, the share of natural gas in primary energy consurnp- 
tion increased from 4% to 16% withn ten years (1969-1979), and Ruhrgas 
experienced a similar growth during that period. Simply because of this 
dominating position, Ruhrgas has to be considered as the driving force for 
the whole LNG project in the FRG. 
Whlst Ruhrgas specializes in the purchase, transportation, and dis- 
tribution of gas, Gelsenberg is a company with a broad set of activities 
mainly in the field of energy production, such as oil and gas prospecting, 
coal mining, electricity production, and coal liquefaction and gasification. 
In 1978 Gelsenberg was taken over by the German BP Company; between 
1974 and 1978 it had a minority state shareholding (Brecht, et al, 1980). 
The Gewerkschaft Brigitta owned by two multinational companies (Esso 
and Shell) has the specific goal of exploring, drilling, and piping natural 
gas, mainly within the FRG, where it accounts for two thirds of domestic 
production. Through BER,** the management branch of the same com- 
pany, it also acts as an important enterprise in the gas market of the 
FRG. Salzgitter Ferngas and EWE,t two essentially state-owned enter- 
prises, have so far only been of regional importance in the gas supplying 
system of the FRG. Ruhrgas and Salzgitter Ferngas, which together with 
the Dutch company Gasunie formed a buyers consortium, were also 
engaged in the negotiations with Algeria for an LNG delivery contract. 
*Ln fact Deutsche BP (directly and through Gelsenberg) and Gewerkschaft Brigjtta each hold 
more than 259. stakes, but a special construction, the so-called Bergemann shareholding pool 
created on the request of the Federal Government, prevents oil and gas interests from tak- 
ing a majority holding in Ruhrgas (Ruhrgas 1980). 
**BEB--Gewerkschaften Brigitta und Elwerath Betriebdiihrungsges.m.b.H. 
tEWE--Energieversorgung Weser-Ems AG 
DFTG 
31% RUHRGAS AG 
31% GELSENBERG AG,  100% DEUTSCHE B P  
1 2 %  GEWERKSCHAFT 50% E S S O  
B R I G I T T A  50% S H E L L  
26% NSG 50% S A L Z G I T T E R F E R N G A S  GmbH 50% EWE 
NSG: Niedersachsen-Gas-Ges.m.b.H. 
EWE: E n e r g i e v e r s o r g u n g  W e s e r - E m s  AG 
Figure 2.3. Company Tree of DFTG. 
2.3.3. The Federal Minister of Transport (F'MT) 
The FMT is the highest authority of the Federal Waterways and Ship- 
ping Administration, responsible for maintaining and developing Federal 
sea and inland waterways and regulating shipping on them. In its capa- 
city of policing shipping, the Administration has to ensure the ease and 
safety of shipping on the waterways. Most of the duties of the Waterways 
and Shipping Administration, such as licensing particular construction 
measures or other proposed activities, are delegated to subordinated 
authorities. The Minister himself is mainly in charge of issuing general 
guidelines and supervising the lower authorities. Individual decisions 
would only be taken by the FMT if considered to be of far-reaching impor- 
tance. 
The FMT was always informed about the main stages of the LNG siting 
decision through regular contacts with the Water and Shipping Board 
(WSB) and meetings with the applicant. The entire licensing of the harbor 
facilities was carried out with the FMT's compliance, but only a t  the last 
stage did the Ninister assume a distinct responsibility within the approval 
process: he was the final decision maker on the acceptability of the public 
safety involved in the transportation of LNG and other hazardous chemi- 
cals on the Jade. 
2.3.4. Water and Shipping Board North-West (RSB) 
The WSB, one of six intermediate authorities of the Federal Water- 
ways and Shipping Administration, has the legal capacity of enacting 
specific duties of this administrative body in the area between the 
Dutch-German border and the mouth of the river Yteser. In particular, it 
is responsible for approving any changes or construction measures in the 
waterways that might affect shipping. When acting as the licensing 
agency for the harbor facilities of the DFTG/lCI project, the Board was 
also the final decision maker in respect of impacts of the proposed pro- 
ject beyond the narrow responsibility of the Waterways and Shipping 
Administration, because the relevant license includes, with some excep- 
tions, all other legally required permits and approvals. 
By its twofold involvement in the LNG terminal siting decision. 
namely as regional shipping regulation authority and as licensing agency 
in respect of one of the main procedures, WSB played a particularly 
important role in the formal approval phase of the decision process. 
Internally these two duties were performed by different though closely 
cooperating departments: nautical and other technical questions were 
primarily dealt with by the shpping traffic department, whereas the judi- 
cial department was handling the licensing procedure. 
2.3.5. The Lower Saxony Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Transport (ME&T) 
The Ministry executes regional development programs for the Land 
government, in particular it grants subsidies and advises companies in 
their siting decisions. One of the departments a t  the MERLT, Industrial 
Settlement Department, was specifically set up to serve as first contact 
for enterprises interested in engaging in industrial activity in Lower Sax- 
ony. On request the department is able to give assistance in site selec- 
tion by use of a computerized data bank, as well as by mediating with 
local authorities. T h s  department, together with two others, namely the 
Energy Department and the Department for Harbor Facilities, negotiated 
with representatives of DFTG, Ruhrgas, and Gelsenberg and with 
Wilhelmshaven about many detailed aspects of the project in the prepara- 
tory phase. As the industrial land reclaimed a t  Wilhelmshaven from the 
sea belongs to Lower Saxony, the ME&T represented the Land also in this 
regard. It is worth noting that although the Ministry has been headed by 
members of all three major political parties over the last ten years, there 
was no change in the policies relevant to the LNG terminal siting decision. 
2.3.6. The District Government Weser-Ems (DGWF.). 
The name "government" should not mislead the reader into forgeting 
that this intermediate authority belonging to the Land administration has 
no legislative power (see Section 2.1). It  performs a variety of adminis- 
trative duties over a region in the North-West of Lower Saxony which 
embraces the Wilhelmshaven area. 
With regard to the LNG terminal decision, the DGWE was involved in 
several functions: being in charge of granting the license according to 
the Federal Immission Control Law, it was a very important actor in the 
approval phase of the siting decision. At the same time the DGWE acted 
as agent of Lower Saxony in planning a part  of the harbor facilities, 
namely the transport bridge assigned to be jointly used by DPTG and ICI 
(Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd of the UK). In this latter capacity 
DGWE also filed application with the \lrater and Shpping Board North-\Yest 
(WSB) for .a plan determination approval. The economic department of 
the agency, finally, collaborated with the  ME&T in implementing the  
regional development program regarding the M'ilhelmshaven area. In this 
respect i t  can  be considered as the "extended arm" of the Land govern- 
ment. 
2.3.7. The County of Friesland 
The County of Friesland. encompasses eight municipalities around 
Wilhelmshaven, exclusive of the city itself; that  is, an  area with nearly one 
hundred thousand inhabitants,* Friesland was involved in many talks dur- 
ing the first preparatory phase of the decision process. In the approval 
procedures Friesland had a limited duty regarding emergency planning in 
case of a major accident. Being one of the authorities affected in its jur- 
isdiction by the proposed project, it was of course informed and heard in 
all licensing procedures. 
The County Council of Friesland has, like the  Wilhelmshaven City 
Council, a majority of Social Democrats, whereas the opposition includes 
a small minority of environmentalists. Socioeconomically the county 
area is partly agrarian/touristic, and partly industrial. The degree of 
industrialization exceeds that  in the  other areas of the coastal region 
near M'ilhelmshaven. Yet, because of difficulties in the existing industry, 
the Friesland area  has to be considered as depressed (WSB 1978). There- 
fore the  different development programs of the Land and Federal govern- 
ment apply for the whole county as well (Niedersachsischer Minister des 
Inneren 1976). 
2.3.8. The City of Wilhelrnshaven 
\lrilhelmshaven is the host municipality for the proposed LNG termi- 
nal. In its capacity to  carry out autonomous administration the city had 
to  release appropriate zoning and construction plans for the project. 
Apart from these legally required formal procedures, the city authorities 
were invoIved in negotiations between the companies and Lower Saxony, 
as well as  in the  preliminary deliberations with regulatory authorities 
almost from the begi.nning. 
The ruling majority in the city council is formed by a coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats which in the 1976 election won 
41 out of 47 seats (SPD, 25; CDU, 16). The remaining seats were shared by 
the Liberal Party (2) and a citizen group (4) which i.s to a large extent,  but 
not exclusively, oriented towards environmental issues.** The local 
*This is the situation as  in 1981 and before 1979; in the two years between the County was un- 
ited under the same neme with a part of the neighboring county o i  Wittmund. 
**Die Burgerschajf, represented in the city council since 1972. 
administration (municipality and county are identical in this case) is 
headed by an official appointed by the council for a twelve-year period. 
In a city like Wilhelmshaven with about one hundred thousand inhabi- 
tants, policy implementation, and to some degree also formulation, relies 
much more on the administration than on the elected council. 
Economically Wilhelmshaven profits from being an important NATO 
marine base and a regional administration center. Industry plays a cer- 
tain role too, but the labor-intensive enterprises belong to structurally 
weak industrial branches, and they got into considerable difficulties 
recently. Consequently, the unemployment rate is above the national 
average. 
2.3.9. Neighboring Municipalities 
Some municipalities in the vicinity of Wilhelmshaven, all belonging to 
the county of Friesland, intervened in the approval procedures for the 
LNG terminal. Wangerland, which has borders to the southeast directly 
on the terminal site, is an agrarian community of 10,500 inhabitants with 
considerable coastal tourism and with a relatively high proportion of inha- 
bitants commuting to Wilhelmshaven or the industrial zone in Friesland. 
Wangerooge, situated on an island close to the Jade shipping channel, has 
1,900 inhabitants and is mainly dependent on tourism. Schortens is a 
partially industrialized inland municipality to the southwest of the termi- 
nal site with a total of 20,000 inhabitants in its different dwelling areas. 
All these municipalities had participated in the more general 
regional planning procedures. In the zoning and construction planning 
for the Wilhelmshaven area, they had only the status of affected parties. 
While Schortens and Wangerooge raised very specific problems a t  a cer- 
tain stage of the decision, Wangerland was importantly affected and 
involved during the whole approval phase. 
2.3.10. Public Interest Groups 
The most effective public opposition to the proposed project 
developed in Hooksiel, the part of Wangerland situated next to the termi- 
nal site. In 1977, a t  about the same time as the formal approval process 
began, an action group called "Initiativausschuss Hooksieler Vereine" was 
founded in order to defeat the plans for the LNG terminal and a petro- 
chemical plant in its vicinity. The Hooksiel Citizen Group (HCG) consisted 
of representatives of all associations and clubs based in Hooksiel (seven- 
teen). It, therefore, claimed a higher degree of legitimacy than typical 
citizen action groups. Nevertheless, its financial resources were small 
and most of the group's activities relied on a few persons. 
In Wilhelmshaver, itself public resistance to the terminal project, 
except for a short period, was not very well organized. A t  the time when 
the approval process started at  the local level, the opposition in the city 
council (Liberals and Ecologists), an environmentalist citizen group, some 
scientists, and the youth organization of the Social Democrats formed an 
action unit. It was mainly directed against the petrochemical plant, and 
did not have very much support from the population. Eventually internal 
difficulties broke the unit up and the different groups continued their 
fight individually. 
2.3.11. Other Parties 
Among the numerous other parties involved at one stage or another 
in the LNG siting and approval decision are several we should a t  least like 
to mention: 
The British company Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. promot- 
ing the petrochemical plant in the proximity of the LNG termi- 
nal site 
The Mobil Oil Company, which operates an oil refinery to the 
south of the planned terminal, as an intervener in the plan 
determination procedure 
The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, which evaluated the 
economic benefits of the project after its acceptability had 
become an issue at  the Federal level 
The Military District Administration I1 in Hanover, concerned 
with possible negative effects of LNG tanker accidents and 
traffic regulations on the NATO marine forces based a t  
Y\'ilhelmshaven 
A couple of Land ministries co-opted as responsible regulatory 
authorities, namely, the Lower Saxony Ministries for the Interior 
and Social Affairs 
Local regulatory agencies such as the Wilhelmshaven Water and 
Shipping Agency, the Wilhelmshaven Water Management Agency, 
and the Factory Inspection Agency in Oldenburg 
The Brotherhood of Harbor Pilots Weser II/Jade, a kind of trade 
union participating in some of the deliberations about shlpping 
safety (regulations) and the most appropriate concept for jet- 
tie s 
Aquatic sports clubs, nature conservation organizations, and a 
fishermen's trade union, which were officially informed about 
the planned development and, in part, objected to the project 
Several official technical boards 
Various consultants (institutes and individuals) 
Political parties, labor unions, business interest groups, or environ- 
mental protection groups organized at a national or regional level were 
not involved in the decision process in any significant way. The local press 
in Wilhelmshaven and the Friesland area reported regularly on the 
planned LNG terminal and later also on the petrochemical plant. Regional 
and national media did not take up the issue of the LNG siting decision 
except for brief notices. The same pattern applies for public awareness 
in general, which did not extend beyond a relatively small area around 
Wilhelmshaven. 
2.4. THE DECISION PROCESS 
This section gives an overview of the main events in the decision pro- 
cess on the siting of a domestic LNG terminal in the FRG. It does not take 
into account internal decision making within interested parties, in partic- 
ular within the companies. Therefdre the starting point chosen for this 
case study is in 1972, at a time when public authorities became more 
directly involved in the site selection process (the precise date remains 
slightly arbitrary). The main events leading up to the approval in princi- 
ple in summer 1979 of an LNG import terminal a t  lTllhelmshaven are sum- 
marized in Figure 2.4 and will be explained below. The numbers shown in 
this figure are used to indicate the decision points in the diagram which is 
intended to clarify the structure of the decision process. 
Several gas companies in the FRG began considering the possibility 
of constructing an LNG import terminal in the late 1960s or  early 1970s. 
Algeria, a t  tha t  time the most important LNG exporting country for con- 
sumers in Western Europe, played a predominant role in these plans. 
After completing an internal screening process, Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg, 
who had agreed on a joint project, decided that  they would prefer a possi- 
bly more expensive domestic site to other potentially less costly sites in 
Belgium, France, or the Netherlands. In 1972 the two companies founded 
a subsidiary firm based in Wilhelmshaven with the purpose of construct- 
ing and operating an LNG terminal, the DFTG (I ) .*  
Subsequent consultations with the Lower Saxony Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Transport (ME&T)** and with local authorities 
confirmed industry's view that Wilhelmshaven was particularly appropri- 
ate for siting an  LNG terminal on the German North Sea coast. In these 
talks the ME&T not only acted as  the Land authority concerned with 
regional economic development in general but also represented Lower 
Saxony as  the owner of the reclaimed terrain a t  Wilhelmshaven. 
The decision in favor of Wilhelmshaven was agreed in principle and 
fixed in a preliminary contract between industry, Lower Saxony, and the 
City of Wilhelmshaven (2). These same parties then engaged in long and 
tough negotiations concerning the economic terms of the proposed pro- 
ject. The results of these talks were fixed in a "settlement contract" 
which was signed in July 1976 by DFTG, Gelsenberg, Ruhrgas, Lower Sax- 
ony, and lVilhelrnshaven (4).f 
Simultaneously with these negotiations, and on the request of Lower 
Saxony and industry, the regulatory and local authorities affected by the 
proposed LNG terminal deliberated on the feasibility of the project from 
different perspectives, such as its impact on economic development, 
environmental effects, and occupational and public safety. They also con- 
sidered suitable locations within the industrial zone a t  Wilhelmshaven and 
agreed on dimensions relevant in selecting the actual site. In 1974, DFTG 
decided in favor of one of the two building plots which it was offered by 
Lower Saxony, namely the one situated in the very north of the 
Wilhelmshaven area (3). Legally the sale of this piece of land was fixed in 
the  settlement contract and later approved by the parliament of Lower 
Saxony. 
*Numbers in parenthesis refers to the main events of Figure 2.4. 
**"Nieders&ichsischcr Minister f b  Wirtschaft und Verkehr", a t  that time caled "Liinister f b  
Wirtschaft und bffentliche Arbeiten". 
tThe contract contnins commitments from both sides on issues such as the provision of phy- 
sical infrastructure, subsidies t o  be granted, support in approval procedures (public authori- 
ties), the  types of investment to be made, environmentzl protection meesures, and the p o s  
sibility of smaller ges corn-panies taking over a shire  in DFTG (industry). Such a settlement 
contract (Ansiedlungsvertrag) is legally binding by private law, and is frequently used in con- 
nection with industriel projects that are subsidized by public means. 
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concerning the  harbor  f a c i l i t i e s  (August 1978).  
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Figure 2.4. LNG Decision Process: Structure and Main Events (PERT Diagram). 
Following this contract, although some time before its actual signing, 
all interested parties intensified their efforts to initiate the required plan- 
ning and approval procedures and various meetings took place between 
representatives of companies and regulatory authorities. In late 
1976/early 1977 these activities were disturbed by a n  event unexpected 
by all parties in the decision process with the possible exception of Lower 
Saxony. The British company Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) 
became interested in Wilhelmshaven for siting a new petrochemical plant. 
Since the  only suitable site was adjacent to the land reserved for the LNG 
terminal, in support of the ICI project Lower Saxony informed DFTG about 
a necessary change in the harbor conception for the LNG terminal. The 
revised plans, which were agreed between among DFTG, ICI, and Lower 
Saxony, provided for two separate jetties, one for each of the facilities, 
which were connected by a jointly used transport bridge (see Figure 2.1).* 
Because ICI wanted to  start  construction of the plant as soon as pos- 
sible, the ICI project had considerable impact on the continuing dynamics 
of the decision process. Hardly had the new concept for the jetties been 
settled when IVilhelmshaven initiated the construction plan (Bebau- 
ungsplan) procedures for  both projects (DFTG and ICI), as required by the 
Federal Construction Law (Bundesbaugesetz) (6). Objections to  the plans 
for the LNG terminal were raised by a rather small group of environmen- 
talists in Wilhelmshaven and a citizen group in Hooksiel, a s  well as by the 
Municipality of Wangerland with a couple of other local authorities (for 
the location of Hooksiel and Wangerland see section 2.2). Having heard 
and responded to these objections, in July 1978 the  City Council approved 
the construction plan as proposed (10). 
A crucial precondition of the LNG project was fulfilled in June 1977 
when the Dutch-German buyer's consortium signed a contract with the 
Algerian company Sonatrach for the  sale of 8 x 109m3 LNG per year, half 
of which was reserved for the German companies (7). Delivery was 
planned for a period of twenty years starting in 1984. According to this 
contract, Sonatrach should have been notified of the exact location of the 
LNG importation site October 1978, a deadline which was later  to cause 
some problems. 
In September 1977 DFTG filed its application for two major licenses 
to be granted by public authorities (8,9). The District Government of 
Weser-Ems (DGWE;) ~vould grant approval for the land-based terminal facil- 
ities through a preliminary license (Genehmigungsvorbescheid) according 
to  the Federal Immission Control Law (Bundes-Immissionschutzgesetz).++ 
The harbor facilities were subject to another licensing procedure, the so- 
called plan determination (Planfeststellung) in accordance with the 
Federal Waterway Law. The Water and Shipping Board North-West (WSB),t 
which was in charge of this plan determination, considered the jetties for 
the LNG terminal. and ICI plant and the transport bridge constructed by 
*Tne bridge was going t o  be built by Lower Saxony, represented in this case by the  District 
Government Weser-Ems. 
+*The term "immission" in contrast to "emission" focuses on the potential detriment to the 
environment instead of indicating the  source of noise, pollution, etc. 
tWasser und Schiffahrtsdirektion Nord-West, one of the six Federal waterways authorities of 
the intermediate level. 
Lower Saxony jointly in three similar procedures.' 
For several months after submittal of the applications the two licens- 
ing procedures proceeded routinely. The licensing authorities began 
scrutinizing the plans, other authorities were involved, and the applica- 
tion was laid open to the public. However, toward the middle of 1978, the 
WSB department in charge of nautical questions revealed a growing reluc- 
tance to approve the project because of serious problems with respect to 
the safety of LNG shipping in the Jade Bay as perceived by the Board. 
When the WSB informed the Federal h5inister of Transport (FMT) 
about this development, stating that it did not wish to have sole responsi- 
bility for the decision regarding appropriate safety measures and the 
acceptability of the population risk, the Minister resolved to consider 
these questions himself. FMT's decision in principle was prepared by a 
working group a t  the ?YSB (which included the most relevant local and 
regulatory authorities and several technical boards) and a permanent 
advisory committee of experts from the Ministry.*' After consultations 
with other Federal ministries FMT expressed the view that  the population 
risk related to the project was acceptable under the condition that  a 
number of injunctions on the applications were taken, the most important 
being a costly change in the shipping channel in the proximity of the ter- 
minal (12). This paved the way for WSB to approve the plan determination 
for all the harbor facilities (DFTG jetty, ICI jetty, transport bridge) 
between March and July 1979 (13). 
When shortly afterwards the DGMrE announced its preliminary license 
for the land-based facilities (14), the potential obstacles for the proposed 
LNG terminal were surmounted. This is equivalent to an  approval in prin- 
ciple of the project allowing to start  construction (15). As for the current 
state of the project (1981), the construction of t.he LNG terminal has not 
started because of a n  unanticipated shift in early 1980 of Algeria's export 
policy concerning LNG. It is expected that construction will be delayed 
until the gas companies are able to acquire a new LNG purchasing con- 
tract.  
*In addition, a procedure concerning water management and protection was carried out by 
the DGWE. Though it became clear that this license would be granted, the procedure was 
never ter.minated because of the delay of the whole project. 
**i3eirat fiir die Befordermg gefarlicher Giiter beirn Hunde:sverkehrsministerium). 
CHAPTER 3 
DIMENSIONS AhTD POLICY CONTEXT OF THE DECISION 
3.1. STATEMENT OF DIMENSIONS 
Siting an LNG terminal is a complex decision problem with various 
aspects and consequences to be considered. Since different societal 
groups are  affected differently by such a decision their perspectives on 
the problem will vary considerably. Owing to the nature of the political 
process, established policies and legal procedures play a crucial role in 
integrating the different views in an acceptable way. In thisqChapter 1 
attempt to achieve two goals: 
to organize the numerous issues and concerns raised in the 
debate in a concise way by summarizing them under "dimen- 
sions" 
to  give a draft view of the larger policy context in which the sit- 
ing decision is embedded. 
The following four dimensions are  discussed here in general and will be 
used to describe in some detail the parties' perspectives on the different 
impacts of the siting decision in Chapter 4: 
( 1) Energy policy 
(2) Regional socioeconomic effects 
(3) Health and safety aspects 
(4) Environmental impact 
3.2. ENERGY POLICY 
From a national perspective, the purpose and effect of the proposed 
LNG project were considered along one sole dimension: its contribution 
to the supply of a desirable form of energy. Natural gas was of minor 
importance in the FRG until the early 1970s. During the last decade its 
share in the primary energy mix increased enormously, from 5 to 16 per- 
cent or approximately 60 x 109m3 of natural gas in 1979 (see Figure 3.1). 
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Source: Vereinigung I n d u s t r i e l l e  K r a f t w i r t s c h a f t  ( V I K ) ,  1980. 
Figure 3.1. Primary Energy Mix in the FRG. 
Currently, one third of the natural gas supply i s  produced domesti- 
cally (1979). The other two t h r d s  come from the Netherlands (38%), the 
Soviet Union (16%), and the Norwegian part of the North Sea (12%). The 
Netherlands is the oldest foreign supplier of natural gas--deliveries began 
in 1967. The first contract between the Soviet Union and Ruhrgas was 
signed in 1970 and the first Soviet gas arrived in 1973. Finally, the so- 
called Ekofisk pipeline from the Norwegian gas fields in the North Sea to  
the coast came into operation in 1977 (Ruhrgas 1980b). After the signing 
of the LNG delivery contract, Algeria became the fourth country on this 
list. The amount of LNG to be delivered by Algeria was fixed a t  4 x loQm3 
in the first version of the contract and later increased to 5.6 x 10'm3 of 
natural gas equivalent per year. The terminal facilities themselves, how- 
ever, were designed to transfer up to 12 x loQm3 per year in the plans 
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submitted for approval, corresponding to one fifth of the current level of 
natural gas use in the FRG. From this perspective the project is not insig- 
nificant with regard to the national energy situation. 
In contrast to  many other European countries, the supply of energy 
in the FRG, including natural gas, is organized primarily by private com- 
panies. Public authorities have limited powers to regulate the activities 
of these companies and prefer to influence their policies, if a t  all, through 
negotiations and selected incentives. Governmental responsibility with 
respect to energy supply is shared by the Federal Government and the 
Lander since by constitution the matter  is defined as one of concurrent 
legislation (see Section 2.1). In practice the Federal Government dom- 
inates in particular in relation to energy imports. The most important 
decision makers, though, are the companies. Within the  limits of general 
market regulations they are quite free in making their principle decisions 
about production and trade engagements. 
A comprehensive national energy policy hardly existed before the  
mid-1970s and has not developed very much since (Kitschelt 1980), but 
the rapid expansion of foreign natural gas supply was fully approved by 
the Federal Government in national energy policy statements. These 
forecast a share of 18% of the overall energy supply for by natural gas in 
1980 and 1985 respectively (Bundesregierung 1974, 1977). In order to  
achieve this goal the Federal Government declared its support for all 
companies trying to  acquire additional gas imports by such means as 
credit guarantees or bilateral agreements with countries a t  the govern- 
ment level. 
The benefits of LNG with regard to future energy supply were never 
disputed in the decision process for the terminal in Wilhelmshaven. By 
some parties this dimension was used as a favorable argument, while oth- 
ers ignored it. Of course this does not imply that energy policy did not 
influence the decision, but it simply means that the related effects of the 
LNG terminal had not been assessed and debated in public. 
3.3. REGIONAL SOCIOECONOMIC EFFECTS 
Apart from Bremen and Hamburg, two cities with the status of 
independent Lander, the coastal region of Lower Saxony is one of the less 
developed parts  of the  FRG. It is still considerably dependent on agricul- 
ture and the few larger cities are mainly commercial and administrative 
centers. Therefore the income per head in the region lies significantly 
below the national average, whereas the unemployment ra te  exceeds the 
average. In Wilhelmshaven itself the situation is particularly difficult, 
because (as the most important base of the German marine forces) i t  was 
almost completely destroyed during World War Two. Even after the war 
the economy of the city remained highly dependent on the marine base, 
which is now used by NATO forces. 
In the light of this situation a program to support the development of 
the coastal region of Lower Saxony was set  up. The cost of such programs 
is usually borne jointly by Federal and Land governments. Though the 
Federal Government contributes considerably to the budget, the respon- 
sibility of deciding on special measures and individual projects remains 
completely with the Land in accordance with the general division of power 
in the FRG. Support is given in two forms, either as direct subsidies to 
companies who invest in new facilities or as grants for the amelioration of 
the infrastructure for industrial activities. 
Wilhelmshaven was designated to become a regional industrial 
center. The policy adopted for Wilhelmshaven, which had, of course, been 
agreed with the local authorities, was to take advantage of the naturally 
good shipping conditions in the Jade. The conditions have been further 
improved by deepening the water channel so that it can now be used by 
vessels with up to 250,000 tonnes of cargo. (Tks  is far more than in any 
other harbor in the FRG: Cuxhaven, which comes closest to TYilhelmshaven 
in this respect, allows ships with up to 110,000 tonnes of cargo to enter 
the port). A great deal of land was reclaimed from the sea in several 
stages, the largest part which includes the later terminal site built 
between 1971 and 1976. This land offered good conditions for industrial 
plants dependent on such harbor facilities. In view of their generally 
growing importance, large energy plants or transfer facilities were con- 
sidered to  be particularly suitable. A policy goal was formulated to 
transform Wilhelmshaven into an "energy turntable" (Ener- 
giedrehscheibe) or even an "FRG Rotterdam". As a matter  of fact, about 
eight facilities, including a coal power plant and an  oil refinery, have been 
attracted so far (Wilhelmshaven 1979). 
DFTG was one of the first enterprises to become interested in the 
specific advantages of the new industrial area a t  Wilhelmshaven. Although 
it was agreed that the direct socioeconomic effects of an LNG terminal 
were modest, public authorities decided to support the project. When the 
plans became more concrete the capital investment was estimated a t  500 
million DM (US8250 million). Some 140 jobs would be created directly for 
the operation of the terminal, without taking into account supply and 
maintenance activities as well as short-term employment in the construc- 
tion phase. Thus local taxes, which are mainly paid on the invested capi- 
tal, were seemingly more important than the number of jobs created. 
The increase in tax revenues for Wilhelmshaven from both the LNG termi- 
nal and the petrochemical plant planned in its vicinity has been 
estimaLed by a member of the city council to be 7 million DM (US$3 mil- 
lion) per year (Wilhelmshaven V).* It should be mentioned that  only the 
host municipality of a facility benefits from these local taxes. 
When opposition to the project grew, the lack of a significant positive 
impact on the regional economy was one of the criticisms raised. The 
argument went even further by claiming that  industrial development des- 
troyed jobs in other economic sectors, namely tourism and fishery in the 
municipalities of Wangerland and Wangerooge. Wangerland, for instance, 
records more than a million overnight tourist stays in a year in its whole 
area, which apart from Hooksiel encompasses essentially two other vil- 
lages a t  the coast. One mussel fisherman in Ilooksiel was going to lose 
(and actually lost) the major part  of his submarine cultures. 
'References of this type refer to interviews. 
The different, partially conflicting perspectives on the socio- 
economic impact of the proposed project were debated in two contexts: 
environmental regulations which have to protect citizens against unac- 
ceptable disturbances and injurious effects, and Town and Country 
Development and Regional Planning. Every local development has to fit 
the larger and less specific regional and zoning plans agreed among local 
authorities affected. I t  depends on the specifications of these plans as to 
what level of detrimental effects has to be accepted by the neighborhood 
of a proposed facility. 
3.4. HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS 
Legislation in the FRG does not distinguish neatly between health and 
safety and environmental impact considerations. Both matters are regu- 
lated jointly in a set of Federal and Land laws, the most important in this 
context being the Federal lmmission Control Law (Bundes- 
Immissionsschutzgesetz) and related decrees.* The latter is applicable to 
almost all sorts of technical devices and installations with some remark- 
able exceptions, such as airports or nuclear facilities. For those con- 
sidered to be particularly dangerous or damaging a formal licensing pro- 
cedure is required. Similar approval procedures are  provided for by 
other relevant laws like the Federal Waterway Law which regulates con- 
struction measures on inland waterways and on the coast. Historically, 
the current law evolved from factory inspection legislation. Therefore, as 
a prerequisite to  being licensed in accordance with the lmmission Control 
Law every planned industrial activity has to meet the relevant occupa- 
tional health and safety regulations. The basic principles with regard to 
environmental protection that have to  be followed for any installation 
submitted to licensing are as follows (Wohlleben and Vahrenholt 1979): 
to exclude dangers, considerable detriments, and disturbances 
to the public and the neighborhood of an installation 
to  take precaution against harmful environmental'effects by 
making use of the best available technology 
to provide for proper waste management. 
Although specified to  some extent in various ministerial decrees and 
administrative directives, these principles remain rather general and 
open to  discretion with respect to  the actual licensing practice. In some 
areas technical standards and guidelines (including measurement 
prescriptions) have been established, such as maximal emission rates for 
about 100 and incidence rates for some ten air polluting substances, in 
the so-called Technical Instructions Relating to Air, but they are  not as 
rigorously handled as in. the United States of America.** In other areas 
*Law for the protection against hjurious effects on the environment caused by impurities in 
the air, noises, vibrations, and similar disturbances. A comprehensive discussion of all regu- 
lations related to  environmental protection can be found iT1 Steiger and Kimminich (1678). ' 
"Technjcal standards and regulations are essentially elaborated by official technical boards 
such as the Federal Institute of Material Control and the Federal Institute of Physics and 
Technology, or semi-official bodies corlstituted under private law such as the Association of 
German Engineers. In many cases they are not binding. 
the requirements of authorities in charge of granting licenses are more 
oriented toward precedents; in particular, those which were confirmed in 
an administrative court suit. If neither of the two guiding principles 
applies, as in the case of novel technologies, the task of the licensing 
authorities becomes more difficult. 
Any proposed project where licensing is legally required can only be 
approved if its safety and environmental acceptability are ensured. This 
seems to endow public authorities with important powers to  decide upon 
such a project. While, in fact, nobody can prevent the  licensing agency 
from refusing an application on these grounds, the decision has to be jus- 
tified appropriately. Since the applicant is not obliged to prove that  the 
proposed facility is harmless or a t  least acceptable with respect to health 
and safety and environmental impacts, the burden of proof lies in prac- 
tice on the public authorities (Hinz 1974). The applicant's duty is to 
deliver sufficient evidence to allow a thorough scrutiny of the plans. If 
the applicant dislikes the requirements imposed by the licensing agency- 
-in the extreme case refusal of the project--it may appeal to the courts 
against the decision as being unjustified. 
In this situation expert studies of a particular form, the so-called 
Gutachten, play an  important role. They are supposed to ensure the flex- 
ibility of the licensing procedures without diminishing their legitimacy. 
However, the merits of the Gutachten are  not always unanimously 
accepted. Objectors in view of well-established cooperation between 
experts, public authorities, and applicants, frequently raise doubt about 
the objectivity of the studies, whereas project promoters point to the high 
cost and delay caused by a "flood of expert studies". 
LNG is a good example of the difficulties just mentioned. Regulations 
concerning operations with explosive gases and liquids did, of course, 
exist in the FRG, but mainly for installations and devices of a much 
smaller scale. They did not cover some of the special features of LNG, 
such as the possibility of distant vapor cloud ignition. Therefore these 
points played a key role in the decision making process within the licens- 
ing authorities, as well as in the public debate about the project. Despite 
the fact that the critical questions with respect to the safety of LNG 
operations had been recognized from the beginning, they could not be 
resolved earlier than in the last stage of the decision process. 
Distant vapor cloud ignition was a very important, but not the  
predominant, issue of the public dispute, a s  in some other LNG siting 
decisions (Kunreuther, Linnerooth, et al. 1982). Many people were likewise 
concerned about possible releases of chemicals from the ICI plant in the 
vicinity of the LNG terminal.' Such releases might not only be caused by 
internal failures in the petrochemical plant but also by an accident on the 
LNG term.ina1. Finally, much of the safety discussion was concentrated on 
vessel accidents involving LNG tankers. While the most serious potential 
consequences of such an  accident would have to  be expected in connec- 
tion with the formation of non-ignited vapor clouds, it was also consid.ered 
*A risk analysis on potential vinylchloride releases performed in connection with t h e  appro- 
val process of the ICI plant eventually led t o  the  removal of some 100 inhabitants oi  a small 
adjacent village called lnhausersiel (Vahrenholt 1980). 
to be a major danger if a large LNG spill ignited immediately 
The preoccupation with shpping safety can probably be explained by 
the h g h  number of vessel accidents which have occurred in Jade Bay 
since it has been used by very large ships. Between 1965 and early 1978, 
thirty-one large vessels were involved in accidents, mainly groundings. 
Eight of them took place on a 5 km stretch of the shipping channel in the 
immediate vicinity of the LNG terminal. In four cases there was a high 
risk of a major oil spill which would have destroyed beaches and nature 
reserves around the Jade. 
One particular bend of the shipping channel was located in such a 
way that an incoming ship which for some reason did not change its direc- 
tion appropriately a t  the bend would directly h t  the jetty or the tran- 
sport bridge (see Figure 2.2). Therefore several parties, including WSB, 
the licensing agency for the harbor facilities, required the removal of this 
bend by a change in the shipping channel. 
There was little doubt that people using the recreation area of Hook- 
siel would be injured if a major accident (explosion, fire, distant vapor 
cloud ignition) took place. As mentioned in Chapter 2 this area is only 
about 1 km away from the LNG storage tanks and 2.5 km from the DFTG 
jetty, the shipping channel and the ICI jetty are within a distance of 2 km. 
Whether the village of Hooksiel at  a distance of 3 km from the storage 
tanks and respectively more than 5 km from the jetties and shipping 
channel could also suffer from an accident was extensively debated, and 
finally excluded by the licensing authorities as impossible. Numbers rela- 
tive to expected fatalities or injuries were usually not mentioned except 
by the Advisory Committee at  the FMT which was talking about several 
hundred people potentially affected in ships on the Jade or a t  the beach 
(Risikoabschatzung 1979, p.11). 
3.5. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
As explained in the previous section, environmental protection is 
regulated by the same laws and monitored by essentially the same insti- 
tutions as health and safety. Therefore at  this point there is nothing to  
add about policy context or responsibilities. It could be argued that the 
distinction made between health and safety aspects and environmental 
impact would be artificial, but it seems justified for the author for rea- 
sons of comparison as well as for the purpose of clarifying the arguments 
used in the public discussions. 
The concerns brought up by different parties in the decision process 
dealt with many different types of environmental damages. h r  pollution 
was discussed with regard to the fuel used to regasify the natural gas. 
People argued that the noise produced by terminal operations would 
exceed acceptable limits in the neighboring dwelling areas. Others were 
more concerned about the damage to the coastal scenery caused by the 
high LNG storage tanks, or more generally, by the psychological effect of 
an industrial skyline near a recreation area. Possible water pollution 
According to private cornmu~~ication f Lir. Gottschalk from the City of Wilhelmshaven. 
from chlorine was considered, and the effect on the marine environment 
of returning cooled water, as well as the danger of increased sand depo- 
sits in different parts of the harbor as a consequence of alterations in 
Jade Bay. Though none of these effects was severe enough to jeopardize 
the project, they attracted considerable attention. In many cases the 
parties bringing up these points were concerned not so much about the 
environmental impacts as such as about their consequences with respect 
to certain economic activities like tourism and fishery. Therefore the 
context of environmental legislation was not always appropriate to dis- 
cuss them, but it was apparently easier to introduce the respective 
interests here than anywhere else. 
CHASTER 4: 
PARTIES PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
MAIN DIk1ENSIONS OF THE DECISION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on con.sequences and features of the decision 
considered to be relevant by the main parties involved. It will essentially 
give the arguments raised by these parties in the decision process. There 
are a number of specific difficulties associated with t h s  task: 
arguments made in public are n.ot likely to be identical with the 
internal objectives and motivation of a party. They are essen- 
tially used as a strategic means to serve the parties' goals in a 
public debate, in negotiations, or a t  the courts (if necessary) 
arguments change over time according to the policy and institu- 
tional context of the current decision problem 
arguments are,  in general, not complete in the sense that they 
do not look at all the aspects and dimensions relevant to the 
party. 
The last statement is especially important with the decision under con- 
sideration. A proper analysis of the arguments made by a party at  a cer- 
tain stage of the decision process has to be based on written documents. 
In this case, though, only a few of them exist, and some of those that do 
exist are inaccessible. This has to  do with the traditional secrecy of 
administrative processes in the FRG as well as with the fact that  the LNG 
siting decision was hardly discussed in a larger political arena. To some 
extent the gaps could be filled with information from the interviews but 
these can never be as comprehensive as documents. Moreover, there is a 
considerable time lag between most of the main events in the decision 
process and the time when the interviews were made. 
These difficulties can be overcome in part by including information 
on legal or socioeconomic conditions and constraints of the different par- 
ties in the description. We cannot go into very great depth here yet 
because this would require an elaborate model of the political system 
under consideration, which goes far beyond the limits of this study. The 
interested parties dealt with in this chapter are the same as those 
presented in Chapter 2. 
4.2. Gas Companies and DPTG 
The gas companies, being private enterprises, have to ac t  according 
to the principles of economic profitability. In an  a t  least partially com- 
petitive energy market,  this means that  they are primarily concerned 
with safe gas supply a t  reasonably low prices. When the terminal project 
was developed, LNG promised to open up new sources of natural gas whch  
allowed the share of gas in energy consumption to stabilize and expand 
further. It seems plausible that--as the companies stress--the concerns 
about safety of delivery weighed down simple price calculations, since the 
consumer price for natural gas always reflects a n  average of the purchas- 
ing prices (Ruhrgas I ,  ]I).* A diversi.fication of sources not only reduces 
the risk of supply interruptions but also strengthens the position of the 
purchasing company with regard to possible requirements for extreme 
price increases. 
While unrestricted in their principal decisions about production and 
trade engagements, the companies have to observe some constraints on 
the realization of their plans. These are, on the one hand., the general sit- 
ing and licensing regulations. On the other hand, if the companies 
attempt to get  financial or material su.bsid.ies from public authorities . 
they will have to  stress that their plans are in the best public interest,  i.e. 
th.at they fit in one or several of the government policy programs regard- 
ing econom.ic structure, energy supply, regional development, etc. 
In their presentation of the LNG terminal project the companies pri- 
marily stress the context of energy supply. Natural gas should be con- 
sidered as a particularly desirable energy source because of its efficient 
energy use and its low environmental impact (with regard to air pollu- 
tion). The project would fit well into the energy program of the federal 
government, which aimed for a n  increased share of natural gas in the 
energy mix. As domestic resources were too small, the expected demand 
for natural gas had to be satisfied by imports (DFTG undated). 
LNG is not only seen as a means of increasing overall gas import but 
also of diversifying the sources of delivery and thus of reducing the risk 
of supply interruptions. Because of the long-term contracts necessary in 
view of the h g h  capital investment for an LNG transport system th.e 
safety of delivery would be further increased (Ruhrgas I, 11). For the same 
reason Wilhelmshaven, as a domestic site, was preferred to possible loca- 
tions of the terminal in other countries. 
'References of this type refer t o  interviews. 
The impact on the regional economy is of course addressed by the 
applicant but not stressed in particular. According to DFTG, 
Wilhelmshaven was primarily promoted as the technically and economi- 
cally most suitable harbor on the German coast, in accordance with the 
findings of a harbor development study made by the FMT for all harbors 
in the FRG. This study found \Tilhelmshaven to offer the best conditions 
for the transfer. of mass goods; in particular, energy carriers delivered by 
large 'vessels. The number of long-term jobs created (between 100 and 
140) was admitted to be modest, but not negligible. In the short te rm up 
to 800 people would be employed construction of the terminal (DFTG I). 
Other socioeconomi.c effects, such as the improvement of the regional 
infrastructure due to the project, were mentioned without going into 
further detail. 
Coming to the health anti safety  aspects, LNG is described by the 
applicant as a well established technology svhch has proved to be safe. 
That there has been no significant accident in one and a half decades 
should convince everyone that the hazards of LNG operation are very low. 
Wilhelrnshaven would offer the best conditions of all harbors in the FKG 
from a nautical point of view. Because of its low traffic density, few boats 
in the water channel, and good gui.dance devices, it was a safe harbor. 
LNG tankships submitted to the strict regulations of the IMCO code (Inter- 
governmental Mariti-me Consultative Organization) on gas tankships would 
have to  be considered as safe (DFTG I ,  Ruhrgas 1, 11). 
In the application itself DFTG attempts to prove that the LNG termi- 
nal project is in accordance with all relevant regulations and standards 
on materials and construction plans. Continuous control of materials, 
inspection of the construction and operation of the terminal, and special 
training of the skaff ensured a maximum of safety. Moreover the best 
available technology would be used. Accidents were faced by an optimal 
combination of risk reduction and mitigating measures, risk prevention 
being especially important for the jetties and the vessels because LNG 
spills could not be confined on water as they could in the  case of the 
land-based facilities (DFTG 1978). These statements were supported by 
several expert reports commissioned by DFTG (see Chapter 8). 
Finally the companies also dealt with the environmental impact  from 
two different directions. First natural gas was presented as a fuel with 
very desirable properties. In particular, LNG had to be considered as one 
of the cleanest energy sources with regard to air pollution, because it had 
to be cleaned before liquefaction. Gas pipelines were built underground 
and therefore would not di-sturb the scenery (DFTG undated). 
As in the case of danger to life and limb, experts were commissioned 
to show that noise and air pollution were below the limits required by 
environnlental regulations and that  water pollution was negligible (DFTG 
1970). 
On analyzing the companies objectives and concerns, one realizes 
that  business policies and pub1.i~ energy policy were nearly identical. The 
impact on regional deveIopment was considered by industry as a favor- 
able side-effect. There is no doubt tha t  the applicant had an intrinsic 
interest in reducing health and safety risks as far a s  possible from a 
technical-economic perspective since a major accident could ruin DFTG 
or the respective shipping company and could also damage the  image of 
the gas companies. Viith regard to environmental effects the incentives 
were rather external to industry. Thus from the companies' perspective 
the siting decision was mainly a trade-off between safety and cost con- 
strained by legislation. 
4.3. THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF TPJJdSPORT (I."I,fT) 
In its capacity as supervisor of the Federal Waterways and Shipping 
Administration the FMT has not only the duty of controlling lower admin- 
istrative levels with respect to the legality of their activities but also of 
ensuring an equal enforcement of the federal legislation. Therefore the 
FXT has a natural interest in all decisions that  might serve as a pre- 
cedent for  similar ones. In the climate of growing societal concern about 
environmental issues and technological risks characterizing the  FRG dur- 
ing the last decade the Federal Minister must have become particularly 
cautious in sensitive matters like the transportation of hazardous goods. 
Against t h s  background it is not very surprising that  the FMT partici- 
pated in the LNG terminal siting decision; one might even have expected a 
more intensive involvement. Since the FMT also represented eventually in 
its decision the federal government as a whole (see Sections 5.7 and 8.3) 
he was not only concerned about maximal safety of the proposed LNG ter- 
minal but also considered other impacts of the project, in particular the 
economic benefits as perceived by the Federal Minister for Economic 
Affairs and the government of Lower Saxony. 
The position of the FMT with respect to health and safety effects 
related to the LNG terminal is essentially based on the risk assessment 
performed by the Advisory Committee for the TI-ansportation of Hazar- 
dous Goods (see Section 8.3). In its report the Committee deemed the 
population risk to be sufficiently small, if important safety measures were 
taken and appropriate traffic regulations formulated (most of these were 
already proposed in the MrSB report to the minister). The Committee 
mentioned expli.citly, though, that  the final decision on the acceptability 
of th.is risk would have to be taken by public authorities in view of the pol- 
itical and economic benefits of the project (Risikoabschatzung 1979, p.3). 
Obviously, after consultations with other Federal ministries in an 
interdepartmental committee, the FhlT was willing to bear the respective 
responsibility. Thus the Minister's position toward the DFTG/ICI project 
can be interpreted as an implicit, though never pronounced, trade-off 
between safety and economic benefits which tries to maximize safety 
under the constraint that the costs must still be acceptable for the appli- 
cant and subsidizing public authorities (FMT I). Of course, there is a limit 
for the public safety risk beyond which the project would have been 
defeated. In his talks with the main parties the author got the impression 
that the decision under consideration was not too far away from this limit 
but that the perceived benefits with respect to energy policy and regional 
development outweighed concerns about safety and related public resis- 
tance. 
4.4. T H E  WATER f i T D  SI l I P P I NG BOFJil) KORTH-T.TST (Y3B) 
As explained in Section 2.3.4, WSB's main responsibility refers to 
shpping in federal waterways like the Jade. Therefore the Board was pri- 
marily concerned with questions of nautical safety and with morphologi- 
cal changes related to the construction of the harbor facilities for the 
LNG terminal. The latter are also of economic importance because of 
their potential impact on the maintenance costs of the shipping channel 
which have to be borne by the Federal \Zraterways and Shipping Adminis- 
tration. 
However, in its capacity as licensing agency for the harbor facilities 
within the Jade the liSB had to take a much broader view on the different 
impacts of the proposed project. By law the WSB was obliged to exclude 
any possible negative effects on public welfare, in particular to ensure the 
health and safety of public and neighborhood, as well as to protect private 
rights that  might be affected by the project (Federal Waterways Law, 
para. 18). While hazardous cargoes were not new to officials a t  the lt?SB-- 
they have, for instance, to  approve the transportation of such cargoes by 
sea--the agen.cy does not employ professionals in this field. Therefore, on 
grounds of competence as well as justification the lYSB had to rely quite 
strongly on outside experts, particularly since the  Wilhelmshaven termi- 
nal was the first large-scale LNG facility applied for in the FRG. 
From the beginning of its involverrlent in the LNG siting process the 
WSB stressed the  importance of safety questions to  be clarified before 
th.e LNG terminal could be approved. After a phase of collecting and pro- 
cessing information, including consultation.~ with technical boards like 
the Federal Institutes for Material Control and for Physics and Technol- 
ogy, WSR deemed the open problems to be resolvable and expressed a 
favorable view on the feasibility of the project. Nevertheless for different 
reasons, not least the frequently changing plans for the LNG project, a 
comprehensive treatment of the safety question was only possible in rela- 
tion with the formal approval procedure (WSB I ,  11). 
Intensive deliberations on the problems of LNG tanker traffic and 
unloading activities took place between WSB and the applicant in the 
working group "Nautical Safety" during the preparatory stage of the plan 
determination (WSH 1978, p.2). As a result expert studies were commis- 
sioned by both parties on issues identified to be crucial for assessing the 
risk: dispersion and j.gnition properties of LNG vapor clouds, the safety of 
the LNG ship tanks in case of a vessel accident, and the likelihood of 
tanker accidents leading to a major LNG spill. Further studies on poten- 
tial health and safety effects and possible risk-reducing measures were 
commissioned by WSB during the plan determination procedure (see 
Chapter 8). 
When the WSB evaluated all these stu.dies together with the informa- 
tion collected previously from the applicant, official technical boards, and 
comparable authorities in other countries (France, Japan, Netherlands, 
USA) i t  came to  the conclusion that the population risk related. to LNG 
operations a t  the harbor facilities of the tertninal were not acceptabIe 
urlless appropriate risk reducing measures were taken (\VSB 1978, p.133). 
Among other requirements a change of the shipping channel in the prox- 
imity of the termin-a1 was considered to be necessary in order to reduce 
the probability of major vessel accidents a t  the jetty. Taking these meas- 
ures into account the so-called residual risk (Restrisiko) would be low 
enough to exclude dangers to public and neighborhood (\IrSB 1978, p.188). 
By similar lines of reasoning the Yt'SB concluded that the public safety 
risk related to potential accidents involving LNG tankers on the Jade ship- 
ping channel remained considerable even after the aforementioned safety 
measures had been taken (WSB 1978, p.188). WSB held that the harbor 
facilities could not be approved before the acceptability of this risk had 
also been settled. 
The only other dimension considered by WSB besides health and 
safety effects was the environmental impact of the LNG project. During 
the preparatory phase YfSB was seriously concerned about possible mor- 
phological effects of the jetty buildings and related construction meas- 
ures. Expected sand deposits were an  important criterion for the selec- 
tion of the plot and the actual model for the harbor facilities. After an 
expert study commissioned by DFTG quite early in the decision process* 
had come up with satisfactory results, noise, air pollution, and similar 
environmental effects were no longer considered to be significant by WSB 
(potential water pollution was not the subject of the plan determination 
but of a specific licensing procedure for water management). 
The WSB perspective on the impact of the proposed project was com- 
pletely confined by the legal responsibilities of the Board in health and 
safety and environmental effects. Legally but also practically WSB could 
have refused the application if supported in this respect by the FMT. On 
the other. hand there is no safety decision without implicit consideration 
of the other dimensions. WSB attempted to ensure the economic benefits 
of the project in as much as it looked for suitable requirements and regu- 
lations to make the safety risk to the population acceptable. These pro- 
posals were al.ways deliberated with respect to their economic feasibility, 
i.e. whether the applicant or public author3ities were able to finance them. 
Nevertheless, WSB's reluctance to approve the LNG tanker traffic and the 
risk-reducing measure it proposed suggest that WSB put a stronger 
emphasis on the safety dimension than most of the other parties in the 
decision. 
4.5. THE LOYa'R SAXONY MINISTRY OF ECONOIb5IC W M R S  
AND TRANSPORT (ME&T) 
In order to ensure the implementation of regional development plans 
promoted by the Land government, the ME&T is concerned about all 
industrial projects in Lower Saxony. With respect to specific programs 
such a s  the one for Wilhelnlshaven, it attempts actively t.o encourage or 
at tract  such projects. Thls requires a flexible policy responding as  well as 
possible to the needs and wishes of interested companies, which on the 
other hand still serve the public policy goals. The ME&T itself defines its 
role therefore as a political broker mediating contacts between com- 
panies, local authorities, and 1i.censing agencies (ME&T I). To regulatory 
'Partenscky, 3974, Ilec., "Gutachtliche Stellungnahme zur geplanten LNG-Umschlagcdege .h 
der Innerjade und zu den Ergebnissen der Model1versuc:he des Franzius-Insi;ituts," T.U. Hzn- 
over. 
authorities or the local population this gives the impression that Lower 
Saxony is promoting certain industrial projects. The kind of support the 
ME&T granted to the ICI project is probably an even better  example of the 
situation referred to than the proposed LNG terminal. The relation 
between companies and Lower Saxony can be characterized as a deal 
where both sides are interested in realizing a proposed project but at  the 
best possible conditions from their perspective. 
The importance of the LNG terminal project with respect to national 
energy supply was taken into account by the ME&T to some extent,  
though Lower Saxony itself did not need gas.* In addition the Ministry 
wanted to support gas supplying companies based in Lower Saxony and 
took the position toward Gelsenberg and Ruhrgas that the LNG terminal 
should be accessible to all companies that were able to  acquire LNG 
delivery contracts. The justification for this was to support regional 
enterprises and to ensure a certain degree of competition in the highly 
monopolized gas market in the FRG (ME&T 11). 
I t  should be clear from the previous statements tha t  the impact on 
regional development was the crucial aspect of the LNG project as viewed 
by Lower Saxony. Given the economic situation in and around 
Vv'ilhelmshaven the LNG terminal was considered to be desirable for the 
following reasons: the number of jobs created was not expected to be very 
high, but certainly more than 140 (the number of people employed in the 
terminal itself). The jobs were safe even in times of economic depression. 
The trade taxes (Gewerbesteuer) paid to the municipality would 
strengthen its financial capacity considerably. Finally the LKG terminal 
could have the effect of a n  "initiative spark" for other projects in the 
newly created industrial area (ME&T I). Safety  and environmental 
aspects were not considered by the ME&T, except for checking whether 
the project seemed to be feasible from this point of view. 
In sum, the ME&T (Lower Saxony) viewed the proposed LNG terminal 
as favorable because of its impact on the  industrial development of the 
Wilhelmshaven area.  The original interest of the Land decreased some- 
what, however, against the  background of other projects considered to  be 
more "important", such as the petrochemical plant promoted by ICI. 
4.6. THE DISTRICT GOVTCRNMENT I'rnSER-EKS (DGYTE) 
The different functions the DGWE assumed with respect to the deci- 
sion process under consideration make i t  difficult to draw a consistent 
picture of interests and concerns underlying the agency's position. While 
economic and construction departments assumed an active role regard- 
ing the realization of the project, the factory inspection department had 
to scrutinize the plans and to decide upon objections from an indepen- 
dent position ts some extent comparable to the courts'. On the one hand 
the law ascribes to every company the right to engage in industrial activi- 
ties unless specific reasons forbid it; on the other hand the licensing 
*Almost 100% of domestic netional gas production comes from Lower Saxony. 
agency has the duty to protect public and neighborhood against negative 
effects of a proposed project. 
It is conceivable tha t  such a situation would lead to internal conflicts 
between departments promoting the project and those in charge of carry- 
ing out the licensing procedures, possibly even to some pressure on the 
latter to decide in favor of the economic benefits. We do not have any evi- 
dence that this was the case in relation with the LNG project. Formally 
internal conficts could not arise here because the licensing concerned 
only the land-based facilities, whereas DGWE's planning dealt with the 
transport bridge between the jetty and the land-based facilities. How- 
ever, it should be clear that such a situation is liable to  cause doubts with 
interveners about the independence of the lfcensing agency. Therefore it 
has to be considered as a structural deficiency with regard to the credi- 
bility of public authorities in the eyes of the public. 
The position the DGWE took with respect to the expected socio- 
economic impact of the proposed project--the dimension of energy supply 
was not addressed--is very similar to that of the hqE&T. Referring to this 
close connection, we sometimes talk about both as Lower Saxony's per- 
spective. An assessment of the economic benefits of the LNG project per- 
formed by DGTVE had been summarized in Section 3.3. During the licens- 
ing procedure the  agency also had to check whether the terminal plans 
were consistent with regional development and zoning plans in force, 
which had been questioned in s0m.e of the objections. These concerns 
were not shared by DGWE (DGWE 1979, p.61). 
As already mentioned, s a f e t y  a n d  environmentu,l e f f e c t s  of the LNG 
terminal were add.ressed by DGTVE in the context of the Immission Control 
Law. The agency was used to licensing large-scale industrial facilities, 
and one of the officials in charge of carrying out the licen$ng procedure, 
had a background in chemical engineering. DGTW did not approve th.e 
terminal plans as they were, but  suggested various changes and imposed 
a number of more or less serious conditions on the applicant. In assess- 
ing the population risk, the agency considered a probabilistic risk assess- 
ment to be inappropriate because of the uncertainty of its results, and 
commissioned instead a n  analysis of the maximum credible accident 
(DGWE I ,  also see Pilz 1980). Based on previous del.iberations and on the 
findings of thls study (Brotz 1979), DGTYE considered the revised terminal 
plans to exclude danger for public and neighborhood as required by the 
law (DGWE 1979, see also Chapter 8). 
h r  pollution and noise were the potential environmental effects pri- 
marily considered in the aforementioned licensing procedure. After DFTG 
had agreed not to use oil for regasifying the LNG, the emission of air pol- 
lutants was assessed in a n  expert study to be very small. With respect to 
noise disturbance to the neighborhood, DGWE required the applicant to 
meet the strongest standard, namely the one applicable for purely dwel- 
ling areas. Complaints about visual detriment due to high storage tanks 
were not upheld (TIGWE 1979). Water pollution dealt with in another 
licensing procedure which also was performed by DGWE (license in accor- 
dance with the Federal Water Management Law and respective Land legis- 
lation) was considered to be insignificant (DFTG 11). 
In general the decision about the acceptability of the environmental 
impact was easier to take than that related to risk because regulations 
are more precise and easier to handle in the former case; moreover, LNG 
is quite harmless in this respect. The risk dimension was taken seriously 
by DGMTE and played the predominant role in the licensing procedure, but 
apparently DGWE did not perceive any unre solvable conflict between 
economic benefits and safety. Therefore it is hard to say whether one of 
the two dimensions outweighed the other. 
4.7. THE CITY OF WILHELMSHAVEN 
Confronted with a difficult situation in the local economy, (unilateral 
structural dependency and a high rate of unemployment), Wilhelmshaven 
authorities committed themselves to a policy of industrialization, but not 
"at any price" (Gottschalk 1980). The benefits of such a policy besides the 
creation of jobs are  mainly related to an  increase in local tax revenues. 
While most of Wilhelmshaven's citizens are willing to  accept this policy, 
the authorities have to take into account environmental concerns raised 
by a critical minority group (but which certainly affect the majority as 
well). Since 1972, 8% of the votes in local elections have gone to an eco- 
logically oriented citizens' group.* Thus, despite a clear majority of the 
ruling coalition in the council, the authorities have to stress their 
attempts to reduce negative effects on environmental quality as much as 
possible. 
The limits of the environmental protection measures are quite obvi- 
ous, as companies will look for another site if they deem the  cost to be 
too high. As mentioned before, on the local level the justification for any 
-industrialization project has to stem from positive socio- economic 
effects, Nevertheless, arguments in favor of the LNG terminal made by 
officials and council members in VITilhelmshaven are on a rather broad 
level. Usually they stress the quality and safety of jobs created (for 
instance, by referring to  the importance, nationally, of natural gas sup- 
ply). The increase in tax revenues is acknowledged to be essential for 
further improvement of public facilities in Wilhelmshaven, such as sport 
and recreation areas or traffic routes. Finally, there is a general feeling 
that IYilhelmshaven's becoming an important harbor city, where energy 
carriers of all sorts are handled and major industries concerned with pri- 
mary production are set up (Wilhelmshaven I-VI). 
The municipality was neither responsible nor had sufficient 
resources to  investigate the health a n d  safety aspects of the proposed 
terminal in detail. Nevertheless, in the face of public concerns, the local 
authorities felt an  obligation to look at  these problems as  carefully as 
possible. The city government considered the selected site to be optimal 
because it maximized the distance between the terminal facilities and the 
nearest residential areas (within the given constraints) (Gottschalk 1980). 
To deal with more specific technical questions the authorities invited 
some of the experts involved in the licensing procedures for discussions 
*In recent local elections (September 1981) this group wes able t o  improve its position furth- 
er,  now holding six instead of four seats on the council. 
with the council and to a public hearing.* In general \Yilhelmshaven fol- 
lowed the view of these experts tha t  L N G  was a developed technology 
which could be made safe by appropriate measures. In some questions 
like the tank conception the city expressed itself in favor of additional 
measures (Jeuerlandisches Wochenblatt /JR 6 December 1978). 
Because of its particular industrial development policy, the city has 
acquired more expertise with regard to environmental impact  control 
than to questions of safety risk. The symbol of its environmental policy is 
an  urban network of air pollution control stations. This network, being 
financed to a great extent by local industry (the respective obligation is 
usually laid down in the settlement contract), is unique in the FRG. It is 
intended to ensure a reasonably clean environment despite ongoing 
industrialization (Stenzel 1 977). 
The LNG terminal seems very benign in this respect, especially after 
the DFTG had agreed to use clean natural gas instead of sulfurous oil to 
regasify the LNG. .Thus, the city government underlined that  the  terminal 
would not significantly increase air pollution. Noise was said to remain 
below acceptable limits in all residential areas and the impact on water 
quality to be negligible as well. With regard to the most critical issue, 
namely potential detrimental effects on the recreation zone in Hooksiel, 
Wilhelrr~shaven authorities hold in their response to objections raised dur- 
ing the construction plan procedure that the distance of several hundred' 
meters ,  a green emission protection zone, and a dam with bushes and 
trees, together with requirements for the operation of the terminal, 
would sufficiently alleviate the negative effects. (Most of these measures 
were originally planned to mitigate the effects of the ICI petrochemical 
plant.) The remaining effects would have to be accepted because the  
whole area  had been reclaimed from the sea to promote industrialization - 
and because the creation of jobs has priority (l\~ilhelmshaven 1978). 
Economic benefits and the  safety and environmental impacts of the 
proposed project were both very important to Wilhelmshaven. On the one 
hand the city had a direct political and economic interest in attracting a 
facility which it perceived to be beneficial; on the other hand, it did not 
want to be accused by its citizens of lacking responsibility. Furthermore, 
there was a strong incentive for M'-ilhelmshaven to maintain a cooperative 
atmosphere with Lower Saxony in order to get support from the Land also 
in future industrial projects. Therefore it seems justified to assume a 
slight bias of Wilhelmshaven toward the economic aspects. 
4.8. THE COUNTY OF FRIESLAND 
The County of Friesland represented mainly the interests of the mun- 
icipalities in the vicinity of Wilhelmshaven or the Jade shipping channel 
and of their populations in the decision. It requested maximal protection 
measures against the effects of the proposed project with respect  to tour- 
ism, agriculture, coastal fishery, and general amenity and quality of life. 
All conceivable measures to reduce the risk to life and limb and to 
exclude negative environmental effects would have to be taken in order to 
'Federal Institute of Material Control, E:ngler-Bunte Institute. 
preserve the coastal zone as a viable living and recreation area (Friesland 
I). For the detailed argumentation we refer to the description of 
Wangerland's perspective in the next section. 
The county's strict position, which almost neglects the economic 
benefits of the proposed project, seems to be inconsistent with 
Friesland's need t o  rely on industry for its economic development as well. 
However, in contrast to ~'~ilhelmshaven, Friesland can count on tourism as 
a second economic branch in the future, and naturally it does not want to  
have this jeopardized. 
4.9. THE MUNICIPALITY OF \'ANGERLAND 
Wangerland's concerns are closely related to  the geographical situa- 
tion a t  the terminal, namely the proximity of the village Hooksiel to tha t  
site (See Section 2.2). Thus some of Wangerlands citizens were more 
directly affected by the planned development than the major part  of the 
population in Wilhelmshaven. This entailed the odd situation tha t  the peo- 
ple who had to bear most of the costs of the proposed project did not 
belong to the municipality politically responsible for the decision. More-- 
over, the  only benefits M1angerland perceived in the  DFTGACI project was 
an indirect form of compensation in terms of Land subsidies for the 
development of the recreation zone. Consequently MJangerland, and in 
particular, Hooltsiel, felt threatened in their viable interests (tourism, 
fishery, and general living conditions), and objected to the project with a 
variety of arguments. 
Their initial concerns developed around the  dimension of socio- 
e c o n o m i c  eJfects. Industrialization was expected to have negative effects 
on tourism in Hooksiel in several ways, by: 
a threatening, ugly scenery 
noise 
air pollution 
fire and explosion hazards 
This could jeopardize a major goal of all regional development programs, 
namely to encourage tourism a t  the coast. The distance between the  ter- 
minal and the  residential and recreation areas in Hooksiel was deemed to  
be too small to  assure Hooksiel's function as a coastal resort.  Moreover 
the selected site would contradict the  existing zoning and development 
plans, which had provided for a gentler transition from recreation to  
industrial a rea  (\IJangerland I ,  11; M1ilhelmshaven 1978). 
The site was not considered to be appropriate in view of the  potential 
health a n d  safety effects. It was selected at--according to Wangerland--a 
very dangerous point in the shpping channel. Therefore the vessels going 
into the new terminal would increase the risks to shipping in the Jade. 
Potential explosions duri.ng unloading operations a t  the terminal could 
injure people a t  the recreation and residential areas. The proximity of 
the LNG terminal, ICI's petr.ochemica1 plant and the Mobil Oil refinery was 
seen as a particularly serious problem. In the view of Wangerland and 
Friesland all of these questions should not only be treated by privately 
commissioned experts but by an independent expert 1ooki.ng a t  the whole 
problem ( Wilhelmhaven Zeitung /RTZ 27 July 1978) 
A decrease in the height of the  storage tanks was strongly demanded 
from the environmental impact  point of view. Air and water pollution 
should also be minimized by additional measures  and finally the level of 
noise was expected to be too high. 'it'angerland's argumentation follows 
the typical pa t t e rn  of an  opposing group in malting no trade-offs in i ts 
impact evaluation but  ra ther  listing all potential negative effects of the 
project with regard to  the  different dimensions. In view of the particular 
role the  community had t o  play in this case such an  at t i tude seems to  be 
perfectly understandable a n d  also rational in t ha t  i t  supported 
Wangerland's struggle for be t te r  protection o r  more compensation. 
4.10. T I B  HOOKSIEL CITIZEN GROUP 
As already mentioned in Section 2.3.10, the Hooksiel Citizen's Group 
(HCG) at tempted to  gather  all lodal interests in a sor t  of village commun- 
ity. This ra ther  unusual organizational s t ructure must  be  seen  against 
the historical background of relations between the  village Hooksiel and 
the municipality i t  belongs to .  Until 1972 Hooksiel was a municipality in 
itself. Only in the course of a n  ad.ministrative reform did i t  become par t  
of Yr'angerland. Consequently there  was still a kind of mistrust  tha t  the 
municipality would not fight for Hooksiel's interests as  strongly as  possi- 
ble, or  a t  least a general feeling t.hat Hooksiel itself should t ake  care  
about things affecting the  village community alm.ost exclusively. Despite 
the representative charac te r  of HCG, the group's activities relied o n  a few 
individuals only. Being laymen, these  had t o  overcome considerable diffi- 
culties in order  to familiarize themselves with all the  technical informa- 
tion. The more detailed the objections were, the be t te r  their chances 
became of influencing the decision substantially. HCG would not have 
been taken seriously unless i t  was able to  argue a t  the s ame  technical 
level as  experts from the  1icensin.g agencies. Many of the  arguments ,  of 
course, were identical t o  those mad.e by Wangerland and Friesland. While 
this does not necessarily mean tha t  they were simply taken  u p  by the  
Citizen's Group, we will not repea t  t hem here .  
Socio- economic aspects and regional development were in focus 
again. HCG took a slightly broader  perspective and argued tha t  the bene- 
fits of the whole industrial development were not obvious. On the one 
hand a few jobs were c rea ted  with enormous public subsidies; on the 
other hand, t h e  new installations destroyed or threatened other  ec0nomi.c 
sectors,  namely tourism and fishing in Jade Bay-. In. the long t e r m ,  the 
NATO marine forces might also leave Wilhelmshaven because of t he  con- 
centrati.on of ships with hazardous cargoes in Jade Bay. HCG did not  con- 
sider all industrialization t o  be  negative, but  the type of industry t h a t  had 
been at t racted t o  Wilhelmshaven was not appropriate for improving th.e 
employment situation t o  any noticeable degree (HCG I ,  J I ;  Wilhelmshaven 
1978). 
One of the main points of criticism cancer-ning health and sa fe ty  
aspects  was again the  location of the terminal close t o  a particularly 
dangerous point of t he  shipping channel. Since the risk of vessel 
accidents would be grea te r  a s  a result of traffic to  the  new jetties, 
construction measures were required to prevent collisions with tankers 
moored at  the jet-ty. The proximity of the LNG terminal and the petro- 
chemical plant, in particular the two jetties, was considered to cause an 
unique accumulation of hazards. These hazards would result from the 
fact that neither detonation of natural gas spills nor the formation and 
propagation of vapor clouds could be excluded on the basis of existing 
expert studies. Thus the distance between the terminal and the village as 
well as the recreation area ought to be greater. An objective senior 
expert report was required in order to prove that the project was harm- 
less (Wilhelmshaven i978; WZ 14 September 1978; J1V 15 September 
1978). 
A greater distance would also reduce negative environmental effects: 
noise and air pollution (mainly from the ICI plant) would exceed accept- 
able limits if the current plans were realized. The size of the tanks was 
attacked as a psychological threat affecting in particular tourism. The 
construction of the jetties and a potential change of the shi.pping channel 
would affect the morphological situation in Jade Bay. This would result in 
increased silt deposits in other parts of the harbor and would disturb the 
ecological equilibrium of the bay. As one of the consequences the natural 
base of shell-fishery would be further damaged (Wilhelmshaven 1978; WZ 
27 Kovember 1978). 
In sum, HCG's perspective, simiIarly to those of 'Elangerland and 
Friesland, was one of an  opposition group fighting for its case. Competing 
objectives were therefore not considered and weighed. 
4.11. THE IMPORTANCE OF TIIE SAFETY DIMENSION 
Concluding this chapter, we will summarize th.e importance the 
safety dimension had in the different parties' perspectives on the LNG sit- 
ing decision. As a matter  of fact, all parties but Lower Saxony's govern- 
ment paid attention to questions of health and safety in their evaluation 
of the decision problem, but the relationship between this dimension and 
other important concerns differed substantially between the various par- 
ties. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the main. dimensions of concern an.d 
the relationship between them for all parties considered. 
The companies and Wilhelm.shaven, in view of their competing 
interests with regard to the LNG project, had to make real trade-offs 
between political or economic benefits and safety (environmental protec- 
tion). Licensing authorities, on the other hand, were required by law to 
look exclusively at  health and safety and environmental effects. Practi- 
.tally, public authorities also paid attention to the economic feasibility of 
injunctions they intended to impose on the applicant. Nonetheless, the 
exclilsion of dangers and detriments for the pubIic was the ultimate cri- 
terion for their decisions. The FMT, which falls into the category of th.e 
licensing authorities as well, deviated to some extent from this pattern. 
Although population safety had to be ensured in any case, the FKT's deci- 
sion rellected political concerns, i.e. primarily expected economic bene- 
fils, much more than the position ol lower agencies. 
Table 4.1. Dimensional Analysis of Party Perspectives. 
PARTY MAIN POLICY QUESTION DOKINANT DIKENSIONS 
What is the optimal site and design for Energy policy and 
panies the project? profit /szfety* 
Is LNG shi?ping acceptable? Sefetylenergy policy and re- 
gional development 
WSB Are LNG shipping and harbor facilities Safety 
acceptable? 
l Is project desirable? Regional development 
DWGE Are land-besed facilities acceptable? Safety and environmental 
protection 
Wilhelnlshaven Under what conditions is project desir- Economic benefits/safe?y and 
able? environmental protection 
Friesland Whet impacts has the projects? Can Economic costs, safety, and 
Bangerland they be made acceptable? environmental protection 
HCG 
*Derlotes a trade-off between dimensions. 
Objectors to the  proposed project, finally, viewed the safety aspect 
as one factor among others to explain their opposition to the plans. This 
does not diminish the  sincerity of their concerns about risk. Given that  
they perceived no benefits from the project, it would be irrational from 
their part not to introduce all possible arguments to put the project in a n  
unfavorable light. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE DECISION PROCESS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the chronological development of the deci- 
sion process leading to the approval in principle of the LNG terminal at 
Wilhelmshaven. Particular attention is paid to the question of how the 
main events in the siting decision and the behavior of the different par- 
tie s involved were influenced by the legally required approval procedures 
as well as by the policy context of the LNG project (see Chapter 3). 
The chapter starts with a description of the formal aplproval and 
1icen.sing procedures carried out in relation to the LNG terminal decision. 
While these procedures were the central part of decision making with 
respect to the acceptability of the population risk, most of the more gen- 
eral political decisions framing the approval procedures were taken 
before this stage in a less formal manner. All contacts, negotiations, and 
agreements made under this preparatory phase have only the status of 
private trade connections or of information and informal advice. Yet in 
terms of substance and real decision making, the involvement of public 
authorities at  an early stage of the decision, in particular the cornmit- 
ments they made toward the later applicant, influenced the whole deci- 
sion process considerSably. Therefore our consideration begins much ear- 
lier than the formal applications for the different legally required 
licenses. 
5.2. DESCRIPTION OF APPROVAL PROCEDURES IN GENERAL 
The approval process on the LNG terminal involved three main pro- 
cedures: 
(1) town and country planning in Wilhelmshaven (Bauleitplanung) 
(2) Licensing for the construction of the jetty and transport bridge 
in Jade Bay called "plan determination" (Planfeststellung). 
(3) Licensing for the construction of the land-based terminal facili- 
ties, called "licensing according to the Federal Immission Con- 
trol Law" (Genehmigung nach dem Bundes- 
Immissionsschutzgesetz). 
Other procedures concerning regional planning, viater management 
and pollution control, the duration of the delivery contract with Algeria, 
and the operation of an energy facility a t  Wilhelmshaven in general will 
not be described in detail, since they played only a minor role in the LNG 
terminal decision. 
5.2.1. Tom and Country Planning 
town and country planning is part of the autonomous administration 
of the municipalities regulated by federal framework legislation (see Fig- 
ure 5.1). According to the Federal Construction Law (Bundesbaugesetz) 
there are two steps involved: 
L 
zoning (Flac hennutzungsplan) 
construction planning (Bebauungsplan) 
Zoning is the general procedure of selecting certain areas for residential, 
recreational, agricultural, and industrial use and of determining traffic 
routes and other public facilities. Zoning plans have to fit the more gen- 
eral regional development plans released by the Land authorities. They 
cover the whole area of a municipality, and are closely related to  the 
overall planned development of a city, town or parish. Construction plans 
are more c0ncret.e. They are released only for those areas to which build- 
ings are assigned. They regulate the type of buildings (purpose, size, 
arrangements), the portion of area to be built upon, and measures to 
preserve the characteristics of the area. Moreover, they allow for 
prescriptions with regard to environmental effects emerging from or 
affecting the area under consideration. Certain areas may be designated 
as protection zones; in others the use of certain damaging technologies 
may be prevented or regulated. Yet the prescriptions must not be too 
specific in order to preserve the  general character of bu-ilding plans 
(Dreyhaupt 1977). 
The formal procedures for zoniw and construction plans are very 
similar. They start  with the decision by the council or the administration 
to release a zoning or construction plan. In the next stage the municipal- 
ity has to announce its intention to the citizens and to explain the main 
features and consequences of the plan in an appropriate form.* The plan 
is redrafted after a public hearing, where people have the chance to give 
their views and to ask questions about the plan. Ths  draft plan is then 
laid open for public scrutiny again, and comments and objections can be 
made by everyone who feels affected in his legally ensured rights. They 
have to be answered in writing, this time by the administration. Public 
authorities whose responsibilities might be affected, participate in a sirni- 
lar  way in the decision process. Thereafter the council releases the  plan 
*This is usually referred t o  as "early citizen participation". Its mainpurpose is t o  inform the 
planning authorities comprehensively ebout potential effects of the draft plan and the views 
of their constituency. 
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Figure 5.1. Town and Country Planning Procedures according to  Federal Construction Law 
Licensing Agency Licensing 
af ter  considering suggestions and objections made by the public and by 
other public agencies. Finally the plan is reviewed by a licensing agency 
of the Land administration. This agency scrutinizes the plan to see if it is 
consistent with framework legislation on town and country planning and 
whether the procedure was carried out correctly. I t  has no active right 
to make changes. Thus the plan is either refused or licensed, in which 
case i t  becomes valid a few days later.  
5.2.2. Plan Determination 
According to the Federal Waterways Law (Bundeswasser- 
strassengesetz) every building or installation in a federal waterway which 
might affect ease and safety of shipping has to be licensed by the Federal 
Waterways and Shipping Administration. This can either be done by a 
simple license (in which case the license is not equivalent to a construc- 
tion permit but the project has to obtain a number of other approvals and 
technical permissions) or by a "plan determination" procedure (see Fig- 
ure 5.2). This plan determination gives final approval, including all other 
licenses and permissions required. Therefore all aspects relating to the 
public interest have to be considered and all regulatory authorities whose 
responsibilities are affected have to be involved in the procedure. In con- 
trast  to the first possibi.lity (single permissions), plan determination pro- 
vides for formal public participation. For the applicant it has the advan- 
tage of judicial safety. 
Any company or other judicial person intending to construct a build- 
ing within a federal waterway must inform the responsible Water and 
Shpping Board. The agency (sometimes the Federal Ministry of Tran- 
sport) then decides w-hich procedures apply. The company is then able to  
apply formally. The licensing agency has to check whether the plans filed 
as an application are detailed enough for i t  to examine all aspects of the 
technical installations which are submitted to  regulation and to impose 
appropriate requirements. (In many cases there h.ave been consultations 
between company and agency about the application before the latter was 
officially filed). In some cases the  applicant may be asked to complete 
the plans, for instance, by expert reports assessing safety or environmen- 
tal impact. 
After the applikation has been accepted the licensing agency starts  
to scrutinize the plans, and other authorities have to be co-opted or sim- 
ply informed, depending on whether their responsibilities are directly 
affected or not. The se t  of participating public authorities usua1.l.y 
includes municipalities, counties, and district governments whose area of 
jurisdiction borders the site of the  proposed project, and regulatory 
agencies such as  the local harbor authority, professi.ona1 and other 
interest groups. Natural preservation and sport associations and similar 
organizations are also informed about the plans. Furthermore, the plans 
are laid open to public scrutiny for a t  least one month. Suggestions or 
objections have to be made within two weeks. T h s  part of the procedure 
is intended to inform the licensing agency in time about possible.viola- 
tions of legally ensured citizens' rights entailed by the proposed project. 
All interveners are then invited to a public hearing where the statements 
have to be dealt with by officials belonging to the licensing agencies or. by 
external experts. 
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The final decision, based on the views of other regulatory agencies, 
on independent expert studies, and on the licensing agency's own exper- 
tise is recorded in writing and sent  out to  the applicant and to all objec- 
tors. It not only approves or disapproves the application but  includes a 
(sometimes very long) list of requirements and injunctions on the appli- 
cant  concerning the construction and operation of the planned installa- 
tions. The licensing procedure is described and the requirements,  as  well 
as the  approval as such, a re  explained in this document. The only way to 
enforce a review of the decision is to  apply to the administrative courts. 
The application has to  be refused, if the proposed construction meas- 
ures would be detrimental t o  the public welfare and if potential detrimen- 
tal effects cannot be excluded by appropriate requirements.  The same 
applies for private law titles tha t  would be affected in a n  unjustifiable 
way. The notion of public welfare includes the protection of citizens from 
dangers and harmful health effects as regulated in the Federal Immission 
Control Law. I f  no negative effects can be found, approval, according t o  
German laws, is obligatory and the conlpany is entitled t o  enforce this 
right by appealing to  the courts.  This is the main difference of approval 
between town and country planning and the proper licensing procedures. 
In the former the local authorities a re  free to refuse a project on political 
grounds without explanation, while in the lat ter ,  the  licensing agencies 
have t o  justify their decisions in detail with technical and/or  procedural 
regulations. 
5.2.3. License According t o  Federal Imrnission Control Law 
The Federal Immission Control Law regulates health and safety as  
well as  environmental protection aspects of technical instaIlations and 
devices in a very broad sense (see Chapter 3). A specific licensing pro- 
cedure is only required for some types of large-scale technical installa- 
tions (considered to be particularly hazardous or damaging). Energy 
facilities a re  among the installations listed in the law.* The structure of 
the licensing procedure is almost identical to the pl.an determination pro- 
cedure. We will therefore not describe it here in full detail. One differ- 
ence is th.at the license may be split into a preliminary license (Vor- 
bescheid), mainly approving the site, and a series of partial licenses (Teil- 
genehmigungen) for different steps of the construction process. Public 
participation in the way described for plan determination is then limited 
to the preliminary license. This split was introduced in order to avoid 
extreme delays in connection with very large projects. 
The authority in charge of the license is always a Land agency. In 
Lower Saxony responsibility usually lies with the district governments, for 
smaller projects also with the local governments. The list of participating 
public authorities is also similar to th.at described in relation with the 
plan determination. Some Land Ministries and the responsible factory 
inspection agency a r e  typically among the regulatory agencies involved. 
*For a more detailed discussion of licensing procedures concerning energy facilities see 
Dreyha-apt (1 977). 
5.3. THE SIi;LECTION OF THE SITE AT T:?L,HELl~SfU~tTI< 
In the late 1960s gas companies in the FRG, encouraged by recent 
experiences in other European countries, also began to contemplate 
becoming involved in the LNG trade. Preliminary contacts with Algeria on 
gas delivery were made and they eventually began looking for a site suit- 
able as an LNG import terminal. Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg, who had agreed 
on a joint project, performed an internal screening process on possible 
sites in four European countries, namely France, Belgium, the Nether- 
lands, and the FRG. Technical and economic factors, such as shipping 
conditions, population density, physical infrastructure, and subsidies pro- 
vided by public authorities a t  the different sites and the access to the 
existing gas distribution network (proximity to consumers) seemed to 
have been major criteria for the selection of the terminal site (DFTG 11). 
As a further  influencing factor political safety was mentioned, although it 
reached its full importance only after the oil crisis in 1973-1974, when 
not only many oil-producing countries cu t  d ~ l v n  supplies but also the 
Netherlands reduced their natural gas deliveries (Rulu-gas I). Around 
1972 the two companies decided that they would prefer a domestic site, 
although this was not necessarily the cheapest solution, and that  
Wilhelmshaven ranked highest among possible locations in Germany. 
Potential sites in other countries were not completely dismissed by indus- 
try but considered as possible second choices throughout the decision 
process, in case major difficulties arose in con.nection with YTilhelmshaven 
(Ruhrgas I ;  DFTG 1,II; ME&T I). 
Then Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg announced their intentions to the 
Lower Saxony Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport in Hanover 
(ME&T). Together they went through another quick screening process 
and confirmed the companies preselection of T~ilhelmshaven. The Baltic 
Coast was ruled out by the fact that  i t  would increase the length of the 
voyage considerably; therefore appropriate sites for the terminal had t.o 
be found on the FRG part of the North Sea Coast. Despite the fact that it 
was a short s tretch,  the latter still offered in principle a t  least four dif- 
ferent places where an  LNG terminal could be sited (apart from the possi- 
bility of an artificial island). These were at the mouths of the rivers Elbe 
(Cuxhaven-Hamburg), Nreser (Rremerhaven-Bremen), Ems (Emden), and 
Jade Hay (Wilhelmshaven). Apart from Yrilhelmshaven, some of the other 
places, namely Cuxhaven, Nordenham on the opposite side of Brem- 
erhaven, and a place near Emden were considered for a very short time, 
but according to the comparison criteria, these alternatives soon turned 
out to be less appropriate. Therefore, according to the gas companies and 
the h!E&T, considerations were focused on Wilhelmshaven without a great 
deal of analysis. 
Since the preliminary siting decision was made almost ten  years ago 
and written documents about 1.t are not available, the information on this 
subject drawn from different interviews is not very reliable. This makes it 
very difficult to reconstruct exactly what these criteria were. Official and 
industry representatives agree that Wil.helmshaven's main advantages 
were the following (ME&'r I ;  DFTG ],TI; Ruhrgas 1): 
the deep water channel (in all other harbors shipping channels 
are not deep enough to allow for 125,000 tonnes tankers a t  the 
moment) 
the low density of vessel traffic in Jade Bay 
the large industrial area available in Wilhelmshaven 
the favorable access to the German gas pipeline network 
In 1972 Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg founded their joint subsidiary firm DFTG 
based in YITilhelmshaven with the registered purpose of constructing and 
operating an LNG terminal. A large part  of the aforaementioned industrial 
area would come into existence by reclaiming more land from the sea 
north of Wilhelmshaven. As described in connection with the  regional 
development policy promoted by state and local authorities (Section 3.3.) 
this project played a central role in the attempt to a t t rac t  industry to 
Wilhelmshaven. The plan to site an LNG terminal a t  l\Tilhelmshaven was 
thus welcomed by both gas companies and public authorities. Whilst the 
former willingly made use of the advantages of the site, the latter were 
pleased a t  getting confirmation in their industrial development policy. 
In the following the local authorities in 'Viilhelmshaven as well as the 
public agencies whose responsibility included the proposed terminal were 
informed and included in the talks. The City of YIilhelmshaven began to 
consider the desirability of the project from its own perspective, and the 
regulatory authorities were to give a preliminary view on the feasibility of 
the project with respect to their legal mandates. They attempted to fami- 
liarize thenlselves with the new technology and to identify the main prob- 
lems which would have to be clarified before or during the 1icensi.q pro- 
cedures from their own point of view. 
- 
As a next s tep the companies, Lower Saxony, and Wilhelmshaven 
began to look for an  optimal location for the terminal within 
Wilhelmshaven's i.ndustria1 area.  The licensing agencies--namely, the 
Water and Shipping Board North-West (WB) and the District Government 
NTeser-Ems (DGWE)--and some other regulatory and local authorities* 
were asked by the ME&T to collaborate on criteria for the selection of an 
appropriate "microsite". With the notion of representing public interests 
these criteria served as inputs for a technical-economic siting analysis. 
A consort.ium of two private consulting firms (Linde AG, Munich and Engel- 
brecht Engineering Association, Hamburg) was comm.issioned by 1IFTG to 
do the stud.y, in order to compare three possible sites; later this was nar- 
rowed down to two on grounds that were not related to the LNG siting 
problems. The following dimensions were considered.** 
safety and ease of shlpping 
hydrological conditions and effects on the morphology of Jade 
Bay 
*Such as the County of Friesland, the Oldenburg Factory Inspection Agency, the 
Wilhelmshaven Water Mznzgement Agency end others 
**The sitjng analysis wes not available to us, all statements about i t  are besed on interviews 
with DFTG (DFTG I, U), \VSEl (ITSB II, 1:II) and on private communication of Dr. Gottschlk from 
the City of Viilhelmshaven. 
population safety: distance of LNG facility from inhabited areas 
and other industrial installations 
potential environmental effects: noise, air, and water pollution 
technical and operational aspects 
availability of sea water for the vaporizing system 
Priority was given to the area in the very north of Wilhelmshaven but the 
difference between the two plots was not very large. According to the 
study, the main advantages of the preferred site were: 
less disturbance for shipping 
more safety from a nautical point of view 
fewer negative effects on existing residential and recreation 
areas (the one in Hooksiel was just being developed, and another 
one near the second site had been used for many years) 
. 
smaller distance between the jetty and land-based facilities 
(LNG pipelines are not only dangerous but also very expensive) 
lower costs 
In the meantime negotiations among the gas companies, DFTG, Lower 
Saxony and Wilhelmshaven on the conditions the terminal had to fulfill in 
order to be acceptable for all parties had shown some results. In late 
1973 the companies and Lower Saxony signed a preliminary contract 
whereby they expressed their interest in the project and laid down some 
general features. The Land, after consultations with local authorities, 
offered the two areas mentioned above as possible constitution plots for 
the terminal to DF'TG. Further negotiations sought Lo clarify points on 
which the parties h.ad not come to an agreement fairly rapidly, since the 
target for terminal operation was 1979 or 1980. Based on the siting 
analysis, in mid-1974, DFTG announced to Lower Saxony and 
Wilhelmshaven that  they preferred the site in the very north of the indus- 
trial area for constructing the terminal. 
Almost simultaneously (July 1974) a first delivery contract was 
signed between Ruhrgas, Salzgitter Ferngas, and the Algerian state-owned 
gas company Sonatrach. The contract period for 20 years was to begin 
around i979 with 6 billion m3 of natural gas per year, but was not exe- 
cuted because the two parties could not come to an  agreement on certain 
points concerning future prices. 
5.4. SETTLEMENT CONTRACT 
Despite the fac t  that the  gas companies and Lower Saxony had in 
principle already agreed on the construction of the LNG terminal in 
Wilhelmshaven in the preliminary contract,  it still took further tough 
negotiations before they reached a definite agreement in 1976. The main 
point of contention was that the Land wanted to reserve part  of the capa- 
city of the LNG terminal for gas companies operating in Lower Saxony in 
order to break the quasi-monopoly on imports and prices of the big com- 
they achieved was to  change the constitution of DFTG (by then 50% Ruhr- 
gas and 5052 Gelsenberg) and to reserve a 26% share for smaller com- 
panies to be nominated by the government of Lo~.ver Saxony (this was car- 
ried out in 1978). 
The conditions of how these changes in DFTG were to be executed was 
one of the points laid down in the so-called "settlement contract" 
(Ansiedlungsvertrag). Such a settlement contract is signed in all such 
industrial development projects. In the form of a private t rade agree- 
ment,  it embraces all commitments made by private companies and pub- 
lic authorities with regard to  planning, construction, and operation of the 
projected facilities. In accordance with this contract the State of Lower 
Saxony sold €30 hectares of the artificial industrial a rea  to  DFTG a t  a price 
of 9.3  million Uh'l (approximately USS4.5. million) .* Furthermore, Lower 
Saxony and l\iilhelmshaven committed themselves to providing the neces- 
sary physical infrastructure as  well as to giving the company all possible 
help for getting approval for the terminal. The companies, on the  other 
hand, agreed on the scope of the  project, on deadlines for constructiori 
and s tar t  of operation, and on specific measures to  protect the environ- 
ment which were more than  they were obliged to do under standard regu- 
lations. 
These final. requirements--as well as  the fact that  Xi.lhelmshaven was 
even included in the contract--are quite unusual because, as a rule, su.ch 
agreements are made between companies and state authorities only 
(IYilhelmshaven 11). As Wilhelmshaven tries to limit the negative effects of 
industrial development by a specific environmental protection policy 
(mainly c o n c e r n i ~  air pollution) the only way to impose stronger condi- 
tions on the  industry was to  enter  into a contract with them (see Section 
4.7). This is due to the aforementioned fact tha t ,  according to Germ.an 
laws, approval of industrial instal.lations is obligatory if all relevant stan- 
dards and regulations are  met .  With regard to environmental pollution, 
this means tha t  a company has the right to obtain approval for a plant 
where certain imission and emission rates  are not exceeded and where 
the emissions are  controlled by the "best available technology". 
In June 3.976 the City Council of Wilhelmshaven voted by a n  
over-whelming majority (includ.ing ecologists) for the contract.  A few 
weeks later it was officially signed by representatives of DFTG, Ruhrgas, 
Lower Saxony and Wilh.elmshaven. Lower Saxony's parliament ,did not 
have to agree directly on the contract ,  but only on the sale of the  area. 
Approval for the lat ter  was given in November 1977 without any public 
debate (Kiedersachsischer Landtag 197Bb). 
5.5. THE PREPARATION OF THE APPLICATIONS 
At tha t  time (late 1976), the Lower Saxony ME&T, continually looking 
around for new industrial projects, was successful in interesting a British 
Company, -. - Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI), in VITilhelmshaven. The 
- 
'According t o  Nieders&chsischer Land~ag (1878a), sir~ce the settlement contract was not 
avai!eble to  us all further imrormation is  drawn from interview-s (Wilhelm.sheven I, 11, 1;: ErfIC&T 
I, 111). 
company intended t o  construct a petrochemical plant in  the FRG o r  
another \'test European country (with a capital investment of USE500 mil- 
lion in the first s tage,  to be increased in subsequent stages).  The com- 
pany had specific requirements for the site--in particular:  
a n  a rea  of about 300 hectares  close t o  a good harbor  
a separa te  jetty 
accessible salt  deposits near  the site 
Noreover production should s ta r t  as  early as  possible. 
In view of the high investment involved and the number  of jobs which 
would be c rea ted  ( the  authorities were talking about  2000 a t  the begin- 
ning; later it became clear tha t  only 450 people would be employed in t he  
plant), Lower Saxony and Wilhelmshaven made  every effort to a t t r ac t  t he  
company. As salt  mines of good quality exist in the region of 
Wilhelmshaven, the main condition t o  be fulfilled was t o  find a n  appropri- 
ate location., The only way to  make available a n  a rea  of the quality and 
size required was to locate the plant in the proximity of the LNG terminal 
site. Thus the next difficulty arose with regard to  the necessary jetty. 
For morphological and nautical reasons it Firas not possible t o  construct  a 
fifth jetty \tlthin the Jade between the three already existing and the  one 
planned by DFTG. To solve this problem the  idea of building a common 
transport  bridge from whlch two separa te  jetties should diverge was 
developed in t h e  ME&-T. Thus the .ICI project had two important  effects on 
the decision process related to the  LNG terminal: the plans for the termi- 
nal, bu t  particularly for the jetty, h.ad t o  be  changed, and a s  a result  new 
problems associated with the  operation of two hazardous installations 
,near  one another  arose. In addition, the approval procedures for both 
projects had t o  he carried out under  considerable time pressure sinccIC1 
wanted to  s t a r t  production as  early as  possible. From then  o n  the two 
projects were closely related. 
When DF'TG was informed by ME&T about  these developments early in  
1977 it was not  very pleased (DFTG I ,  WSB 111). Under the condition tha t  it 
would not have to  bear  any supplementary costs the company finally 
accepted the proposed changes and agreed to redo all plans for t he  jetty. 
Durirg the following months different concepts for t he  construction of t h e  
jetties and the transport bridge were discussed between DFTG, ME&T, 
licensing agencies and the consulting firms assigned t o  draw up the con- 
struction plans. A t  the same time UFTG drew up plans for the land-based 
facilities to be  submitted as applications to  the licensing agencies. All 
this was essentially finished in t h e  middle of 1977. 
The last precondition for DFTG to  file i ts applications was fulfilled in  
June 1977 when Sonatrach and a European buyers '  consortium., including 
Ruhrgas, Salzgitter Fern  as,  and  the Dutch Gasunie, signed a new delivery 
contract for B biIlion m natural gas per  year ,  half of which would go t o  
the FRG. Delivery was to begin. in late 1983 and would continue for over 
20 years (Erdol und Kohle September 1977). As a supplementary condi- 
tion the contract  included a deadline for the buyers '  consortiilm t o  
announce on  which site the terminal would be constructed. This 
deadl.ine--originally October 1978--caused some troubIes in the licensing 
procedures and eventually had to be postponed because the decision 
could not be made in time 
5.6. TOWN AND COUNTRY PmNII.lG 114 \TILHELIi!?S&aN 
In May 1977, \Vilhelmshaven authorities initiated the construction 
plan procedures for the petrochemical plant and the LNG terminal. This 
requires some explanation since, in keeping with the idea of town and 
country planning, the plans should already have been fixed when the com- 
panies arrived. A rough concept of how the area, which had been 
reclaimed for purposes of industrial development, was going to be used 
did, of course, exist. This was laid down in a first zoning plan which had 
been agreed among interested parties, in particular between the munici- 
palities of \Yilhelmshaven and Wangerland. However, this plan was not 
detailed enough owing to the fact that facilities such as roads, railway 
tracks, and electric cables differ very much depending on the type of 
installation they have to serve. Therefore the plans had to be adjusted 
and worked out in detail for the two projects considered here. In this 
respect the whole planning procedure does not fit very well into the con- 
straints for  siting a large-scale facility. From this point of view there is 
nothing exceptional about the construction plan procedures under con- 
sideration. Yet it was in the course of these procedures that a number of 
conflicts among public authorities and between citizens and public 
authorities arose. 
The construction plan proposed. for the ICI area was presented to the 
public, as well as to neighboring municipalities, early in summer 1977. 
The reaction on both sides can best be described as "planning shock". By 
this tern1 we mean that people suddenly became aware of what was going . 
to be con~t ruc ted  in front of their homes (see Hartje and Dierkes 1978). 
Particularly in Wangerland, citizens felt that  the current plans were not in 
accordance with former development and zoning plans and suspected 
they had been deliberately excluded from the information given. In their 
view, the original zoning plans which had been agreed among municipali- 
ties and publicly announced provided for a "soft transition" between 
Hooksiels' recreation zone and the Wilhelmshaven industrial a rea .  (In this 
context, "soft transition" means that  only trade and smaller, clean and 
safe industrial facilities ~vould be located. there.) While the plans to build 
an  LNC; terminal were generally known, a large petrochemical plant with 
potential hazards and harmful environmental effects was not expected. 
The Hooksiel Citizens' Group and an  action group in Wilhelmshaven were 
formed for the purposes of defeating the plans in their existing form. 
The first opportunity for a confrontation with Wilhelmshaven authori- 
ties was the public hearing of the ICI project after the announcement of 
the construction plan procedurse. The outcome of this hearing was not 
satisfactory for the interested parties concerned -with the project. Kore- 
over the rest  of the procedure was carried out in an extremely short 
time--only 4 months (usually i t  takes at least a year for comparable 
plans). The speed at  whch  the hearing was carried out and the way com- 
ments and objections were treated prorrioted a feeling of distrust among 
citizen groups and neighboring municipalities. 
As a result of this experience the opponents to the  project prepared 
themselves very carefully for the discussion on the DFTG con.struction 
plan in fall 1977. The official hearing \-:as preceded by a couple of meet- 
ings in Hooksiel. One was organized by Hooksiel Citizens' Group with Mr. 
Johannsohn, a technical expert in the field of chemical plants, from Bre- 
men. He expressed very critical opinions on the location of the LXG ter- 
minal and the petrochemical plant of ICI. In particular he stressed the  
hazards resulting from the proximity of these two installations and the 
fact that  LNG tankers and vesse1.s t5-ould essentially have to use the same 
harbor facilities. A short time later,  a t  the invitation of the municipality 
of Wangerland, DFTG gave the first public presentation of the planned LNG 
terminal in Hooksiel (JTY 15 October 197'7). In the following discussion on 
safety issues company representatives denied the existence of significant 
risks related to the LNG terminal. Some people in the audience on the 
other hand raised important concerns and demanded an  expert inquiry 
into all industrial projects a t  Jade Bay. 
The official presentation. of the DFTG project during the  construction 
plan procedure took place in Wilhelmshaven. When the  objectors from 
the  public raised the same concerns about the LNG terminal as in the  
previous meeting, this time the company's view was not only presented by 
their own representatives but supported by two experts from. the Univer- 
sity of Karlsruhe and two members of the Federal Institute for h!aterial 
Control. Moreover, the top civil servants of the City Administration also 
put the  project in a favorable light. Attendance a t  the  three meetings 
was quite good (up to two hundred people). Despite the heated debates 
the  contributions remained on an "objective" (sachlich) level as formu- 
lated in one of the newspaper reports ( P Z  7 November 1977). 
I t  is intere'sting tha t  nearly all of the arguments against the LNG ter- 
minal that  were subsequently used by objectors in the  decision process 
arose a t  this first s tep of public involvement. The main factors of concern 
were (for more details see Chapter IJ?: 
the safety of the population living in the nearest village (Hook- 
siel) and the people using the recreation area  next to  the  termi- 
nal storage and vaporization facilities 
protection of the same areas from noise and air pollution 
conservation of the natural. coastal landscape, especially in the 
areas of tourism at Hooksiel 
water quality and living conditions for the sea  fauna in the Jade 
Bay area it being a natural preservation zone and economic base 
for fishermen 
safety of shipping and aquatic sports in the Jade 
fighting efficiency of the NATO marine forces stationed in 
Wilhelrnshaven 
morphological alterations in Jade Bay tha t  would result in silt 
deposits in other parts of the harbor. 
In the period following this first public hearing the City of 
Wilhelmshaven had to elaborate the details of the construction plan which 
was to be released. After a couple of additional hearings with DFTG 
representatives and experts of the University of Karlsruhe the plans were 
approved by the city council in. early spring 1978 and made available for 
public scrutiny thereafter. Citizen groups in Wilhelmshaven and Hooksiel 
and a couple of neighboring municipalities made objections partly against 
Lhe project itself, partly against the decision procedure. For instance, 
criticism was made that public involvement occurred too late, a t  a time 
when substantial changes in the project could no longer be made 
(Wilhelmshaven 1978). All these concerns were turned down in the final 
vote of the city council in July 1978 on the grou.nds that the planning pro- 
cedure was correct,  whereas detailed technical aspects of the project, 
especially those with regard to public safety, were not related t o ' t h e  
current decision but had to be considered by the relevant 1icensi.p agen- 
cies. In contrast, for the ICI construction plan, where Wangerland, 
strongly supported by the County of Friesland, and the Hooksiel Citizen 
Group had applied to the courts, the decision concerning the LNG termi- 
nal was not challenged further. 
Wangerland's suit against the ICI  project seems to have disturbed the 
Lower Saxony and TYilhelmshaven authorities considerably. Apparent1.y 
they were anxious to settle the conflict outside the courts by a m.ixture of 
politicaI pressure and willingness to compromise. On the one hand Lower 
Saxony made it clear that the Land could reconsider the support it had 
given so far to the touristic development of Wangerland; on the other 
hand, it seemed to be prepared to follow Wangerland's requirements as 
much as possible without jeopardizing the project. Wilhelmshaven, 
although the decision being contended had been taken by the city coun- 
cil, tried to play a mediating role in t h s  conflict (Wangerland 1,II ;  HCG 
1,II). After several talks during summer 1978 an agreement between 
Wangerland and Lower Saxony was reached and laid down in a contract in 
late September 1970. The main points of this contract,  which to some 
extent also took into account concerns about the LNG terminal, were: 
The industrial zone in the north of YiTilhelmshaven may not be 
extended northwards beyond its actual limits a t  the border 
between TlTilhelmshaven and Wangerland. 
Lower Saxony would continue to promote tourism in Hooksiel. 
In particular, the Land committed itself to subsidizing a planned 
recreation center near Hooksiel.* 
A dam with a maximum height of 15 m would be buiIt and a cer- 
tain stretch of land offered in order to improve the  protection of 
Hooksiel and its recreation area against industrial emissions. 
*The costs for this  recreation center consisting of a roofed seawater swimming pool with ar- 
tgiciel weves and various communication fecilities, are estimated a t  12.5 million DL1 (approx- 
imately USS6 nillion), 80% of which will be covered by different state subsidies. This is xigni- 
ficantly more than the  usual ra te  of 50X state subsidies for econon~ic developmerit projects. 
Moreover it vies not cleer that  without this contract this perticular project would have been 
recognized a t  all :is desirable by the  responsible Land authorities. 
Lower Saxony ensured the right of citizens to acquire private 
property for construction purposes in the recreation area. 
Wangerland on the other side promised to withdralv its claim 
against the construction plans concerning the 1C1 project. 
Whether satisfactory or not this compromise apparently took the edge off 
Wangerland's and Friesland's protest against the petrochemical plant and 
the LNG terminal. While these parties raised serious concerns in the 
main licensing procedures before and after the agreement with Lower 
Saxony had been reached, they renounced to express their opposition in 
another law suit. HCG's claim about the construction plan was not 
affected by the agreement. Later the courts dismissed it because the 
citizens in Hooksiel were not recognized as being affected in th i i r  legally 
ensured rights by the outline plans of the ICI plant. 
5.7. THE PLAN DETERIJINATION PRDCEDURE 
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the plan determination procedure was 
not the only possibility for licensing the projected harbor facilities 
according to the Federal Waterways Law. Ths  licensing procedure was 
chosen in view of expected objections and in order to avoid confusion and 
time delays caused by a great number of individual permissions. This 
suggestion was made by Lower Saxony tg the FMT. 
~onsultations'between DFTG and ltIrSB about the application and the 
problems to be clarified by expert studies were intensified in May 1977 
when representatives from both parties formed a working group called 
"Nautical Safety" which existed until spring 1978 (WSB 1978, p.2). In reg- 
ular meetings the issues of these studies were coordinated between com- 
pany and public authorities. Most of them were later commissioned by 
DFTG, others like the Krappinger Gutachten by 'll'SB (see Chapter 8). The 
intention was to cover all potential points of concern and to help facilitate 
the role of the licensing agency. When DFTG's application was officially 
filed with WSB in September 1977 many of the expert reports commis- 
sioned by the company were not yet completed. Thus it was possible to 
take into account objections made in the public hearings at  
Wilhelmshaven (DFTG I). 
Because of the joint planning of the DFTG and the ICI  jetties the 
licensing agency decided to treat  them jointly too. Therefore it had to 
consider three applications at  the same time, namely for: 
the DFTG jetty (applied for by DFTG in September 1977) 
the unloading and transportation facilities on the ICI jetty 
(applied for by IC1 in January 1978) 
the ICI jetty and the joint transport bridge (applied for by Lower 
Saxony, represented by the DGIA'E, in February i978) 
In May 1978 the complete applications (including expert reports 
commissioned by the applicants) for plan determination were available 
for public scrutiny and objections could be raised. Advantage of this 
opportunity was taken by a number of individuals and organizations, e.g. 
local citizen. groups (although the latt-er are treated as individuals), 
several sports clubs, a fishermen's union and a few companies which han- 
dle facilities in the neighborhood of the LXG terminal. Public authorities 
possibly affected were involved in a similar way (apart from those who 
had to assess the application anyway with respect to their particular 
responsibilities). 
In the course of evaluating the application, \'{SB commissioned more 
expert reports. Their s tated purpose was partly to revise the expert opin- 
ions and to support the agencies' decisions independently of the appli- 
cants '  consultants, and partly to study problems which had not been con- 
sidered in the application (see Chapter 8).  Kost of the reports were deli- 
berately not finalized before the hearings in order to take into considera- 
tion all comments and objections made there. Three hearings were 
organized by the \VSB in September i978 with the different groups of 
interested parties (companies, public bodies, individuals). The experts, 
on which the authorities' decision relied, took part  in these hearings. The 
hearings again revealed great differences of opinion between objectors 
and experts on the major safety and environmental impact issues, but it 
never turned into sheer polemics, as  some of the organizers had 
suspected. By contrast the'eleven hours of discussion a t  the hearing with 
individual interveners was characterized as "always objective" (sachlich) 
and "sometimes a lesson for the audience" in the local press ( WZ 14 Sep- 
tember 1978). 
To date nothing really unusual had happened in the decision process 
concerning the LNG terminal. The main economically interested parties 
(applicant, Land, City) had come to an agreement laid down in the settle- 
ment contract, the town and country planning procedures were ter- 
minated, and the licensing procedures seemed to be well under way. 
Unexpectedly to most other parties in the decision, the approval pro- 
cedure at  the waterways and shipping authority, WSB, resulted in an 
important shift in the level of decision making in late 1978. 
Already during the summer of tha t  year WSB had informed the 
Federal Minister of Transport in Bonn, expressing that it still considered 
the safety problems related to the planned DFTG/ICI'project, and in par- 
ticular the tanker traffic with hazardous goods it would entail on the Jade, 
as very serious. Therefore the Board did not wish to have sole responsi- 
bility for the decision regarding appropriate safety measures and the 
acceptability of the population risk. Of course the FMT had known about 
the project and the plan determination right from the beginning. Yet it 
was only then that he became more actively involved in the decision and 
began to worry about the project and the possible consequences of its 
approval or refusal. 
Seemingly, the involvement of the FMT in the licensing of an indivi- 
dual project is unusual. As a matter  of fact: the FMT is mandated to 
supervise but not to grant a plan determination approval. In thls case his 
participation was legitimized by the fact that  the approval of the plan 
determination was dependent on the possibility of appropriate ship traffic 
regulations. Because such regulations would affect all users of the Jade 
shipping channel, they were not: to be issued in the course of a plan deter- 
mination procedure which as an  administrative act deals with the applica- 
tion of one particular client only. Formally the FXT was therefore n o t .  
involved in the proper plan determination procedure but in a more gen- 
eral decision problem whch  could be treated at any level of the Federal 
Waterways and Shipping Administration. 
However, in fact, this meant a shift of the decision concerning the 
acceptability of the LNG project from KSB to the FMT. since the accepta- 
bility of the  population risk related to LNG tanker traffic on the  Jade was 
considered by IYSB as a necessary pre-condition for the licensing of the 
LNG harbor facilities, a negative decision of the FMT would have entailed 
refusal of the plan determination application. A positive decision of the 
FMT with regard to appropriate ship traffic regulations and the accepta- 
bility of the remaining risk on the other side included also the acceptabil- 
ity of the population risk related to the proper harbor facilities, because 
the lat ter  was of the same nature but considered to  be significantly lower. 
Consequently, a t  least the advisory committee a t  the Ministry (see later) 
did not distinguish between the two questions. 
While concerns about the acceptability of the  populati.on risk at th.e 
W$B were apparently the main reason for the involvement of the FMT, a 
couple of other factors which could have contributed to t h s  shift in th.e 
level of deci.sion making should be taken into consideration.: one of them 
is related t o  possible time delay, the other to more general policy impli- 
cations. By the middle of the year 1978 it must have becoine clear to all 
parties that  the  deadline of 31 October 1978 to name the LNG import 
facility site to Algeria could not be met. Therefore the gas companies, as 
well as the public authorities which were interested in the  aspects of 
energy supply and the  socioeconomic benefits of the  LNG terminal, would 
have become concerned about the time delay. Moreover, Lower Saxony 
was anxious to  avoid any time delay for the  ICI project. In view of threats 
from this company to look for another site and penalties to be paid by the 
Land in case of a time delay (this was laid down in the respective settle- 
ment contract),  Lower Saxony did not want to  take any risk in this 
regard. Thus the  gas companies and ICI very likely at tempted to influ- 
ence the licensing authorities in favor of a speedy positive decision by 
stressing the importance of the project. In such a situation it is very sen- 
sible for the higher authority to  take over the responsibility for the deci- 
sion. . 
Moreover the  decision on vessels carrying LNG and hazardous chemi- 
cals on the Jade could have been considered a precedent for the enforce- 
ment of regulations on the transportation of hazardous cargoes in ship- 
ping channels. In this case the FMT was concerned about an  individual 
decision in brSB w h c h  did not sufficiently take into account the conse- 
quences of such a decision on similar ones to be made in the future. 
Whatever the  actual significance of these three reasons, the important 
facts to  s tate  here a re  that : 
WSB was not able or willing to approve the project as  a who1.e 
withn the expected period of time 
FMT's involvement in the decision corresponds to distinct exter- 
nal interests (companies, Lower Saxony, other federal minis- 
tries) t o  influence and accelerate the decision process. 
In contrast the Xater~vays and Shippin.2 Authorities were anxious to stress 
that there ivas nothing unusual in F?.<T's involvement in the approval pro- 
cess. As a consequence of regular contacts between l"B and FKT about 
every major decision the FKT would alxvays have his say in matters that 
turned out to be important. The time delay in the plan determination 
had to  be explained by the fact that a crucial Gutachten (Brotz, 1978) was 
not completed before December 1978. While this interpretation is obvi- 
ously correct  for the proper licensing procedure, in our view it dces not 
apply fo r  the overall approval of the LNG project, which mas, as described 
earlier, dependent on a decision concerning the acceptability of the 
tanker traffic. Both questions were originally to be dealt with by YtSB 
although in different departments. 
5.8. THE DECISION CONCERNING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF LNG SKIPPING 
One of the first measures of the FhlT was to establish a working group 
a t  YiSB with the purpose of intensifying the procedure and elaborating a 
decision aid for the Board (WSB 1978; p.2). Ths  working group included, 
apart from representatives of the WSB and the FMT, the DGWE, the County 
of Friesland, the City of Wilhelmshaven and four technical boards. * It had 
to complete its task (mainly the comparison of the different expert 's 
reports) within less than two months, and WSB lodged a complaint about 
the short  time span in its two-hundred page report to the Ministry (WSB 
1978: p.3). Therefore this report, which was finished a t  the end of 
October 1978, mainly reflected the views of the Board. It tried to assess 
the population risk of vessel traffic with LNG and hazardous chemical car- 
goes in the Jade without evaluating it. Nevertheless, the terms used in the 
conclusion, which stated a "significant" (nicht unerheblich) risk to life 
and limb in the residential and recreation areas of Hooksiel, suggested 
that  the risk was hardly acceptable. 
The "Advisory Committee for the Transport of Hazardous Goods", 
which is a standing committee a t  he Fh!T's disposal, was then asked by 
the minister to perform a final risk assessment based on the WSB report 
and on all other expert studies. Four of the five members of the working 
group actually concerned with this duty belonged to institutions which 
had air-eady been involved or consulted during the approval procedure 
(Germznischer Lloyd, BAM. PTB, and FKT); the fifth was the Federal 
Health Bureau. 
After ten meetings between October 1978 and January 1979 they 
came to the conclusion (Risikoabschazung 1979) that: 
(1) A number of special safety measures (most of them identical to 
those proposed by the WSB) had to be taken in order to reduce 
the risk to sl-upping from tankers carrying LNG and hazardous 
chemicals. 
*Bzxe!y the Federzl Lnstituies for Xieterie! Co:ltro! (9>.%1), end for Physics m d  Tech-lology 
(PTB), the  Federa! Sureeu for the Znvir~nmen: (U3.4), and the Society for Sucleer Power 
Utilizztion in Vessel Cons',ruction end S:?ip?lng (GKSS). 
(2) There still remained a nonoccupational risk, although very 
small, for people using the recreation area near the LNG termi- 
nal and for various water sports. The risk to'life and limb for the 
population in the nearest inhabited areas was considered to be 
negligibly small. 
(3) As a policy recommendation the experts stated that the residual 
risk was acceptable on the condition that the political and 
economic gains of the project were deemed to be sufficiently 
high by the responsible political authorities (which had literally 
"to take over the residual risk"). 
At the same time an interdepartmental committee with representa- 
tives from six or seven federal ministries dealt with the DFTG/ICI project. 
They had agreed on the risk evaluation procedure and the questions to be 
answered by the  Advisory Committee. Later on each of the ministers 
expressed an opinion on the costs and benefits of the project, as seen 
from their various responsibilities. These activities in the Federal 
Government, were, a t  ].east in general, agreed upon by the Government of 
Lower Saxony. The Federal Minister of Transport'and. Lower Saxony's Kin- 
ister of Economic Affairs and Transport had consultations in autumn 1978 
on the measures to be taken by the Federal Government. Moreover, some 
other Federal Ministries, such a s  the Ministry of Economic Affairs (energy 
department),  con.tacted their counterparts in the State Government in 
order to obtain support in their assessment of the LNG project. 
Despite all these horizontal and vertical consultations which seem- 
ingly were sought to spread responsibility the final decision on LNG ship- 
ping was taken by the Federal Minister of Transport alone. He approved 
the project in early 1979 on the condition that all safety measures and 
regulations proposed by the Advisory Committee would be realized. This 
paved the way for'the Y,TSB approval given between Xarch 1979 (transport 
bridge) and Ju.ly 1979 (DFTG jetty, ICI jetty) to all three applications. In 
the official document the decision to approve the terminal is justified by 
the  expert reports commissioned by the licensing agency (WSB 1979). 
These would prove that  no risks according to  relevant regulations existed 
for the public and the neighborhood of the jetty if all requirements (more 
than 300) imposed by the licensing agency were followed. Among these 
the injunction to change the shipping channel over a l e w t h  of 7 km in the 
proximity of the terminal plays a major role. (The same requirement is a 
condition for the approval of the ICI plant and the transport bridge 
applied for by Lower Saxony too.) It is explained by the fact tha t  it would 
reduce to a negligible limit the otherwise significant risk of a major vessel 
accident on the jett,y. As there was a causal relationship between th.e 
operation of the jetty and this risk, it would be justified to impose the 
injunction in. relation to the plan determination. This means that  DFTG, 
ICI, and Lower Saxony would have to bear the costs, which were estimated 
to be a t  least 100 million DK (about USSSO million). This would increase 
the costs of the LNG terminal by about 20% if they had to be borne by the 
DFTG alone. 
In the last phase of the licensing procedure the applying companies, 
being aware of the likelihood of this injunction, had tried to pass these 
expenses on to the public authorities. Kegotiations between state  and '  
federal authorities, including a mee t iw  between the Federal Chancellor 
and Lower Saxony's Prime Xinister, took place but  did not lead to a posi- 
tive result. Thus DFTG applied to the courts against the TZISB decision, 
arguing that  it was not justified to charge only the applicant since all 
users of the shipping channel would profit equally from the improvement, 
and that the injunction concerning the shipping channel was not suffi- 
ciently supported by the expert reports.  The case has still not been 
decided (DFTG I,]]). Another, also still pending, suit against the KSB deci- 
sion was filed by Mobil Oil on grounds of possible damages to the oil 
refinery and the related jetty operated by this company in the proximity 
of the LNG terminal. After the plan determination approval for the tran- 
sport bridge in March 1978, two Hooksiel citizens representing HCG made 
a claim to the courts for prohbiting the beginning of the  constructi.on 
until all necessary licenses were legally valid. They were dismissed on 
formal grounds and a following complaint against this decision Jvas 
refused by the responsible administrative law courts. Because after 
these failures the  chances for winning their case were deemed to be very 
low by the Hooksiel citizens, they desisted from applying against t he  
approval of the DFTG jetty (HCG I). 
5.9. PIELTHINARY LICENSE ACCORDING TO 
F'LZDl3RA.L IMMISSION CONTROL LkVI 
The licensing procedure a t  the District Government l\reser-Ems was 
initiated and terminated almost a t  the same time as  the plan determina- 
tion. In-contrast t o  the lat ter ,  normal channels were always followed, so it 
will be described only very briefly. DFTG, havinz the option to apply for 
the final construction license a t  once or  to divide the procedure into prel- 
iminary license and subsequent partial licenses, chose the lat ter ,  
although the DGWE had suggested to  them the other possibility. Ez post 
f a c t o  they were quite happy about their choice because public concerns 
were revealed to  be more important than expected (DFTG I ) .  
The application was laid open for public scrutiny between June and 
September 1978; comments and objections were considered in a public 
hearing in November 1978. The arguments of the objectors will not be 
repeated here since they were very similar to those raised in the two pre- 
. vious approval procedures (see also Chapter 4) .  Perhaps i t  is interesting 
to note tha t  in the last of the three hearings on the  szme topic the citizen 
groups opposing the project were represented by a few of their members 
only, who had become technically expert in the meantime (PYZ 27 
Xovember 1978). The experts  commissioned by the District Government 
were partly identical with WSB experts. In particular the essential study 
on health and safety risks for the population was carried out by the same 
expert (Brotz 1979). 
The document by whch  the preliminary license was pronounced in 
July 1979 contains, similar to the plan deterrninati.on approval issued by 
WSB, a long list of specific requirements on  risk reducing and mitigating 
measures, environmental impact control, emergency p1an.s .and related 
issues. Approval based on expert studies is given on the condition that all 
the requirements are met (DGKE 1979). 
The most important change from the original plan emerged as a 
voluntary commitment by DFTG as a result of negotiations between the 
Company, the licensing agency, and TI-ilhelmshaven, although i t  was even- 
tually included as a requirement in the licensing notification. Instead of 
four large tanks (130,000 m3) protected by a double steel hull, six smaller 
ones (80,000 m3) would serve to store the LNG. The outer tank would be 
in ferroconcrete, considered by all the experts to be safer than pure 
steel. Thus one important claim raised by both the h!unicipality of 
Wangerland and the Hooksiel Citizen Group had been satisfied. This 
change did not only affect risk perception but also allowed for a reduction 
in the height of the tanks--an eyesore for landscape protectors and peo- 
ple relying on tourism--from 48 to 41 meters. Although already con- 
sidered a t  the time of the public hearings, it was not definitely announced 
before spring 1979. 
When the preliminary license of the DGWE was pronounced all main 
approvals required for the terminal had been given. The construction of 
the LNG terminal could have begun in late summer 1979, but for reasons 
external to the decision system under consideration, it has not done so 
yet (end of 1981). 
5.10. POST DECISION EYENTS 
In March 1979 the contract between Sonatrach, the Algerian State 
Company, and the Dutch-German buyers' consortium was modified again. 
The amount of gas was slightly increased and the designated starting date 
for LNG delivery ckanged from late 1984 to early 1983. Although strictly 
speaking this change took place before the final decision was announced, 
it should be considered as a post decision event because it had no effect 
on the approval procedure whatsoever. 
In November 1979 Ruhrgas announced that  the construction of the 
LNG terminal would start  in the near future but nothing happened until 
spring 1980. At the Kyoto Conference on LNG (April 1980) the director of 
Sonatrach disclosed in public that Algeria wanted to change its gas export 
policy, e.g., to increase LNG prices quite dramatically (Erdiil und Kohle 
August, 1980). With respect to  the aforementioned contract, Algeria 
informed the gas companies tha t  it was a t  the moment not able to afford 
the high investment costs for the necessary liquefication facilities. It is 
therefore doubtful whether the LNG project will be realized a t  all even 
though a preliminary delivery contract with Nigeria has been signed in 
the meantime. The gas companies assert tha t  they are still interested. 
In any event there will be a major time delay until the terminal actually 
starts working (perhaps in the late 1980's). 
By contrast the construction of the ICI plant and the respective har- 
bor facilities, including the transport bridge, began immediately after the 
required licenses had been granted. Now, in fall 1981, the plant is com- 
pleted and already operating a t  its full capacity. The change in the ship- 
ping channel has not been effected so far. Unless the LNG terminal will 
be constructed despi.te all difficulties it is unlikely that  this injunction will 
ever be enforced (T'{SB 111). 

CHAPTER 6 
PARTY PERSPECTn'ES ON THE DECISION PROCESS 
6.1. PARTY PERSPECTn'ES ON THE ROLES OF KEY ACTORS 
m Trn DECISION 
This section summarizes comments made by parties involved in the  
LKG siting decision on other interested parties and the relations between 
them.+ None of the interested parties had any doubts about the capacity 
of the gas companies planniK, the LNG terminal or their subsidiary DFTG. 
Public authorities consider DFTG's behavior generally as cooperative and 
flexible. The company would have been particularly willing to accept 
safety measures and other requirements. Most of the criticism was con- 
cerned with certain aspects of the technology rather than with the role of 
the applicant in the decision. 
The companies, despite apparent tensions between them and the 
Board, do not view the Water and Shipping Board North-West as being an 
opponent. Rather they put the blame on the fact that  WSB had to act in a 
field where it had little competence (namely operations with hazardous 
chemicals). With regard to its main responsibilities the WSB's expertise is 
considered to be excellent. The FMT looks a t  WSB as having been reason- 
ably cautious and sceptical about information on safety questions coming 
from the applicant until they were confirmed by independent experts. 
The district government is of the opinion that WSB put too much weight 
on the question of safety and behaved too cautiously. Together with 
\trilhelmshaven officials, DGWE considers the WSB report to FMT from the 
content and formulation point of view as "beyond acceptable limits," i.e., 
'Neeriy ail information i n c o ~ o r a t e d  in this che?:er originetes from the inteeews between 
re?resentetives of the res~ect ive pu',ies end members of the IWSA resevch  team. Since 
there should be n o  do-~bts  es to  what statemerits come from which perty, we  do n o t  explicitly 
refer t o  these sources. 
as overstating the population risk. Objectors, on the other hand, talk 
about greater accountability of WSB compared to the other licensing 
agency, DGWE. 
Lower Saxony's (i.e., the state government's) leading role in promot- 
ing industrial development is unquestioned by all parties in  the decision 
process. It is effected by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport. 
This ministry--according to licensing agencies as well as local authorities- 
-mainly cares about economic aspects. To ensure safety or environrnen- 
tal impact control the YE&T would consider exist iw regulations and their 
implementation by the responsible authorities as being sufficient. This is 
consistent with the picture given by the ministry itself. 
The District Government of Weser-Ems is appreciated by the appli- 
cant as  being experienced, and in all respects a competent partner, who 
has clear objectives and does not hesitate in making decisions. 
Wilhelmshaven's opinion is that the DGWE limits its control to the well- 
defined standards and explicit requirements of existing regulations 
without interpreting them in the spirit of a future-oriented environmental 
policy. The WSB sees the district government, in many respects, as the 
long a r m  of Lower Saxony's government, yet without questioning there- 
fore its accountability as a licensing agency. Representatives of the 
citizen groups finally express unanimously very unfavorable opinions on 
the DGWE. They reproach i t  for supporting industry a t  the costs of the 
interests of the local population. Officials in the DGWE are,  according to 
them, not willing to take any action th.at might restrict the plans of the 
Land government. The way experts are selected to give their opinion on 
the plans, and the way the questions to be answered by these experts are 
formulated, is considered to be manipulative. The district government, in 
contrast, stresses its independence with regard to ministries in Hanover 
as well as to private companies. 
The local opposition considers the City of Wilhelmshaven, that is the 
administration and, in particular, the ruling majority of the Council (see 
Section 2.3), to be insufficiently critical about industrial development 
projects. These would only look a t  the size of the projects proposed 
without carefully scrutinizing the impact on the regional economy and liv- 
ing conditions. The Hooksiel Citizens' Group argues that Wilhelmshaven 
has lost control over the industrial development; which, once initiated, fol- 
lowed its own rationale. Under the conditions given, this would mean a 
concentration of hazardous operations that nobody had originally 
intended. The city's en~lronmental  policy is viewed by the same 
opponents as beirg essentially cosmetic in nature. Because of the lack of 
a general scheme for industrial development, and the limitation of 
environmental impact control to only a few pollutants and monitoring 
measures, it would not be able to prohibit negative effects in the future. 
The Land government and licensing agencies also have some reservations 
about this policy and interpret it as interference in their responsibilities 
and as an  expression of distrust. 
Wilhelmshaven authorities feel that Wangerland's strong reaction to 
the terminal plans (and its support by the county of Friesland) was not 
justified. Since people knew about the industrial develo?m.ent and had 
accepted the general plans for it ,  they should not be surprised. Thus the 
behavior of Wangerland's officials is considered as being "very human": 
one does not believe what is going to happen until it actually happened. 
To some extent this interpretation is supported by representatives of 
Wangerland. At the time the decision had to be taken by the council of 
Hooksiel, the lat ter  was going to be dissolved in a regional administrative 
reform. Under these circumstances and in consideration of the limited 
resources of a parochial council, one could not expect representatives to 
be fully aware of the consequences of a planned development. 
Public opposition to the projected terminal was heard by a relatively 
small number of individuals, but applicant and licensing authorities 
recognized that the arguments the citizen groups put forward were sound 
and based on a good understanding of technological problems. The appli- 
cant admitted that all critical questioils discussed in the literature were 
raised in the objections. Nevertheless the motivation of local opponents 
was considered to be mostly selfish by the authorities tha t  had to cope 
with the objections. WSB held that  their licensing procedure was 
attacked by the local opposition not because of real concerns but 
because it had failed in the previous town and country planning pro- 
cedures. Wilhelmshaven officia1.s pointed out that  the objectors did not 
present any alternative solution. Their only goal would be to avoid any 
risk related to industrial activities in Wilhelmshaven. 
A civil servant in the federal bureaucracy described the  siting deci- 
sion as primarily a "deal between Land government (Lower Saxony) and . 
industry (gas companies)." This. view of the relationships between these 
two parties was confirmed by many participants in the decision. With 
regard to the DFTG project it does not mean that the interests of the 
Land and the companies were completely in line. In contrast there had 
been long and tough negotiations about certain points, especially about 
other users of the LXC terminal (see Section 5.4), but this rather  con- 
firms the picture of a deal where the importance of the relationship was 
not questioned. Nevertheless, when the ICI petrochemical plant project 
came into the discussions, there obviously was a change in  the relation- 
ship between Lower Saxony and DFTG. WSB, for instance, had the impres- 
sion that Lower Saxony's interest in the DFTG project became very weak 
after the appearance of ICI. ICl's full support by the Land was ack- e 
nowledged by all parties. The Hooltsiel Citizen's Group felt that, from the 
beginning, this support was so strong that  it predetermined formal appro- 
val and licensing procedures, thereby undermining the democratic 
nature or legality of these procedures. 
The cooperation between Federal and Land authorities was generally 
viewed as good. WSB and the district government both describe their col- 
laboration as close and correct though their views on risk assessment and 
safety measures differed in some points. The only conflict between Lower 
Saxony and the  Federal government was related to the financing for th.e 
change in the shipping channel. Vihilst Lower Saxony argued that this had 
to be borne by the federal government since the waterway is under 
federal administration, the lat ter  stressed that the change was only 
necessary because of industrial development projects which were the 
responsibility of the State. 
The conflict between Tfilhelmshaven and Wangerland has been 
touched upon several times already. Thus v:e will not repeat the argu- 
ments described in Chapter 4 and in the previous Chapter. Representa- 
tives in \';angerland have always stressed that they were not opposed to 
industrial development in general. Even if they were, they did not see any 
chance of being successful since there was no other possibility left open 
to Wilhelmshaven. Wangerland complained about the reluctance of 
Wilhelmshaven authorities to listen to their arguments. Some people, 
also from TYilhelmshaven, thought that the way officials in Wilhelmshaven 
had treated neighboring municipalities deliberately destroyed the cli- 
mate of t rust  and cooperation that had been built up over the years. 
Finally,, we wish to summarize some remarks about the relationship 
between licensing authorities and private objectors, in particular the 
action groups. Direct confrontation between these two parti.es was 
described by the participants as  "hard but within acceptable limits." 
Many of the objectors wanted to collaborate with the authorities, a t  least 
a t  the beginning, but during the procedure they felt that their offer had 
been refused and they became disaffected. All public authorities were 
quite pleased that resistance was not stronger, despite the fact that they 
had originally not expected it a t  all. They interpreted this as compliance 
on the part  of most of th.e people living in YITilhelmshaven. The citizens' 
groups, on the other hand, think it rather demonstrates resignation, and 
manipulation by local authorities and by the local newspaper which would 
give only official views. 
6.2. PARTY EVALUATION OF DECISION OUTCOME 
The gas companies are,  of course, pleased with f i e  approval of the 
terminal site, since it was their choice. On the other hand, they have to 
cope with a number of requirements, some of them quite bothersome. 
the exception of the change in the shipping channel, DFTG considers 
the requirements eventually to be acceptable. The obligation to keep the 
overall noise level below a certain limit and the modified tank concept, 
which the company agreed upon voluntar.ily, seem to be the .most difficult 
and expensive additional measures. Yet the company views them as 
being justified in some way. "Unjustified requirements" raised by objec- 
tors had been turned down by the licensing authorities. DFTG's position 
towards the charge in the shipping channel has been described in earlier 
chapters (in particular, Section 5.8). The c0mpan.y does not think that  
the change as such is unimportant, although with regard to potential 
accidents of oil tankers it is seen as having more importance. 
The licensing agencies (WSB, DGWE) which clearly had to justify their 
own decision, considered their requirements as necessary not only in the 
public interest, but also to ensure a balanced outcome. These would 
regard both the interest of the local population from the point of view of a 
reasonably preserved environment and the interests of the applicant. In 
particular, the change in the water channel would contribute to this 
balancing of different interests bj7 excluding the risk to life and limb for 
the population. 
M'ilhelmshaven authorities still think that  the selected site is the best 
possible choice in the FRG. Despite the revelation that  it has been neces- 
sary to make additional and rather  expensive changes in Jade Bay, no 
other harbor would offer similar conditions for the transportation of 
hazardous cargoes. 
lran.gerland is not satisfied with the outcome of the decision but feels 
tha t  a law suit would not have been successful. The compromise actually 
agreed upon had a t  least contributed t o  some important improvements 
compared to the original plans. The future existence of the recreation 
zone with its touristic installations granted by Lower Saxony and addi- 
tional protection and safety measures would reduce the negative impact 
of the terminal on Wangerland. Taking into account the existing power 
s t ruc ture ,  Wangerland did not expect to achieve much more,  though nei- 
ther  the question of safety nor that  of local economic development had 
been solved in a completely satisfactory way. The benefits of industrial 
development were estimated as rather  unimportant beccuse the jobs 
created are too specialized for the workers living in Wangerland and 
because the municipality would not profit from tax revenues. The only 
positive effect could be expected from people employed a t  the terminal 
who settled in Wangerland. 
The Hooksiel Citizens' Group shares most of Yfangerland's views on 
the outcome of the decision. It considers all improvements to have 
resulted from the joint efforts of the citizen group, the local council, and 
the county of Friesland. In any event, they consider themselves the 
losers. If they could decide on their strategy once again, they would 
organize more public resistance and have less tru.st in the  willingness of 
licensing authorities and officials in \'iilhelmshaven and Lower Saxony to 
cooperate with representatives of the local population. 
6.3. PARTY EXALUATION OF DECISION PROCEDURES IN G E N m  
The most striking aspect of parties views on the decision process is 
the high degree of satisfaction about existing regulations and procedures. 
All public authorities are pleased with their current  state: the pro- 
cedures work and they see no reason to argue about their legitimacy. 
The system of responsibilities, though quite intricate, has  evolved histori- 
cally and is familiar to everyone. 'Thus under the condition of appropriate 
coordination it would not cause any problems. Industry's needs and 
interests were met  by a close cooperation between public agencies and 
companies. Informal talks before the beginning of the formal procedures 
prevented unjustified time delays and economic losses. Those directly 
affected by a project had standing a t  the licensing procedures. In sum, 
the conditions for a fair balance of the different interests were as sood as 
possible. If somebod.y felt a t  a disadvantage he could apply to the courts. 
This view is shared al.most completely by industry people. They think that 
the cost and some minor disadvantages related to the licensing pro- 
cedures are outweighed by the advantage of clear decision. 
Some general complaints which related to the general 
political-economic situation were made by civil servants in Land and 
federal ministries. One was that sudden unexpected changes in economic 
circumstances made it very difficult to carry through the licensing pro- 
cedures for large-scale projects in a straightforward manner. In the case 
of the LNG terminal th.ere was, for instance, a strong time pressure for 
the provision of a certain license, later it turned out that the realization 
of the project was not very likely a t  all. The other point of concern is the 
effect of international competition on environmental protection regula- 
tions. If these were too strict or too strictly enforced, private companies 
threatened to remove their activities to other countries. 
The attitudes towards public participation were ambivalent. On the 
other hand, most parties, including public authorities, considered a 
comprehensive public debate with regard to policy decisions of all kinds 
as necessary and useful. On the other hand public authorities and com- 
panies unanimously complained about certain types of objectors who 
were politically motivated and made use of any arguments they could find 
in order to defeat a project. The possibility of participating in licensing 
procedures should be confined to people whose private rights are directly 
affected. Unfortunately this could. not be ensured if participation was 
reduced below the current level--a level which should therefore be main- 
tained. Under no circumstances should public participation be further 
enlarged, which would mean a substantial contribution in the decision 
process. Decisions had to be made exclusively by political representa- 
tives 1egitimi.zed through public elections. 
All difficulties encountered in the decision process were considered 
.to be caused by special circumstances, external events, personal biases 
and mistakes, etc.,  but  never by failure of the decision procedures as 
such. Therefore proposals to change these procedures remained very 
modest. A Wilhelmshaven official suggested that the active involvement of 
the municipality be formally built into the decision process. Representa- 
tives of other public agencies felt that the courts som.etimes acted too 
clumsily and went into too much technical details. 
Interestingly enough, the speakers of the local population did not 
differ that much from public authorities and priva1;e companies in their 
evaluation of the decision. They also considered regulations and pro- 
cedures in the FRG to be very good, if only they could be enforced 
correctly. In the decision process on the LNG terminal the law had been 
disregarded in many respects. Xeighboring-municipalities should have 
been included in. the decision to modify the zoning plans. When Wanger- 
land applied on this ground the courts had taken a political decision in 
favor of TZrilhelmshaven. Public participation had only been formally 
effected without giving people a fair chance to scrutinize the plans and 
without listening to their argument;. The infornlation on the project was 
strongly biased and thus geared to manipulate people's opinions. Xobody 
really listened to the concerns and propositions of the objectors. Licens- 
ing agencies did not care about a comprehensive objective risk assess- 
ment but instead selected experts and the topics of their studies in a way 
which justified approval in th.e easiest way. They blamed Lower Saxony's 
early commitment in favor of the ICI project as the main source for all 
these deficiencies. This decision had. predetermined the whole approval 
and licensing process in a most unfavorable way. 
CHAPTER 7 
AI4kLYSIS OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF TI33 LI4G SITIIZG DECISIOK 
7.1. SPECIAL FEATURF;S AND N0TE;t';ORTHY EnrEI4TS IN THE DECISIO1.J 
The main features and events of the LNG siting decision have been 
described a t  some length in Chapters 2 and 5 of this report. In this sec- 
tion we will summarize some specific aspects of the decision process . 
which have to be considered as 'unusual or a t  least noteworthy compared 
to similar industrial facility siting decisions. Possible explanations and ' 
the impact of these conditions and events are briefly discussed. 
With regard to the focus of this study the following points seem to be 
most relevant. 
The preparatory phase of the approval procedures, which 
stretched over more than 5 years from the first involvement of 
public authorities until the formal application, was exceptionally 
long compared to a typical industrial siting decision. 
The planning process, public discussions and formal procedures 
concerning the LXG terminal were significantly affected by the  
close connection between this project and ICI's proposed petro- 
chemical plant. 
An important part of the approval procedures, in particular the  
construction planning, had to take place under considerable 
time pressure. 
ViSB's refusal to take the sole responsibility for a decision about 
the acceptability of LNG tanker traffic led to the unusual, 
though legally correct, involvement of a federal ministry in the 
approval process concerning a specific project. 
The plan determination procedure for the LNG facilities 
exceeded previous experiences a t  the WSE in the scope of the 
questions a t  stake, the number of experts involved, and the type 
of requirements connected with the final approval (in particular, 
the injunction to change the shipping channel). 
The DFGTACI project provoked serious tensions eventually lead- 
irq to open conflict between local authorities, particularly 
between the municipalities V,Tilhelmshaven and Wangerland. 
Public opposition to the proposed project was limited to a rela- 
tively small set  of people. It came from a coalition of environ- 
mentalist groups in 'M'ilhelmshaven and an unusual citizens 
group intending to be a kind of representative community body 
for the village of Hooksiel. 
Despite the fact that the main licenses for the LNG terminal 
were granted by summer 1979, the construction has not begun 
so far. b 
Owing to the informal character  of talks among industry, local 
authorities, and the Land agency in charge of industrial development, 
there is no rule for their duration; the same applies to the preparatory 
phase of approval procedures. With regard to the LXG terminal, several 
factors contributed to the  relatively long duration of the preparatory 
phase: Lower Saxony's requirement that the corporation in charge of 
operating the LNG facilities be open to smaller gas companies was a seri- 
ous point of contention in the negotiations with Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg 
leading repeatedly to a time delay of t.he settlement contract (ME&T 111). 
Furthermore, the negotiations between gas companies and. Sonatrach in 
Algeria were very tough with regard to price conditions.* A.nother impor- 
tant reason for t h s  delay was the lack of experience on the part  of public 
authorities in the FRG with LNG facilities of this scope. Thus, numerous 
doubts about the acceptability of the LNG technology with respect to 
safety and environmental impact questions had to be dealt with during 
the preparatory phase. Nevertheless, the most important of these ques- 
tions were not settled before the initiation of the formal approval pro- 
cedures. 
Some of the consequences on th.e decision procedures resulting from 
ICI's plan to construct a petrochemical plant in the proximity of the LNG 
terminal site have been mentioned earlier (see Chapter 5). One of the 
immediate consequences--apart from the necessary revisions of the har- 
bor facilities for the LSG terminal--was that Lower Saxony took a more 
active role since it becam.e one of the applicants itself. Some citizens of 
IYilhelmshaven, as well as  the neighboring municipalities', became 
alarmed by the new plans, although they had known about the LNG termi- 
nal before t h s  time. The regulatory authorities, in particular YiSJ3, had 
then to cope with a more complex technical situation, although the 
licensing agencies hold tha t  the main questions about the LNG terminal 
wo.uld have arisen even without its affiliation with the ICI project. In sum, 
most of the parties were influenced in their concerns and positions by the 
*A  pre-coairect signed in 1974 wi:s never excc:ited heceuse of di.Ife~ences on the t  point. 
appearance of ICI. 
One, perhaps the most important, impact, of the ICI project on the 
LNG terminal decision was the increased momentum resulting from the 
imposed time pressure. ICI, which was fully supported by Lower Saxony, 
was pushing for an early decision. Consequently, a number of decisions, 
such as the construction plan approval for IC1, were taken in a precipitous 
way entailing legal difficulties* and provoking conflicts a t  the local level. 
Towards the middle of 1978, the gas companies apparently also became 
worried about delays in the approval procedures, since they had to meet  
a deadline for notifying Algeria about the site of the LNG import terminal. 
There is a good deal of evidence, however, that their concerns did not 
strongly influence the timing of the decisions. Eventually, the deadline 
was postponed for three months, yet the licensing procedures were not 
terminated a t  the time the notification was made (December i978). 
Nonetheless, time pressure was felt in the construction plan and plan 
determination procedures whether exerted by an applicant interrnedi- 
ated by Lower Saxony, or  self-imposed by those who had to carry them 
out (WSB i978; p.3; FMT I). I t  is likely that the LNG terminal decision 
would have been more d.ifficult or at least delayed without the driving 
force exerted by the IC1 project. 
This leads us to  a key event in the approval process, the reluctance 
of the WSB to decide upon the safety of LNG shipping and the related shift 
in the decision making level. With respect to the main theme of this case 
study, the most interesting question concerns the contribution of the risk 
dimension to WSB's attitude, that  is, to what extent it can be explained by 
the type of technical information WSB had to deal with and by the manner 
in which this information was perceived and interpreted. Since this ques- 
tion will be elaborated in the following chapter, here we will try to put the 
risk considerations into perspective by taking into account all possible 
influencing factors: 
As the agency does not employ professionals in the field of 
hazardous chemicals, WSB officials had to rely to a large extent 
on experts from outside. 
Difficulties resulting from this situation must have been aggra- 
vated by the tim.e pressure explained above. 
There are indications that the "human factor" played a certain 
role. Representatives of other interested parties mentioned 
several times in. reference to WSB the influence a single person 
could have on the behavior of an agency. If such an influence 
existed, it was in the direction of risk avoidance. 
The WSB would have an  interest in involving the FMT in a deci- 
sion where the possibility for a catastrophic accident was 
involved in order to spread the responsibility for this decision. 
In addition, the WSB might have needed support for. several 
measures it was going to require from the applicants that  were 
unusually far reachlng and expensive. 
*This procedure hed to  'ce repetited twice due to concerns raised abou: i ts  lege! correctness 
(\\'i!he!;r,sh aven Iii). 
Quite likely all of these factors contributed to the decision or, better,  
"non-decision" a t  KSB concerning the LNG project as a whole. Once the 
Board had taken this position the question of LNG shipping and the 
related population risk was actually critical for the approval of the termi- 
nal. The involvement of the Fl!?T indicates that  the application was on the 
verge of being refused. Therefore the last part  of the decision process, 
taking place at the level of the federal government, was really the one 
where the question of acceptability was settled. 
Local opposition to the proposed project was shaped to a large 
extent by the specific sociogeographical situation of the terminal site. 
Those haklng to bear the main part of the safety and environmental costs 
were inhabitants not of Wilhelmshaven but of the neighboring municipal- 
ity of IYangerland. On the other hand only the host municipality of 
Wilhelmshaven expected to benefit from the project. Owing to these 
opposed interests tensions between local authorities were likely to occur. 
Given the long preparatory phase and the fact that the area  to the north 
of Wilhelmshaven had already been designated to industrial development 
projects the form and intensity of the actual conflict was surprising. 
Therefore there must be some further reasons to account for this 
development. h<isinformation and different expectations about the 
planned use of the industrial area on Wangerland's side played a certain 
role; the urgency of the ICI project apparently also contributed to  shar- 
pen the situation. Finally, the personality of Wilhelmshaven's head of 
administration, who was referred to as "positively scintillating" and s0m.e- 
times a little rude, was blamed for the worsened atm.osphere between 
Wilhelmshaven and other local authorities (Wilhelmshaven VI; DFTG 11; 
Wangerland 11). The resulting opposition from Wangerland and the Fries- 
land County possibly would have complicated the approval of the project 
if t h e  case had been treated at  the courts. Because of the actual 
compromise laid down in a contract between Lower Saxony and Wanger- 
land, it had no impact on the final decision except for the special protec- 
tion and mitigating measures fixed by this contract. 
The most interesting aspects of the public opposition to  the proposed 
LNG terminal were the organizational s tructure of the Hooksiel Citizens' 
Group and the fact that it did not embrace more of the local population 
or political and environmental groups organized a t  a national or regional 
level. While for the further aspect we refer to Section 4.10, a few factors 
for the latter will be mentioned here: the local citizen groups opposing 
the project. did not make a serious at tempt to enlarge their case to 
regional or national issues. Moreover, the nuclear power debate in the 
FRG reached its climax just at  the time when the LNG terminal decision 
was at  stake. Thus more forces of the ecological movement were already 
bound. The sociological situation in the \'~ilhelmshaven area was not 
favorable for citizen activities either. Given that this area belongs to a 
depressed region and that industrial development was already planned 
before the LNG terminal came into discussion, a large pa r t  of the local 
population accepted the project as unavoidable. There is some evidence 
that the gas companies and Lower Saxony took t h s  specifi.~ situation into 
account as a factor in favor of the site at  V;ilhelmshaven. 
To look a t  the effort and money* the applicant put into the promo- 
tion of the planned LKG terminal until it was definitely approved, it is 
astonishing to see the project postponed for years. Obviously Algeria's 
unwillingness to fulfill the delivery contract agreed upon in 1977 was the 
main factor  for DFTG's construction moratorium. For increasing the sunk 
costs wold worsen the gas companies' position in further negotiations 
about a purchasing contract (Ruhrgas 11). However, the companies might 
have looked harder for another source of LNG if the overall growth rate in 
energy and gas consumption had not declined against all expectations 
during the last few years. Yoreover, Ruhrgas has just reached another 
agreement 1v-i th the Soviet Union for extending pipeline delivery consicler- 
ably until the end of the decad.e (Neue Ziircher Zeitung./-WZ 22/23 
Kovember 1981). Nonetheless, the projected LNG terminal might already 
have brought some benefits to the gas companies: the sole possibility of 
new sources of delivery should have strengthened their position in nego- 
tiations with the traditional delivery countries. From an energy policy 
perspective the realization of the LEG project would be still desirable 
because it contributed to reducing the strong dependence on a few 
export countries. As a matter  of fact, there has been a heated political 
debate upon this last point i+lthin the FRG and a t  the international level in 
relation to the aforementioned purchasing contract between Ruhrgas and 
the Soviet Union. If the opposition to this project eventually prevailed the 
LNG terminal a t  Wilhelmshaven would be a realistic alternative option and 
thus very actual again. 
7.2. EVALUATION OF THE DECISION STRUCTURE 
The first decision of importance, after the two German companies, 
Ruhrgas and Gelsenberg, had agreed to promote an  LRG terminal, was the 
selection of an  appropriate site. I t  was essentially taken by industry, 
public authorities mainly providing information about the properties of 
the different sites. However, an important influencing factor for the com- 
panie s' choice was former public policy decisions, namely regional 
development plans and the physical infrastructure already created. a t  
Wilhelrnshaven. It was then necessary for the companies to interest th.e 
state and municipality authorities holding jurisdiction over the preferred 
terminal locations for the project in order to get  their compliance. 'I'he 
ensuing negotiations and internal deliberations of these t h e e  actors set- 
tled the question of desirability from the different parties' perspectives, 
as well as the concrete conditions for the realization of the proposed pro- 
ject. While the public authorities tried to get concessions c o n c e r n i ~  the 
technical concept or the business structure of the LNG terminal from th.e 
companies, the latter were anxious to get appropriate support and make 
use of public subsidies if possible. By referring to alternative locations 
for the facilities in other countries, they were able to keep the authorities 
requirements below certain limits. This distribution of roles not only 
reflects the economic interests and power of companies and public 
authorities, but in the FRG it  also corresponds to the domir,ating view on 
*As a very ro-ugh es:ime?e of these costs 3PGhes te!khg ebout sever4  :c:xs of rri!!ion DJI 
( a - o l ~ d  30 rd l ion Dhi) which KO-dd -::e lost if the 7roject iziled (DFTG I!). 
desirable forms of cooperation between private industry and state agen- 
cies, saying that  state interventions should be limited to the creation of 
framework conditions. 
The public, the people directly affected, and the regulatory agencies 
in charge of ensuring the public welfare, in particular population safety 
and environmental protection, were only marginally involved a t  this stage 
of the decisions process. NThile the public was only represented by 
Wilhelmshaven and Lower Saxony, the regulatory agencies could directly 
express their (preliminary) views on the acceptability of the project in 
consultations with applicant and authorities. However, these views were 
neither based on a very thorough analysis nor binding on any of the  par- 
ties. Thus the main actors of this phase incorporated the information 
about requirements and conditions likely to be imposed by other public 
authorities as a sort of framing conditions to their decision in principle on 
the LNG project. This means the consideration of the respective dimen- 
sions did not necessarily evolve from intrinsic concerns of the parties 
' taking this decision. 
By contrast during the formal approval procedures all possibly 
affected parties were informed and had some say concerning the decision 
a t  stake. The main decision power was then with the regulatory authori- 
ties, in particular the agencies in charge of carrying out the licensing 
procedures. These procedures, which are regulated by laws and inter- 
preted by the current jurisdiction of administrative courts, allow only for 
considering a restricted set  of questions. Important pre- decisions, such 
as the site, could not be questioned, although this phase was the first 
time that side-effects and impacts of the project were treated carefully 
by the regulatory authorities. 
To assess the influence of these authorities on the decision an impor- 
tant difference concerning the  character of the formal procedures 
between town and country planning and the proper l icensix  procedures 
has to be recalled. Since the municipality is free to release or draw back 
a certain zoning or construction plan without further justification, the 
respective decision is open to political arguments and to pressure 
exerted by different interested parties on the city council. A negative 
decision would have required very strong reasons though, because 
Wilhelmshaven had already made commitments in the se ttlement con- 
tract. The licensing procedures are considerably more restrictive. 
Refusal of an application has to be justified by the licensing agencies with 
serious concerns concerning the  construction or operation of the pro- 
posed facilities (see Section 5.2). Apart from a limited margin inhersent in 
every decision, the outcome of the procedure is therefore determined by 
general policy decisions in the past,  and is not open to political or other 
considerations related only to the  specilCic application. It depends on the 
type of project, namely on how establish.ed and well-understood a technol- 
ogy and its impacts is, and whether this margin in the approval decision is 
large or narrow. Given the lack of experience in the FRG and. the differ- 
ences in the scientific literature it seems to have been rather on the 
large side in the case of I-he LNG terminal. 
From a political perspective the main problem related to this: deci- 
sion structure concerns the question of democratic control and participa- 
tion. Citizens objecting to the project as well as opposing local authori- 
ties complained about their involvement in the decision being too late. 
They considered their chances to influence the decision substantially as 
very small owing to the precommitment of the most important actors 
(see Chapter 6). Clearly the described structure for a siting procedure is 
not consistent with a strongly participatory societal model. Respective 
requirements are not unique though, but rather an  aspect of the continu- 
ous struggle about the democratic norms of the political system intrinsic 
to all our societies. 
The second question Lo be asked in this context is whether such a sit- 
ing procedure is able to ensure an optimal decision in a more material 
sense, namely whether it is suitable to reduce the physical and economic 
costs and risks as  much as possible. Since the answer to this question is 
very complex and depends on a ' lot  of detailed information, we can only 
illuminate a few aspects. The crucial point from a procedural perspective 
seems to be the entanglement of the preparatory and the  formal approval 
phase of the decision process. If it was not possible for the predominant 
actors of the preparatory phase to anticipate the  later requirements of 
regulatory agencies and the main points of concern in the public debate, 
serious difficulties could arise. Refusal or even requirements for major 
changes of the project might entail high financial costs or losses. The 
licensing agencies, on the other hand, could be quite embarrassed to take 
such a decision, so tha t  in cases of doubt they might be tempted to grant 
approval in spite of certain concerns about the acceptability of the pro- 
ject. It has to be mentioned, thou.gh, that  German administrators are 
usually relatively insensitive to the economic consequences of their deci- 
sions. 
Some of these problems apparently played a role in the LNG terminal 
decision. Alth.ough the applicant knew that the population risk related to 
shipping was considered a serious problem by public authorities, i t  had 
not completely foreseen the  difficulties a t  the MTSB and was surprised by 
the injunction to  change the  shipping channel. Most of the difficulties 
could be overcome by the involvement of the federal government. As dis- 
, 
cussed in Sections 5.7, and 7.1, this certainly means deviation from stan- 
dard siting procedures, indicating that the licensing procedures were not 
completely appropri.ate to deal with the LNG terminal decision. A possible 
explanation for t h s  deficiency of the formal licensing procedures, if this 
assumiption is right, would be that  they defined the decision problem too 
narrowly. Looking a t  shlppirg safety alone might not be sufficient to 
judge the acceptability of the LXG project. The involvement of federal 
ministries, though it did not change the administrative character of the 
appro-val decision, allowed for  a broader set of dimlensions to be taken 
into account. Kevertheless, it should not be overlooked that  only the 
experts concerned in the FMT advisory committee paved the way for the 
final approval of the LNG project. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
CHAPTER e 
SAFEI"I' QUESTIOI< S I'II TD THE R O I J  OF EISI; ANALYS!S 
8.1. THE 1Ji:PORTMLTCE OF THE RISK ISSUE 
Safety questions were an  important aspect of the siting and approval 
decision about the LNG terminal a t  Wilhelmshaven. They were considered 
a t  all stages of the decision process but under changing assumptions and 
constraints and a t  different depth. In this chapter we will focus on the 
influence of considerations about population risk, including technical 
expertise, on the LNG decision. Beginning with an overview on the general 
importance of the risk dimensions we will concentrate on the use of 
expert studies, and conclude the chapter with an evaluation of the risk 
assessment procedure from different perspectives. 
Industrial siting decisions usually give rise to various concerns about 
safety and environmental effects. While industry considered the latter to  
be of minor importance in the case of the LNG terminal, it was well aware 
of the importance of the safety question. According to the companies 
promoting the project, this fact has been realized from the beginning, 
and population density was a major factor in the preliminary site choice 
(see Section 5.3). 
As discussed in Section '7.2, population risk was not the predominant 
issue during the phase of negotiations among industry, Land, and local 
authorities. Nevertheless, it played an  important role because the accep- 
tability of the risks was a necessary condition for the desirability of the 
project. In particular, the city of Viilhelmshaven needed confirmation on 
this point since its constituency would be directly affected by the hazards 
of the proposed project. 
Consequently, the safety question was discussed by industry and the 
public authorities a t  some length. Khen the regulatory agencies whose 
jurisdiction was affected by the project were asked to give their views on 
the feasibility of the LNG project the acceptability of the population risk 
was one of the crucial points to be clarified. After a preliminary delibera- 
tion the responsible authorities deemed the safety problems related to 
the LNG terminal to be resolvable, with the reservation, however, that  
more detailed considerations during the licensing procedures would not 
reveal unexpected difficulties. Thus the main weight of the risk assess- 
ment process shf ted  to the later formal procedures. 
A t  the beginning of the  approval phase the public debate evolved 
around issues of town and country planning in the Kilhelmshaven area,  
mainly the consistency of the submitted plans with the original zoning. 
Very soon health and safety, and environmental impact aspects were also 
raised by those going to oppose the proposed project. Owing to the geo- 
graphical and sociopolitical situation in the proximity of the terminal 
site, the coincidence, sometimes also entanglement, of concerns about 
economic impact, environmental effects and population risk related to 
the project was almost unavoidable. Therefore, it would be very difficult 
to assess to what extent arguments concerning public safety risk 
corresponded to  real concerns of the  different parties or whether they 
were only used for strategic reasons. Research on individual risk percep- 
tions suggests that such a n  attempt is even inappropriate, since people 
usually do not base their judgments about the acceptability of a technol- 
ogy on a narrow-consideration of the risk dimension (Otway and von Win- 
terfeldt 1982). Although in general the  local population seems to have 
been more concerned about environmental effects emerging from the ICI 
plant, there is no doubt that  people also worried seriously about possible 
accidents. Additional safety measures were not by chance a n  intrinsic ' 
part  of the attempts to pacify the local opposition. 
During the formal licensing procedures the regulatory authorities 
had the legal mandate to scrutinize the plans, among others, with respect 
to the acceptability of the population risk. In the plan determining pro- 
cedure this question was the dominant issue, but it also played a role for 
the licensing of the land-based facilities. Public concerns raised by inter- 
veners had a limited impact on the questions considered by the  licensing 
agencies or by outside experts. However, as the latter stressed, the pro- 
cedures would not have occurred much differently without th.ese inter- 
ventions. 
The last part of the decision process, where the Waterways and Ship- 
ping Administration dealt with LSG shipping regulations, was exclusively 
devoted to the question of health and safety. As stated in the previous 
chapter,  this point was critical for the L S G  project as a whole. Thus one 
could. say that the risk dimension was of increasing importance during 
the decision process. To some extent this has to be attributed to the 
decision structure, precisely the time at which the different aspects of 
the d-ecision were considered. As more and more of the other questions 
had been settled, risk was the remaining one to be treated. However, the 
public authorit-ies' perception of public safety risks related to LNG tran- 
sport and handling also seems to have changed during the decision pro- 
cess. At least they had underestimated the difficulties to resolve the 
open problems. The influence of technical information and expert views 
on t h s  development will be considered in the following section. 
1 
8.2. EXPERT STUDIES DEALING T,TTB POPULILTIOI.~ RISK 
The companies promoting the project familiarized themselves, of 
course, with the  main safety problems related to  the  LXG technology 
before they performed their internal selection process. Likewise the  
responsible regulatory authorities when asked to give their preliminary 
views on the project, began to collect information from comparable 
authorities in other countries, official technical boards, and the  company 
experts. However, no comprehensive risk analysis was done specifically 
for \\'ilhelmshaven during the proper site selection and preparatory phase 
of the approval process. Expert studies concerning the risk to  the popula- 
tion were only introduced later in the legally required formal procedures. 
These studies, or Gutachten, usually carried out by certified experts were 
commissioned by three  groups of actors,  namely the applicant, inter- 
veners, and the  licensing agencies (DGWE, WSB). DFTG's main purpose 
was to support its applications for the two main licenses by independent 
expertise. Interveners used a couple of reports to put forward their 
objections to the  proposed project. The set  of expert studies commis- 
sioned by the licensing agencies was directly related to the final approval 
and therefore played the  most important role in the decision process. 
Most of the studies did not address the problem of population risk as 
such, but  more piecemeal issues like technical safety, safety of shipping. 
or prevention and mitigating measures against fire and explosions, deal- 
ing with risk to  life and limb only implicitly. The focus on safety instead 
of risk has to  be seen in the background of the relevant legislation in the 
FRG, according to  which public authorities are  responsible for protecting 
the citizen against "harmful environmental effects and other  dangers, 
considerable detriments, and considerable disturbances" (Federal Immis- 
sion Control Law, para.  5), whereas the notion of risk is not used. Table 
8.1 gives an  overview of all expert studies dealing with population risk, 
which is supposed to be self-explanatory. 
8.2.1. Expert Studies Commissioned by the  Applicant 
The first expert studies related to  population risk were commis- 
sioned by DFTG. Together with several reports on other questions they 
were submitted to the  licensing agencies a s  supplements to  the applica- 
tion for both main licenses ( a  few months after the application itself had 
been filed). The stated task of these reports was to prove that  the plans 
submitted as application were consistent with relevant technical regula- 
tions and standards and that the proposed safety measures were 
appropriate and sufficient. None of them was strictly required but in the 
consultation tha t  preceded and followed the formal applications the  
licensing agencies made suggestions about topics that should be covered 
by expert reports.  In particular, studies were done by the following insti- 
tutions and experts: * 
'Since we did not have direct access t o  the expert reports (So. 1 to 5) c ~ ~ r r i s s i o n e d  by the 
applicant, all information a'bout tne f i r s t  three studies hed to  be d r a m  from other sources 
(DPTG 1 ~ 7 8 ;  1vs9 1978; BASI 1979; wsa 1979, I IGY~E 1979). 
Table 8.1. Expert Studies Dealing with Public Safety Risk 
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F!raunhofer Association (ICT).* As indicated in the title of the study, 
ICT looks a t  the ignition properties of mixtures of natural gas and 
air. One of the  findings is that detonation of such mixtures cannot 
occur. Conceivable LSG spills and other gas releases are described 
and used to calculate potential blast effects on the neighborhood of 
the LNG terminal. According to ICT blast risks for the population as 
well as for adjacent industrial installations can be excluded (KSB, 
1978). 
(2,3)EngLer- B u n t e  I n s t i t u t e  a t  t h c  i?niversi ty  of KarLsruhe (EBI).  This 
study consists of two. parts,  one for the land-based facilities, the 
other for the jetty. The EBI considered conceivable accidents result- 
ing in fire or explosions, the consequences of such accidents, and 
how appropriate the "safety concept" of the proposed terminal was 
to cope with these hazards (DFTG 1978). The study comes to the con- 
clusion that  the safety of workers and of t_he population is assured. 
Even a "catastrophic accident" would not cause any detriment out- 
side the LNG terminal (WSB 1978). 
( 4 , 5 ) ~ .  BGttcher / H. Rother** These two certified experts based their 
expert opinion on the EBI study. They scrutinized the plans of the 
proposed LKG facility in order to check whether the accidents con- 
sidered by EBI could be faced with the fire safeguard measures 
assigned in the application plans. According to Bottcher/Rother this 
is ensured and technical precaution against fire a re  in general suffi- 
cient (DFTG 1978). 
(6) The Germanischer  Lloyd (GL) has a semi-official s tatus as recognized 
experts of the  Federal Government on the safety of shipping and 
marine technology. The company was asked by DFTG to give its view 
on t.he safety of LNG-tankers. In its report GI, s tates  that  all LNG 
tankers have t o  meet  the very strong requirements of the IMCO code 
which provides for their safety (Germanischer Lloyd, 1978). 
On request of the licensing agencies certain supplements were added 
to  these expert studies during the approval procedure. These considered, 
for instance, further types of potential hazards, or  took into account 
more precise information about the project. None of these supplements 
seems to have caused an  important change in the conclusions of the  origi- 
nal reports. In sum all the expert studies commissioned by DFTG 
asserted that  the safety measures described in the application were suffi- 
cient and that any dangers to  the neighborhood from the L S G  terminal, 
including the petrochemical plant proposed by ICI, could be excluded. 
This way of presenting the  results of the studies does not make use of the 
notion of risk. As far as can be said from second-hand information about 
the  studies, quantified measures or a comparable concept of risk did not 
play a role for deriving these results either. Apparently the decision on 
*Ins:!;ut Y&- ((:heinie der Treib- und Exp!oslvstofr'e der Frau~~\ofer-Gese!!schd: (ICI'), Pfinztd. 
**Di?I.-k~g. Rudolf %t:c::?er, 31;l.-ing. Horst Rother, "Ueber~fZung des brzr1dschu:z:ec:h- 
nischen Te3s des eingerelchtcn Antrags," Diisseldorf, Februzry 1378 and "2rendsch;l:z fiir 
die E r r i c h t l ~ ~ g  2nd 9etrie5 des seeseitigen Ela~teSes eines L S G T e r ~ ~ a l s  in Kii:?e!msieve:nV, 
D';lsse!dor:, A;r2 1978. 
what accidents to consider as conceivable and what likelihood to a s ~ i g n  to 
their occurrence was based on some sort of best engineerir.g judgment. 
Calculations were used but only for determining the consequences of such 
accidents. 
8.2.2. Excert Studies Commissioned by Intervsnors in the 
Licensing ProceGures 
The expert reports done for the applicant were laid open to public 
view and sent out to directly affected organizations and companies 
together with the plans for the LKG terminal. A number of the objections 
to the application reacted to or referred to  these reports. Xobil Oil AG, 
the German branch of the international company which operates an oil 
refinery in the vicinity of the proposed terminal also commissioned an  
expert to scrutinize the plans. This study was carried out by a U S  consul- 
tancy flrm. 
(7) Energy Analysts. As stated in the introduction to its report  Energy 
Analysts intended to give a survey of analytical methods currently 
used by the LNG industry to quantify potential hazards of proposed 
LNG facilities (Energy Analysts 1970). The cited literature is 
exclusively from the US.  Based on dates on Wilhelmshaven given in 
the EBI report and on assunlptions about LXG vapor cloud dispersion 
and ignition that were deemed to be conservative, Energy Analysts 
calculated,that a major LNG spill a t  the jetty (25,000m3) would have 
serious consequences in the vicinity of the terminal (including the 
Mobil Oil refinery and the recreation area). Its main point of criti- 
cism was that  the probability for such a spill had not been assessed 
by the applicant and that  the data basis was not sufficient to carry 
out an assessment. Thus Energy Analysts suggested a careful 
analysis of potential collisions a t  the jetty and a deliberation on suit- 
able safety measures. 
(8) G. Johannsohn. Xr. Johannsohn is an expert on hazardous chemicals 
who used to work for public authorities before invited by the Hook- 
siel Citizen Group to comment on the proposed terminal.* In his 
report,  which is ra ther  an  outline and collection of material from the 
literature than a n  independent study, Johannsohn mainly refers to 
research for the U S  Coast Guard (Johannsohn undated). He discusses 
a model to estimate the potential hazards of LXG and ammonia spills 
onto water without applying it to the specific conditions of the 
Wilhelmshaven site. 
Neither of the two last expert studies can be considered as an 
independent risk assessment of the LXG terminal. They both commented 
on the way such an assessment should be done without themselves under- 
taking for t h s  task. Under these circurnstances, statements about th.e 
actual risks of the LNG terminal in Xilhelmshaven could not be expected 
and th.e results had the form of recornmendations on the approval pro- 
cedure. 
€3.2.3. Expert Studies COT-nissiarizr?_ bj7 Lizznsirg hzzncies 
These studies were requested for tv.-o purposes: one, to advise the 
licensing agencies in their decision, and, t~vo,  to justify these decisions 
against potential claims from those directly affected. By justification we 
mean in this context scientifically b ~ s e d  evidence furnished by indepen- 
dent experts showing that the project meets all relevant reguktions, and, 
in particular, that  it does not impose any dangers on the public and the 
neighborhood of the facilities. Studies commissioned by public authori- 
ties from outside experts are usually v;el! defined and limited to a pal-tic- 
ular set of questions. They mainly deal with these points where the 
responsible authority, after having studied and structured the problem, 
feel insufficiently experienced or not legitimate to give a decisive ans.ia:er. 
The balance between these two purposes, advice and justification, is 
changing from case to case. While, for instance, Professor Brotz's study 
(see later) seems to have only marginally influenced the authorities' 
internal decision-making process, Professor Krappinger's report had 
apparently a significant impact on the posit.ion of the Y;SB (DGWE 11; lfSB 
1978). 
(9) 0. h'rappinger. In their deliberations with the applicant WSB* had 
come to the conclusion that ship collisi.oi~s and grounding of LNG 
tankers could result in disastrous accidents. Therefore an estima- 
tion of the expected frequency of such events was deemed to be 
necessary. Professor Kraappinger, the head of a shipping. construc- 
tion research institute,** was asked to perform this study since the 
WSB had already cooperated with him on a computer simulator of 
, shipping operations in the Jade. He established a mathematical 
model based on the historical record of vessel accidents in the Jade 
and on the aforementioned shipping simulators to calculate expected 
probabilities of different types of accidents involving LSG. tankers. 
By combining these results with estimated ra tes  for a rupture of one 
of the LNG tanks in the event of an  accident, the calculated probabil- 
ities of the order of per year, for a major spill, d.epending on the 
type of accident. The higher probabilities concerned accidents of 
LNG tankers on their way to the jetty, whereas the results for 
accidents a t  the jetty were considerably lower (Krappinger 1978a,b). 
This last step in the analysis provoked a lot of criticism because the 
rupture probabilit.ies were deemed to be unjustifiably high, and the 
estimated spill rates had to be lowered in the final version of the 
study report (Krappinger i 978c). 
(10,i1)D.D. Karlsch ./H.D. Sp9hn. i  These two certified experts dealt -with 
very similar issues as the Botcher/Rother study, namely to scrutin- 
ize whether appropriate fire protection measures were p ro~ lded  for 
in the terminal pl.ans. It is interestir-g to note t.hat this \%-as the on.ly 
report commissioned not directly by one of the licensing agencies 
but by Wilhelmshaven, which acted in this case as as agent of the 
*htensive deliberations on nautical problerr-s w e n t  on 'between T93 2nd '.he a??:icat  POT- 
hlzy 1977  XI:^ Spring 1978 i r ~  Lqe v:orking g r 0 . q  "nz7J:icel sefety" (Y53 1978). 
**3iirr.bilrgisc:le S c : ~ i f f s S z - ~ v e r r ~ c h s z n s - . ~  Gx-29
t 3l;i.-Ing. 3. Kzrlscb, Koin, 3i?l.-!ng. 9.3. S3053,  SI3nster, GJ:ech:e.? z-J Frzgen des Vo:-?t:>- 
gexder~ Elrand-a~~d Xe:zeLro3:?en-Sci-~:zes, h l y  ~ 7 d  Y o v e ~ ~ S e r  .197H. 
DGWE. 
(12,13) W. Brotz .  Brijtz's study (1978, 1979) !$-as commissioned in the sum- 
mer of 1978 by DGTiE and TEB a t  approximately the time when the 
first version of the Krappinger report had been submitted. Profes- 
sor  Brotz, an expert frequently -.corking for public authorities, had 
to scrutinize the applications for both licensing procedures wit11 
respect to the technical safety (Sicherheitstechnik) of the propcsed 
project. The I'SB specified this task by requesting the  investigation 
of three major types of potential accidents and of the so-called dom- 
ino effect, i .e. ,  the  interaction between L S G  facilities, industrial 
plants in the proximity of the LNG terminal, and vessels in case of an  
accident; moreover, it was requested that  external failure sources 
like aircraft crashes be considered. With respect to the land-based 
facilities, Professor Brotz was to assess the likelihood and potential 
consequences of the maximum credible accidents and to give his 
opinion on the  safety of the revised conception for the storage 
tanks. * 
Important parts of his two reports deal with numerous technical dev- 
ices, design requirements, and operational prescriptions to prevent 
failures and confine accidents. After this traditional engineering 
approach, deemed by Professor Brotz to ensure sufficiently the safety of 
the terminal, he considers, following the wishes of the  licensing agencies, 
the potential danger to  public and neighborhood relating t o  the 
aforementioned accidents {Brotz 1978, pp.180-183). By partly using his 
own models, partly methods developed in connection with nuclear safety 
regulations, the calculates the physical consequences of these accidents. 
While dangers for the population, particularly at t he  recreation zone near 
Hooksiel, cannot be completely excluded by these calculations, Professor ' 
Brotz considers them in view of the very low probability of these 
accidents to  be small enough to fulfill the requirements of law.** 
(14) Technical Inspect ion .Association. The report of the Technical Inspec- 
tion Association (Tl'n' 1979) is a standard expertise in comparable 
procedures since the  Association would I.ater be prominently involved 
in operation licensing. It scrutinizes the  application with respect  to 
consistency with numerous safety regulations for technical details, 
the  focus lying on operational safety. The study requires or suggests 
several ra ther  minor technical changes, but in  general considers the 
LNG terminal plans to fulfill the  legal requirements. 
(15) Federal Board for ;latericzl Control. Tne study commissioned by KSB 
from the Federal Institute of >,:aterial Control, as the official expert 
board in t h s  field, was quite similar in type t o  the precious ones. It 
probably would not have been necessary in a less delicate decision. 
Its purpose was to review the application and safety measures pro- 
posed by other experts to  determ.ine whether they reflected the 
s t a t e  of the ar t ,  t o  judge whether the safety requirements of the plan 
*Tnh conce?iion ?ro<des for ~n outer tzn!< rLede of reixforced coxcrete ins.:esd or' steel. 
**Some qxantitative ;ro5a':?ity e s t i r e t e s  ere ?al<en fro= other studles (Kre;;inger, 'I'CV), 
the likelihood of other events is essessed h qua!i:e:iue ;errs. For more details see \:end! 
and Lathrog ( I  981). 
determination were sufficient, and to comment  on the YSB report  t o  
the  FYT discussed in the follo~ving. The first tvro questions \-:ere 
affirmed by the BAY with a fev: additional suggestions 2nd KSB's con- 
ce rns  about population risks viere considered t o  be unjustified (BAY 
1 979). 
In a s tandard approval process regarding a large industrial facility, 
the expert  studies described so far, together with those deali-ng with 
purely environmental issues ~\?hich were not considered here ,  would be 
sufficient t o  prepare  and support the final decision of the licensing 
authorities. In fact,  the preliminary license was terminated a t  this s tage.  
Although the  number  of studies related t o  the  LNG terminal v.-as quite 
high, none of them significantly exceeded the usual frame I\-ith respect  t o  
scope or methodology. Only Professor Krappinger's analysis deviated by 
its quantitative approach from the  other  reports,  but  this can  be  
explained with the  specific kind of question be considered. 
As described earlier,  t he  situation was complicated and difficult with 
respect  t o  t he  plan determination procedure. Therefore, another  round 
of risk assessments  were t o  be performed before t he  final approval. 
8.3. FINAL !SSESSKENT OF TI-IE POPULATIOT4 RISK RELATED TO LliG 
TllhTIXRS 
* 
By summer  1978, it was clear t o  the T'iSB from Professor 
Krappinger's study tha t  vessel accidents involving L X G  tankers  (and those 
transporting hazardous chemicals t o  and from the ICI jetty), identified a s  
the largest potential source of population risk, had to be expected along 
the  shipping channel as well as the jetty with a cer tain probability. The 
consequences of such  accidents,  in respect of their scope and likelihood, 
had not been assessed in a way tha t  satisfied the IYSB. Moreover, shipping 
regulations and other  safety measures  appropriate t o  reducing the  
related population risk were unusually far-reaching and expensive. \Then 
the FXT was informed about t h s  situation it decided to  consider the open 
questions. 
In order  to  g e t  a concise picture of the problems and t h e  different 
perspectives on them the FMT suggested establishing a working group a t  
TTSB formed by representatives of important parties in the licensing pro- 
cess,  and  of four technical boards (see Section 5.7). Based on discussions 
within this group JYSB produced in October 1973 a report  t o  the FYT 
which, owing t o  t ime pressure,  reflected mainly the vie~vs of the Board 
(VSB 1978, p.4).  In this report  the agency explained why the information 
collected on the question of population risk by the date  of the report  was 
not considered t o  be sufficient and reassuring enough to  approve th.e pro- 
posed terminal: 
By the  expert studies numerous problems which a r e  still being 
investigated a t  th.e international level were introduced. The stu- 
dies deviate therefore partly even in fundamental questions sub- 
stantially from each other .  Regarding the question of how t.o 
evaluate the risks there  was disagreement, for instance, also 
among the experts of the working group. The expert studies 
revealed partly also to be incomplete in as much as  essential 
and for this case decisive questions, which are knovrn from the 
international literature, were no considered a t  all. (WSB 1978, 
p.5) 
Nevertheless, after proposing and deliberating various risk-reducing 
measures, IVSB tried to evaluate the residual risk of LNG tanker traffic by 
reviewitq and comparing the different expert studies. Despite the fact 
that the probabllitp of a major accident was deemed to be very low, KSB 
came to the conclusion that the population risk remained considerable 
because of the serious consequences of such an accident (VSB 1978; 
pp.185-189). Since later the expert; studies criticized in his report were 
used to justify the approval of the terminal facilities, it has to be men- 
tioned that the final version of the Brotz study was only submitted after 
the completion of the WSB report. 
The FKT handed this report together with all the expert studies over 
to the Ad~lsory Committee for the Transportation of Hazardous Goods, a 
permanent board of experts a t  the Kinistry. The committee formed a 
sub-group which prepared in ten meetings a final risk assessment. Four 
of the five members of thls group belonged to institutions that  had 
already been involved in the decision process, namely Germanischer 
Lloyd, BAM, PTB, and FKT, the  fifth to the Federal Health Bureau. 
If{hether intended or not, this cornposition played an essential role in 
establishing some consensus between experts who had not agreed so far 
on crucial points. 
The report states that probability estimates would be desirable to 
assess the acceptability of the risk if they could be based on statistical 
data. Otherwise a quantification of the residual risk would involve too 
much uncertainty to be of any help to decision makers 
(Risikoabschatzung 1979; p.8). Therefore the risk assessment of the Com- 
mittee was confined to qualitative statements. After deliberation on 
several major hazards, the Committee concluded that there was a resi- 
dual risk related to shipping with LXG and other hazardous chemicals, 
smaller by is probability but larger by the potential consequences than 
comparable risks already accepted. This residual risk would be accept- 
able if public authorities took the responsibility for it taking into account 
political and economic benefits of the proposed project 
(Risikoabschazung 1979; p.:2). This view was adopted by the FXT and 
paved the way for the plan determination approval including its injunc- 
tions and requirements for the applicant. 
8.4. SUMMARY REX'IARICS ON THX USE AI4D IL?PACT OF TECI-IITICAL 
ANALYSIS 
Technical analysis and expert studies dealing with risk to life and 
limb were broadly used in the decision process about the LNG terminal a t  
Wilhelmshaven. All of them were performed and introduced in the con- 
text of the formal approval procedures, while the proper site selection 
decision was taken without a comprehensive risk analysis accessible to 
mo,re than one of the interested parties.* The type and shape ~f these 
studies was in many respects relaied to their use in connection vrith the 
licensing procedures. Usually of a narrow scope, the studies treated 
well-defined problems and questions snd came up with clear ansJq:ers. 
Their authors were of course selected with respect lo their professional 
qualifications, but past cooperation, reputation, and official or semi- 
official status also had some influence on the choice. 
In most cases the presentation of the results was oriented ton-arc% 
the general mandate of the regulatory authorities to exclude dangers for 
public and neighborhood or more specifically to ensure consistency 11-ith 
particular safety regulations. &!any of the Gutachten concluded with the 
statement that subject to certain additional measures the proposed fscil- 
ities were safe. To some extent this context also explains why quantita- 
tive measures were hardly used to assess the population risk: the admin- 
istrative, semijudicial framework of the licensing procedures is not very 
appropriate for dealing with the probability statements, but rather 
expects definite answers. Therefore, the main risk assessment studies 
took a less formalized approach which tried to 'combine basically qualita- 
tive estimates on conceivable accidents with quantitative calculations of 
their physical consequences. The acceptability of the  risks v a s  esta- 
blished by showing that serious damages had not to be expected for max- 
imum credible accidents. Other studies of minor importance follorved a 
conventional engineering approach which is mainly based on past experi- 
ence with similar technologies and generally recognized technical stan- 
dards. The only author using frequentis tic data and probabilistic 
methods was not supposed to perform a comprehensive risk anzlysis but 
to deliver a particular piece of information for the evaluation of the popu- 
lation risk. 
This leads to the purposes the expert studies had to fulfill, which 
were essentially two: advice and justification. In general the purpose of 
justification dominated over the purpose of advising the commissioners of 
the risk studies. The tim.ing of important studies illustrates this point. 
For example, the Brotz Gutachten were completed only briefly before the 
announcements of the two main licenses but after the objections raised 
during the respective procedures had been dealt with in public hearings. 
Therefore, i t  would be surprising i.f the findings of the  different expert 
reports had influenced the decision making process considerably. For 
particular aspects such a s  the probability of vessel accidents with poten- 
tially serious consequences, it appears, though, that there was a signifi- 
cant impact on the main parties' views and positions. l~oreover., a large 
part. of the numerous proposals regard.ing the improvement of technical 
details, additional safety measures and devices, or even more important 
construction and design features put forward and debated in the expert 
reports were taken into account in the plans actually approved, the modi- 
fied concept for the storage tanks being the most prominent example of 
this sort. 
*Vie do not k3ow whet kind of enelysis the com?anies used in:erne:!y, hut for t h e  poliricel 
process :his is irrelevent. 
The main burden of the risk assessment and evaluation process 
remained thus with the regulatory agencies. They had to concer;tuelize 
the problem and to formulate the questions they wanted to have 
answered by outside experts.  Given the intricate nature of the safety 
problems related to the LSG terminal, the officials responsible for the 
licensing procedures performed their task very vell. HOT\-ever, contrsdic- 
tory expert  views on certain points seem to have caused diFficulties that  
could not be resolved within the respective agencies. Eventually they 
were overcome \$-hen the FKT ssked dissenting experts to reconsider the 
conten.ded questions in a workicg group, thereby forcing them to agree 
upon j ~ i n t  conclusions. 
While the procedure chosen by the FSCT was quite effective in dealing 
with disagreement among experts consulted by the licensing agencies, 
this situation should not be mixed up with an adversarial process where 
the differing expert views correspond to  different party interests.  
Counter-expertise was not impossible, but was by no means encouraged 
within the  licensing procedures. When the plans were laid open for public 
scrutiny interveners had only two months or even one month to  raise 
their concerns. They would have to bear alone the costs of any study they 
wanted to commission. Xoreover, as mentioned above, the most impor- 
tant  expert  studies were not even completed a t  the time when objections 
were to be made.  The only way to challenge these expert studies would 
have been to  apply to  the courts against the approval decision. The 
experts mmrnissioned by the licensing agericies, like the agencies them- 
selves, did not play the role of party to the decision but ra ther  of a final 
authority. This follows from the timing of their studies and is underlined 
by the fact tha t  the studies were not submitted t.o any proper review pro- 
cess except  for the overall evaluation performed by the Advisory Commit- 
tee of the  FMT. Consequently, the authors of the-Gut- achten did not try 
to  convince the public, the intervenors, or other critics of the proposed 
project. Since their main duty was to support and legitimate the appro- 
val decision there was no incentive to present the results of the studies in 
a n  easily understandable format. 
Finally, we turn to  the question of how typical the risk evaluation 
process was. The last stage of this process together with the relatively 
high number of studies commissioned on issues related to health and 
safety indicates that the risks of the LNG terminal were perceived as very 
serious by public authorities. Yet, authorities and applicant repeatedly 
stressed that  they refused any association of the L 3 G  risks with those of 
nuclear power, and in the authors' view they are right. On the other side 
it is quite obvious that  the concerns about safety exceeded what one 
would have expected in a standard approval process concerning the siting 
of a large-scale industrial facility. Whle the DCik" viewed the licensing 
procedure for the land-based facilities as not too unusual, the 1Yater~-ays 
and Shipping Authorities considered their approval procedure as  unpre- 
cedented with respect to the scope and de?th of the risk assessment pro- 
cess. Whether it really becomes a model for other decisions is not clear,  
although a similar procedure is currently used by the 'iYSB to evaluate the 
planned LNG terminal a t  Eemsllaven close to  the Dutch-German border. 
In any case, the experiences gained in connection with the 1,SC; terminal 
a t  V~ilhelmshaven are sure to have some impact on future regulntions 
concerning the transportation of hazardous 1iqu.ids and gases. 
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